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Preamble 
Every dissertation is influenced by the perspective and life experience of its 
author. My perspective is one of a Belgian and American citizen, trained in a business 
school and teaching finance in another business school, after having worked in the 
financial service sector, mainly on corporate governance, from the mid-1990s to the 
mid-2000s.  
I spend my time researching, educating (as a teacher and as a parent), reading, 
and engaging in my local community. My research interests started with questions 
about why financial markets seem impervious to critique, and evolved to focus on 
inquiries concerning finance and society. This includes questions on value, beliefs, 
and paradoxes.  
In some ways my interest in this area can be traced back to much earlier in my 
life. When I was growing up in a family of 6, my father used to say "strive for 
excellence”. My mother added “perfection does not exist on this side of resurrection” 
and “it’s not important to be first”. She told us “we trust you” and my father added 
“we’re proud of you whatever you do”. This forged my ideas of what is just and what 
is possible – just about anything, when dialogue takes place. It is the continuous 
process of becoming better that counts. As an educator, I see how the becoming of 
people and things is important, focusing on the development of a potential rather than 
considering things and people as a final product. And I see education as a means to 
change the belief of what is just and what is possible, as a way to construct a new 
imaginary. It is this process of becoming that fascinates me, even more than the 
outcome which is never quite reached.  
My PhD process was marked by moments of great enthusiasm as I discovered 
theories which reintroduced the concepts of beliefs, values, compromises and change. 
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As I wondered what made me so enthusiastic about studying my topic, I realized that I 
found sense in studying the becoming of things. This dissertation therefore has a 
recurrent theme of change and stability, as I analyze the process of responsible 
investment mainstreaming at different levels and through different lenses. 
After the 2008 financial crisis, it was striking to see how fast things came back 
to business as usual. As a teaching assistant in the finance department of ICHEC 
Brussels Management School, I organize every year a trip to London for our master 
students to discover “finance in the City”. We visit big banks, meet their HRM and 
fund managers, tour their trading floors. On one of these trips, the students met a 
former Lehman Brothers employee and asked him what the fall of Lehman changed 
for him, in his life as a banker. His reply was: “after only a few weeks, our whole 
team had been hired by competing banks in London, which goes to prove that we 
were the best.” This anecdote of back to business as usual is just one illustration of 
how financial markets seem to be impervious to radical change and to critique, a 
puzzle pointed out by several authors (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Dardot and 
Laval, 2013). So this thesis is about studying change and stability in finance, with the 
case of responsible investment. 
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Abstract 
The mainstreaming of responsible investment (RI) is an aspirational notion 
introduced by practitioners to promote the inclusion of ESG (environmental, social 
and governance) criteria in institutional investor’s decision process. This 
mainstreaming, though undefined so far, is characterized by new actors in RI and new 
tools, which should lead to an increase in RI assets under management. But 
mainstreaming brings along new challenges for RI in terms of legitimacy and 
practices. The belief that business and market-based strategies will bring positive 
social and ecological change is far from natural, and results in tensions. Reconciling 
such different logics as maximizing shareholder return and aligning investors with 
broader objectives for society, provokes a transformation of RI, leading to paradoxes.  
To overcome the difficulties associated with RI’s mainstreaming, researchers 
increased their attempts to demonstrate the value of RI for institutional investors. To 
do so, most literature on RI, and on the value of sustainability in general, adopts a 
neoclassical approach focusing on financial return, with inconclusive results. This 
thesis set out to explore the challenges of RI mainstreaming in terms of beliefs, 
tensions and paradoxes. By adopting a new theoretical perspective this thesis seeks to 
develop a nuanced, critical understanding of RI mainstreaming. Specifically, it seeks 
to answer four questions: (1) “What are the collective beliefs for responsible 
investment and how have they evolved over time?” (2) “What are the disputes and 
resolutions around responsible investment’s mainstreaming?” (3) “What tensions are 
embedded in RI mainstreaming and through which arrangements are they coped 
with?”, and (4) “What are the ESG factors most relevant for a company’s market risk, 
depending on its sector?” 
The first study focuses on the content of collective beliefs (Orléan, 2006) 
through five periods of RI. The data revealed the existence of RI’s “civil rights” years 
(1982-1991), “green niche” years (1992-1997), “professionalization” years (1998-
2000), “SRI” years (2001-2004) and “ESG” years (2005-ongoing). This study 
followed the evolution of multiple collective beliefs over time to identify two distinct 
categories of collective beliefs – justifying RI and practicing RI—that characterize 
how mainstream actors collectively make sense of RI. 
The second study goes further into “justifying RI”, and contributes to research 
on processes of legitimacy using convention theory (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006) to 
understand ESG challenges. A discourse analysis of UK press shows that RI focuses 
on appealing to conventional finance with a market logic, resulting in very few 
challenges of the legitimacy of the existing institutional order. Indeed, by referring to 
the dominant worlds of worth, RI validates them and strengthens the existing 
compromise. 
The third and fourth study deal with “practicing RI”. They complete the 
investigation with an empirical, data driven and investor-oriented approach. Study 
three provides evidence of the variety of tensions present in the process of RI 
mainstreaming and of the coping mechanisms used to deal with the tensions in 
practice, namely framing, shifting, transcending and defending the arrangement. We 
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see that while tensions are inherent in organizational systems, they are constructed as 
paradoxes by the actors involved with them. A duality of “contradictory, yet 
interrelated elements” (Smith & Lewis, 2011) is not a paradox if it is not 
acknowledged and treated as such by those subject to it. The fourth study analyses the 
link between sustainability and risk, measured by downside deviation. The results 
show that ESG metrics matter for market risk, particularly when measured by semi-
deviation, but without any predictive power on the magnitude of future risk's 
reduction. The most relevant factors to reduce a company’s market volatility vary 
from one industry to another.  
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Samenvatting 
 
De mainstreaming van Duurzaam Beleggen is een ambitieus begrip ingevoerd 
door professionals om het bijvoegen van ESG-criteria (milieu-, maatschappelijke en 
bestuur criteria) te promoten in het besluitvormingsproces van institutionele 
beleggers. Hoewel deze mainstreaming tot nu toe ongedefinieerd is, wordt hij 
gekenmerkt door nieuwe actoren en nieuwe werktuigen in Duurzaam Beleggen, wat 
tot een groei van het beheerd vermogen zou moeten leiden. Maar de mainstreaming 
brengt ook voor Duurzaam Beleggen nieuwe uitdagingen mee qua legitimiteit en 
gebruik. Het geloof dat business- en marktgerichte strategieën een positieve sociale en 
ecologische verandering zullen teweegbrengen, is ver van vanzelfsprekend en leidt tot 
spanningen. Het verzoenen van zo uiteenlopende logica’s, zoals het maximaliseren 
van de aandeelhouderswaarde aan de ene kant, en beleggers rijp maken voor bredere 
maatschappelijke doelstellingen aan de andere, leidt tot een transformatie van 
Duurzaam Beleggen, en dit brengt een aantal paradoxen met zich mee.  
Om de met de mainstreaming van Duurzaam Beleggen gepaarde 
moeilijkheden te boven te komen, probeerden onderzoekers de waarde van Duurzaam 
Beleggen voor institutionele beleggers steeds grondiger aan te tonen. Het gros van de 
vakliteratuur over Duurzaam Beleggen, alsook over de waarde van duurzaamheid in 
het algemeen, hanteert een neoklassieke aanpak die op het financiële rendement 
focust en die aanpak leidt niet tot overtuigende resultaten. De doelstelling van dit 
proefschrift is het bestuderen van de uitdagingen die verbonden zijn aan Duurzaam 
Beleggen in termen van geloof, spanningen en paradoxen. Via een nieuw theoretisch 
perspectief wordt er getracht genuanceerd en kritisch inzicht aan te brengen in de 
mainstreaming van Duurzaam Beleggen. En er wordt dan ook in het bijzonder 
gefocust op vier vragen: (1) Wat zijn de collectieve geloven over Duurzaam Beleggen 
en hoe hebben ze zich mettertijd ontwikkeld? (2) Wat zijn de onenigheden en de 
overeenkomsten over de mainstreaming van Duurzaam Beleggen? (3) Welke 
spanningsvelden zijn te  vinden binnen de mainstreaming van Duurzaam Beleggen en 
aan de hand van welke strategieën worden ze aangepakt? (4) Wat zijn de meest 
relevante ESG-factoren voor het marktrisico van een bedrijf, afhangend van de 
businesssector?  
Het eerste onderzoek is vooral gericht  op de inhoud van de collectieve 
geloven (Orléan, 2006) en dit over vijf periodes van Duurzaam Beleggen. Kwamen 
uit de data tevoorschijn: de ‘civil rights’-jaren (1982-1991), de ‘green niche’-jaren 
(1992-1997), de ‘professionalization’-jaren (1998-2000), de ‘SRI’-jaren (2001-2004) 
en de ‘ESG’-jaren’ (2005- tot op heden). Deze studie bestudeert de evolutie van 
veelvoudige collectieve geloven na verloop van tijd, en daaruit kunnen we twee aparte 
categorieën  identificeren, namelijk, Duurzaam Beleggen bewijzen en Duurzaam 
Beleggen in de praktijk brengen.  Die categorieën bekenmerken de manier waarop 
mainstream actoren gezamenlijk verstandig gebruik maken van Duurzaam Beleggen.   
De tweede studie gaat dieper in op ‘het bewijzen van Duurzaam Beleggen’, en 
draagt bij tot onderzoek over legitimiteitsprocessen door gebruik te maken van de 
‘convention theory’ (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006) om ESG-uitdagingen te begrijpen. 
Een redevoering analyse van de Britse pers toont aan dat Duurzaam Beleggen niet 
werkelijk verschilt van de traditionele Finance met een marktlogica, zodat de 
legitimiteit van de bestaande institutionele orde heel weinig uitgedaagd wordt. 
Inderdaad, door te verwijzen naar de dominante werelden van waarde, bevestigt 
Duurzaam Beleggen die en versterkt dan ook het bestaande compromis.  
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 De derde en vierde studies focussen op het “uitoefenen van Duurzaam 
Beleggen”. Zo wordt het onderzoek afgewerkt met een empirische, data gedreven en 
investeerdersgerichte aanpak. De derde studie bewijst het bestaan van allerlei 
spanningen in het mainsteamingsproces van Duurzaam Beleggen, en van de 
mechanismen die gebruikt worden om met deze spanningen, in de praktijk, om te gaan. 
We weten natuurlijk dat spanningen inherent zijn aan organisaties en systemen,  maar 
we kunnen toch vaststellen dat die, door de betrokken actoren, beschouwd en 
behandeld worden als paradoxen. Een dualiteit van “tegenstrijdige maar toch met elkaar 
verbonden elementen” (Smith & Lewis, 2011) is geen paradox zolang die niet  erkend en 
behandeld wordt  door diegenen die daarmee te maken krijgen. De vierde studie 
analyseert het verband tussen duurzaamheid en risico, gemeten door een negatieve 
standaardafwijking. De resultaten tonen dat ESG-metrieken van belang zijn voor het 
marktrisico, in het bijzonder wanneer dit door semi-afwijking  wordt gemeten, maar 
zonder voorspellende kracht over de omvang van toekomstige risicovermindering. De 
meeste relevante factoren om de marktvolatiliteit van een bedrijf te verminderen, 
variëren van de ene industrie naar de andere.  
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Résumé 
L’intégration de l’investissement socialement responsable (ISR) est une 
aspiration des praticiens de la finance qui vise à inclure des dimensions 
environnementales, sociétales et de bonne gouvernance (ESG) dans les critères de 
décision des investisseurs institutionnels. Si cette notion d’intégration de l’ISR est 
actuellement en manque de définition, elle se caractérise par l’arrivée de nouveaux 
acteurs et de nouveaux outils, qui devraient mener à une augmentation des actifs ISR 
sous gestion. Mais cette tendance ne se concrétise que peu, et l’intégration de l’ISR 
amène de nouveaux défis en termes de légitimité et de pratiques. En effet, la croyance 
que des stratégies de gestion ancrées dans une logique financière mèneront 
naturellement à des améliorations sociétales et environnementales est loin d’être 
évidente, et provoque des tensions. Les tentatives pour concilier des objectifs aussi 
différents que la maximisation du rendement actionnarial et l’alignement des intérêts 
des actionnaires avec les enjeux de société mènent à une transformation de l’ISR, et 
exacerbe sa nature paradoxale.  
Pour pallier les défis de l’intégration de l’ISR, de nombreux chercheurs ont 
tenté de démontrer la valeur de l’ISR pour l’investisseur institutionnel. Dans cette 
optique, la littérature académique sur l’ISR et sur la soutenabilité en général tend à 
adopter une approche néo-classique qui se focalise sur le rendement financier, avec 
des résultats mitigés. Cette thèse vise l’exploration des défis de l’intégration de l’ISR 
en termes de croyances, de tensions et de paradoxes. En suggérant un nouveau cadre 
théorique pour cette problématique, notre objectif est d’apporter une compréhension 
plus nuancée et critique de l’intégration de l’ISR. Ceci se fera à travers quatre 
questions de recherche : (1) Quelles sont les croyances collectives pour l’ISR et 
comment ont-elles évolué dans le temps ? (2) Quels sont les épreuves et les 
arrangements dans l’intégration de l’ISR ? (3) Quelles sont les tensions au cœur de 
l’intégration de l’ISR et comment sont-elles gérées ? Et (4) Quels sont les facteurs 
ESG qui impactent le risque de marché d’un investissement, selon son secteur ? 
La première étude explore le contenu des conventions collectives (Orléan, 
2006) à travers les cinq périodes de l’ISR que sont les années « droits civils » (1982-
1991), les années « niche verte » (1992-1997), les années de « professionnalisation » 
(1998-2000), les années « ISR » (2001-2004) et les années « ESG » (2005-en cours). 
Cette étude suit l’évolution des multiples conventions collectives à travers le temps 
pour en identifier deux sortes – justification de l’ISR et pratique de l’ISR – qui 
caractérisent la manière dont les acteurs financiers donnent sens à l’ISR.   
Un pas plus loin, la seconde étude analyse la question de la « justification de 
l’ISR », contribuant ainsi à la recherche sur les processus de légitimation, sur base de 
la théorie des conventions (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006). Une analyse du discours 
dans la presse anglo-saxonne met en lumière la logique de marché utilisée pour 
justifier l’intégration de l’ISR, avec très peu de mise à l’épreuve de l’équilibre 
institutionnel en place. En effet, en se référant aux cités dominantes, l’ISR valide et 
consolide le compromis existant.  
Les troisième et quatrième études plongent dans la « pratique de l’ISR ». Elles 
complètent la recherche avec une dimension empirique orientée vers l’investisseur, 
grâce à une approche ethnographique. Les tensions liées à l’intégration de l’ISR sont 
identifiées, ainsi que la gestion de ces tensions, illustrant comment les tensions 
inhérentes à un système organisationnel peuvent être considérées comme paradoxales 
par les acteurs. Des dualités d’éléments contradictoires et inter-reliés (Smith & Lewis, 
2011) ne deviennent en effet des paradoxes que si elles sont reconnues et traitées 
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comme tels par les acteurs avec des allers-retours constants d’une dimension de la 
dualité à l’autre. La quatrième étude, enfin, analyse le lien entre la soutenabilité et le 
risque de marché, mesuré par le demi écart-type du rendement. Les résultats 
permettent d’identifier les indicateurs ESG qui influencent ce risque de perte, malgré 
l’absence de pouvoir prédictif concernant l’amplitude de la réduction de perte. Ces 
indicateurs ESG sont spécifiques à chaque industrie. 
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Part 1 
1 Introduction 
I once attended a workshop on sustainability where the guest speaker, whom I 
had specifically come to hear, concluded that “responsible investment is ridiculous, 
and makes no sense”. This kind of reaction towards responsible investment (RI) is not 
uncommon. It illustrates the conflicting logics and objectives that characterize RI as it 
is defined and practiced today. RI is particularly full of paradoxes since it has begun a 
mainstreaming process. These are hard to reconcile, and can lead to tensions. So we 
could simply dismiss responsible investment as a flawed concept -- as the quote 
suggests. But then aren’t all organizations flawed by nature because they are 
paradoxical? Or, as I chose to do, we can instead study RI to better understand this 
phenomenon, and investigate what we can learn from the challenging process of RI 
mainstreaming. 
The mainstreaming of responsible investment is an aspirational notion 
introduced by practitioners to promote the inclusion of ESG (environmental, social 
and governance) criteria in institutional investor’s decision process. This 
mainstreaming, though undefined so far, is characterized by new actors in RI and new 
tools, which should lead to an increase in RI assets under management. But 
mainstreaming brings along new challenges for RI in terms of legitimacy and 
practices. The belief that business and market-based strategies will bring positive 
social and ecological change is far from natural, and results in tensions. This 
preconception is similar to the idea that with RI you can “do well by doing good”. 
Reconciling such different logics as maximizing shareholder return and aligning 
investors with broader objectives for society, provokes a transformation of RI, leading 
to paradoxes.  
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RI mainstreaming is, of course, a compelling object to study if we are 
interested in alternatives to conventional finance. There are many frustrations with 
conventional financial markets, which seem to have lost contact with business and 
society. By including environmental, social and governance criteria in investment 
decisions, by adopting a long term focus, and by taking stakeholders into account, RI 
may offer an alternative to some of finance’s shortcomings. But RI mainstreaming is 
also an opportunity to study the becoming of things. Indeed, change is omnipresent in 
RI, with external invasions from multiple influences, translations through time and 
space, or collective agreements evolving and overlapping through time.  
Over the past 40 years, RI has evolved through different periods, from being a 
faith-based investment, which excluded stocks based on religious values, to what is 
now called ESG integration, which institutional investors practice by adapting their 
financial tools to include environmental, social and governance criteria. The case of 
responsible investment is interesting because it offers a complex and fragmented 
institutional environment to study change and stability. With the different RI periods, 
we can study different equilibriums and the processes that lead from one to the other.  
In addition, RI mainstreaming is an opportunity to study value, and 
particularly whether the coexistence of multiple forms of value is possible. ESG 
mainstreaming addresses the ambivalence of turning unique qualities into one single-
minded (economic) metric of worth, which makes it an interesting case for anyone 
experiencing the audit society we live in.  
The next sections will further introduce the research. Section 1.1 clarifies the 
aim of the research, which is to build a framework for a nuanced, critical 
understanding of RI. It introduces the four research questions that will be answered. 
Together, they give insight into the challenges of responsible investment 
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mainstreaming with an alternative perspective, different from the traditional, neo-
classical study of finance. Section 1.2 describes the structure of the thesis. My 
research was conducted through four different academic articles. I show how these 
relate to each other and contribute to a multifaceted but coherent analysis of the 
challenges of responsible investment mainstreaming. Section 1.3 lays out the context 
and some concepts required to understand the research object. Section 1.4 details the 
ontology and epistemology underlying the research, leading to a coherent 
methodology which I describe and justify in section 1.5.  
1.1 Research objective and questions 
The aim of the studies I conducted during my PhD was to understand the 
phenomenon of RI mainstreaming as a way to uncover the standards, ideals, and goals 
which are evolving in RI. In the following chapters, I will address four research 
questions, which are declinations of “What are the challenges of responsible 
investment mainstreaming, in terms of beliefs, paradoxes, and tensions?” because this 
phenomenon is having trouble materializing 
First, I ask “what are the collective beliefs (Orléan, 2005) for responsible 
investment and how have they evolved over time?” With this question I identify the 
collective beliefs of RI in mainstream finance; I address the evolution of the collective 
beliefs over time; and I discuss the implication of those collective beliefs for 
mainstreaming and RI in general. 
Then, I ask what are the disputes and resolutions (Boltanski and Thévenot, 
1999) around responsible investment’s mainstreaming? More specifically, what are 
the arguments and counter-arguments around those disputes and what are potential 
resolutions of the disputes surrounding responsible investment? I address this question 
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in terms of justification, as proposed by the “economies of worth”, using discourse 
analysis. 
After studying discourse, I study practice by following a group of institutional 
investors creating a framework to practice RI. I ask: What tensions are embedded in 
RI mainstreaming? And through which arrangements do the individuals, the group or 
the institution cope with the paradoxical tensions (Smith & Lewis, 2011)? 
Finally, I ask: “what are the factors most relevant in evaluating a company’s 
market risk, depending on its sector?” The originality of my approach resides in the 
framework that I explore, after having observed its construction by a group of 
institutional investors over 2 years.  
As a result, this thesis primarily contributes to the literature on RI 
mainstreaming. I provide insights into the capacity of RI to become mainstream and I 
define five periods that characterize the evolution of RI. But I also provide accounts 
of why the phenomenon of RI mainstreaming exists and how it operates in the manner 
it does, thereby theorizing the phenomenon of RI mainstreaming, which very few 
studies have done so far (see Arjaliès, 2010; Slager, Gond, & Moon, 2012, for 
exceptions). With the different studies I conducted, I participate in an ongoing 
conversation about how institutions, such as collective beliefs, and processes, such as 
paradox resolution, influence our thoughts and behavior. 
1.2 Structure and chapter flow 
This dissertation is built around four chapters (chapters 2 through 5) 
corresponding to four academic articles. Two of these articles, both published, are 
media studies based on press data, with media articles from the financial and non-
financial press on the topic of responsible investing. The other two articles are 
respectively a quantitative and an ethnographic study based on a group of institutional 
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investors which I followed for two years in their commensuration efforts to design a 
framework for ESG mainstreaming which would allow them to compare different 
investments according to common metrics. Figure 1 below represents the overall 
structure of the chapters and the flow of the dissertation in a graphical manner, 
illustrating the way certain chapters (re)use/build on each other 
Figure 1 : Flow of chapters 
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1.3 The challenges of responsible investment mainstreaming: context and 
concepts  
This dissertation draws on three conceptual pillars: collective beliefs as 
coordination mechanisms, tensions conceived as test situations for a dispute, and 
paradoxes understood as contradictory, yet interrelated elements. We clarify these 
concepts here a first time, along with the context of responsible investment (RI) and 
RI mainstreaming to which these concepts apply.  
Responsible investment is intuitively referred to as “doing well, while doing 
good”, suggesting a double objective of financial return along with a positive impact 
on society. It is generally defined as an investment process that integrates social, 
environmental, governance and ethical considerations into investment decision 
making (Cowton, 1994; Eurosif, 2010; Hudson, 2005; Renneboog, Terhorst, & 
Zhang, 2008; Sparkes, 2002; Waddock, 2003).  
Responsible investment is part of the changing environment of financial 
markets. Inequities in the economic system have grown in recent years, prompting 
debates and crises. One of the latest discussions aimed at addressing this in the EU 
institutions is on the evolution of responsible investment. Indeed, the European 
Commission has issued a call to “team up with investors to drive the transition to a 
sustainable economy”.  This link between financial markets and a sustainable 
economy is one that has been criticized as insufficient in the past years. The recent 
financial crises have illustrated quite strikingly the disconnect between finance and 
the real economy. Responsible investment, and its mainstreaming, is often presented 
as a possible solution to this disconnect (Novethic, 2011) insofar as the RI community 
acknowledges that an investment has an impact on society, and accepts the 
responsibility to “evaluate that impact and to direct it, as much as reasonably possible, 
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to societally productive ends, while achieving a competitive  return” (Louche & 
Lydenberg, 2011).  
RI is a very diverse field, as any historical contextualization will highlight. 
The ambiguity inherent to RI provides room for the coexistence of multiple 
interpretations and practices, and allows different stakeholders to identify with the 
same idea, even though they do not necessarily agree on its specific content 
(Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 2013). In this thesis, I acknowledge all forms of 
RI to provide a historical grounding, but then focus on ESG integration as the 
expression of its mainstreaming. Despite its contested definition and the variety of 
labels, constant denominators of responsible investment approaches include a 
stakeholder view, a long-term vision and a broad definition of materiality. As a 
consequence, RI could address many of the criticisms that financial markets have 
been facing, including short-termism, disconnect from the economy, and the idea of a 
rational maximizer of shareholder value ignoring stakeholders’ interests.  
At this point, it is worth asking whether the term RI is an ‘essentially contested 
concept’, or whether it is merely ‘radically confused’ (see Gallie, 1955).The theory of 
essentially contested concepts suggests that there are certain concepts whose very 
nature will lead to endless disputes about the proper meanings of these concepts. 
These essentially contested concepts share specific characteristics for seven key 
conditions: (1) appraisiveness, (2) internal complexity, (3) various describability, (4) 
openness, (5) aggressive and defensive uses, (6) original exemplar, and (7) 
progressive competition. Scholars consider Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to 
be an « essentially contested concept » (Okoye, 2009). I argue that RI, on the other 
hand, is rather a confused concept which would benefit from being treated as a cluster 
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concept (Choi and Majumdar, 2014), i.e. a conglomerate of sub-concepts such as ESG 
investing, impact investing and ethical investing. 
If RI is obviously not a univocal concept, let alone a set of clear cut practices 
surrounded by academic and practitioner consensus (Matten and Moon, 2008; 
Christensen et al. 2014), the phenomenon of RI mainstreaming is even more of a 
moving target. Mainstream is not a concept, and has not really been the subject of 
academic research. It is rather a practitioners’ aspiration reflecting their ideals and 
intentions rather than actual behaviors (Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 2013). 
Exploring mainstreaming therefore uncovers the standards, ideals, and goals which 
are evolving in RI. Since the arrival of institutional investors in the RI arena, 
mainstreaming has become a litany in RI experts’ discourse.  
Responsible Investment mainstreaming is currently scrutinized in a growing 
body of literature (Giamporcaro & Gond, 2010; Sparkes & Cowton, 2004). Despite a 
growing interest in responsible investment, the literature highlights a number of 
impediments, both internal and external to the organization, which make the actual 
practice of responsible investment among institutional investors rather limited 
(Amaeshi, 2010; Guyatt, 2006; Juravle & Lewis, 2008). Furthermore, when ESG 
criteria are used by mainstream investors, the ESG team will often be isolated within 
the institutional investor’s organization and the process is not integrated in the 
institution (Louche, 2004). However, many indicators do point towards an ongoing 
process of the institutionalization of the field, including the appearance of RI indices, 
RI rating agencies, and RI considerations in financial analyst training material. 
While RI mainstreaming is not currently achieved, albeit well under way 
(Amaeshi, 2010), it provides a case in point of the fast changing field of finance. 
Indeed, the financial sector is one field that has been changing very rapidly in recent 
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years. It has been characterized by impressive innovation, growing complexity and 
interdependence, dramatic uncertainty and instability (Carruthers & Kim, 2011).  A 
multitude of actors in this field impose their particular institutional order, imposing 
processes and giving legitimacy to financial intermediaries: stock exchanges and their 
regulators set rules for listed companies, rating agencies set norms for equity and debt 
issuers (Sinclair, 2000), consultants and analysts set norms for valuation methods 
(Lordon, 2000). 
Collective beliefs are one of the challenges of responsible investment’s 
mainstreaming, as I show in this thesis, because the current collective beliefs 
regarding responsible investment are not favorable to mainstreaming. For example, RI 
is believed to be complicated, making it hard to put in practice. And RI is believed not 
to lead to superior returns, making it hard to justify. To address concepts such as 
beliefs and justification, which are important in this thesis, I rely among others on 
convention theory – a theory developed by a group of institutionalist economists and 
pragmatist sociologists (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005; 
Dupuy, Favereau, Orléan, Salais, & Thévenot, 1989). Together they propose an 
enlarged model of rationality, with embedded questions of coordination and values. 
Convention theory focuses on analyzing cognitive interactions and the multiplicity of 
equilibriums using discourse and conventions. Its authors adopt a constructivist 
perspective on the objects they study, and focus on legitimacy as the outcome of a 
process of justification when facing disputes, privileging research methods close to 
ethnography. This research philosophy and methodology are aligned with the ones I 
adopt in this thesis, as explained in the methods section.   
Tensions are conceived as test situations for a dispute. The values which are 
disputed may be shaken, but may also come out strengthened by the dispute after a 
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test. Boltanski (2009) identifies three types of tests, leading to different resolutions. 
The “test of truth” attempts to defend what is, a good versus evil story. It is a 
simplification characterized by a tautological discourse to defend the constructed 
reality with the intent of confirming it rather than criticizing it. The next level is the 
“test of legitimacy” during which actors question the reality as it is constructed by 
confronting it with what they are experiencing. Finally comes the “existential test”, 
which takes place at an individual level, based for example on a personal experience 
of injustice. These tests have uncertain outcomes but may lead to arrangements or 
compromises as a result of the institutional work of justification (Patriotta et al., 
2011), which is one reason why they are relevant to discuss how responsible 
investment might impact the financial system. 
Paradoxes, the third conceptual pillar, allow to consider the dynamics of RI 
mainstreaming. Indeed, these contradictory, yet interrelated elements, like judgment 
and metrics in a commensuration process, or like the economic rationale and the 
sustainability rationale in responsible investment, can co-exist, feed each other and 
can be channeled through or eliminated from a process. With paradoxes, we see that 
the evolution of RI is not a linear process, made of one equilibrium after the other. In 
fact, the ambiguity of RI could be exacerbated with mainstreaming, because of the 
many coexisting paradoxes.  
Researching RI mainstreaming, therefore, requires sensitivity to process and 
allowance for exploration and disagreement. For such objects of study, a mix of 
methods is required, combining historical and longitudinal studies, case studies, and 
empirical exploration (which we apply to discourse as well as to tools, as described in 
the methods section).   
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1.4 Research philosophy: ontology and epistemology 
I consider myself to be an interpretivist constructivist. Meaning emerges from 
our engagement with the realities of the world – and is constructed. I consider that 
individuals are not agents but interpretative actors with critical capacities, rendering 
their discourse relevant. I chose this approach of my topic because I was frustrated by 
the lack of critical thinking on business and society throughout my professional 
experience. I was surrounded by two perspectives, neither of which satisfied me. A 
first, most common approach was utilitarian: in my professional environment, I saw 
no questioning on meaning, no taking into account of any historical context. Events 
were taken for granted and appreciated for their functionality. A second approach, 
more of an NGO vision, was extremely critical and normative, anti-business, and did 
not correspond to my desire to focus on what positive outcomes can result for things. I 
wanted an approach where critiques are welcome, and alternatives are considered, 
including critiques on alternatives, without falling into pessimism and negativity. To 
do this, I had to learn and practice a critical perspective myself. So I devoted the past 
five years pursuing a PhD to develop my fluency in critical thinking, through the 
examination of theories and methodologies in institutional theory and convention 
theories. The thesis process allowed me to adopt a new critical perspective on my 
subject, to reformulate propositions and reevaluate them. As an illustration, I re-
evaluated my position on paradoxes during my research. I initially thought complexity 
is good and necessary (despite students shying away from it). My pre-conceptions 
were similar to Quinn and Cameron’s views on positive organization theory -- that it 
is desirable to have both sides of a paradox. But this position ignores the dark side of 
paradox, and the burden that these paradoxical tensions may be for some individuals 
(i.e. the emotion resulting from the paradox). After this PhD process, I could say I 
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have become attracted to critical inquiry, which I would like to adopt as a theoretical 
perspective in future research. This ontology corresponded to my perspective and life 
experience.  
Figure 2 positions my research in the pluralistic epistemological perspectives 
of existing RI research. Most existing research can be placed in the bottom right 
quadrant, such as the current debate on RI’s performance, which I participate in with 
chapter 5. Most of my research questions are positioned in the upper left quadrant, 
with a focus on change and an orientation toward subjectivity. 
Figure 2 positioning my research perspective in a pluralistic RI framework, adapted from Gond and 
Matten (2007) 
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1.6 Methodology: data selection and research design 
My methodology varies from econometrics to interpretative ethnography as 
well as discourse analysis as illustrated in figure 3.  
Figure 3 : A research design combining multiple approaches and levels of analysis 
 
In chapters 2 and 3 I use media data to study discourse. The press articles I 
collected provided non-sensitive, publicly available material, from which I was 
independent as a researcher. This media data lent itself well to an analysis with 
theories on equilibrium, such as convention theories.  
In chapter 4, the data I collect comes from my ethnographic observation of the 
Delphi process. This data lends itself to analysis with theories on processes, such as 
paradox theory. While I limited my interferences in the Delphi process, I could not be 
independent as a researcher, in the same way as I was in the other studies. As an 
illustration, I was considered by the people in the Delphi project as a justification 
mechanism: being observed by an academic was a way to increase their legitimacy. I 
address this possible distortion with reflexivity, and document it in the chapter.  
Chapter 5 is data driven. In it, I adopt an exploratory approach, with the 
Delphi framework and Bloomberg data as my point of departure. The framework was 
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constructed by institutional investors, through a dialectic process leading to consensus 
on what KPIs should appear in the framework. The Bloomberg data, which I use to 
populate the framework, is collected from publicly disclosed information by 
companies, without any extra level of interpretation. As a result, I distinguish myself 
from previous research of this kind that typically uses the KLD framework, and uses 
composite metrics constructed by third parties, which adds a level of interpretation 
between the data and the researchers.  
The rationale for this mixed methods approach flows from the research 
questions I raised, and the discussions I meant to participate in. While the econometric 
chapter was important in order to take part in the current discussions on RI’s 
challenges (namely, its un-evidenced value creation), this approach also showed its 
limits in advancing research on RI mainstreaming, because of the necessary fit 
between theories, data and methods. In this thesis, I offer multiple perspectives on the 
challenges of RI mainstreaming, which only a mixed methods design could help me 
address. 
Figure 4 : Rationale for mixed methods: the fit between theory, data and methods.  
 
 
In addition, the different articles and research questions allowed different 
levels of analysis. Orléan’s positioning in convention theory is well suited to study the 
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meso-level, with the auto-referential belief of the market. Boltanski and Thévenot’s 
worlds of worth allowed a focus on the micro-level, with the individual actor’s 
justification. Paradox theory seemed well suited for all levels of analysis, including 
individual paradoxes, organizational paradoxes, and institutional level paradoxes. 
Paradox theory also allows me to add a focus on dynamics rather than on a series of 
equilibriums. And finally I took a micro-level look at tools. Economic tools such as 
the modeling of an ESG framework imply a micro level focus on individual 
preferences and productive acts. Throughout this dissertation, my focus is on 
institutions, and I draw on institutional theory to understand their influence. But I also 
look at the behaviors and beliefs of actors in these institutions, as part of the puzzle.   
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Part 2 
2 Collective beliefs on responsible investment 
2.1 Chapter summary 
Attempts to define and evaluate RI have not gathered much consensus. They 
fail to recognize that RI is a construction, which evolves over time and covers 
heterogeneous practices. In this context, we need to identify the belief underlying RI 
to determine the value it can represent for financial markets.  
This first chapter1 provides insights to help understand what RI mainstreaming 
consists in, by adopting a new theoretical perspective on ESG. Building on 
responsible investment (RI) data from the U.K. financial press between 1982 and 
2010, I examine the collective beliefs which financial actors rely on to take decisions 
under uncertainty, as a way of understanding the status of and implications for RI 
mainstreaming. The analysis of collective beliefs through five periods of RI lead me 
to define two theoretical dimensions—justifying RI and practicing RI—that 
characterize how mainstream actors collectively make sense of RI. My analysis 
reveals that the RI collective beliefs currently (a) do not provide a favorable 
environment for RI mainstreaming and (b) need to be taken into account when 
discussing the value of sustainability. 
 
2.2 Introduction  
Academic literature has struggled to demonstrate the business case of 
sustainability in responsible investment (RI), that is the integration of environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) issues into mainstream finance (Kurtz, 2008). However 
demonstrating the value of RI is important and probably necessary for RI to shift from 
                                               
1
 This chapter was published as the following article: Dumas, C., & Louche, C. (2015). 
Collective beliefs on responsible investment. Business & Society, 0007650315575327. 
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a niche to mainstream. More than 200 academic articles exist on the subject of 
sustainability’s financial performance (Derwall, Guenster, Bauer, & Koedijk, 2005; 
Bauer, Derwall, & Otten, 2007) including several meta-studies (Orlitzky, Schmidt & 
Rynes, 2003; Allouche & Laroche, 2005; Wu; 2006). Despite the ongoing spirited 
debate, the performance of RI remains largely inconclusive (Margolis, 2009). This 
highlights a paradoxical situation where on the one hand many signs show that 
responsible investment has gained importance in capital markets (Mercer, 2009; 
Mercer & UNEP FI, 2007), but on the other hand there has not been a significant 
global shift towards greater sustainability in finance. 
 
In this chapter I propose to explore this paradox trough a new theoretical lens. 
Building on the concept of collective beliefs (Orlean, 2004; Bourghelle 2005; 
Dequech, 2008), we argue that RI mainstreaming is unlikely to happen as long as it is 
not supported by the collective beliefs, that is shared interpretations, that guide 
investors’ actions and decisions (Jemel-Fornetty, Louche, & Bourghelle, 2011). We 
argue that the understanding of the collective beliefs around the activity of responsible 
investment can provide insights on equity market participants' decision making. They 
thereby inform the debate on sustainable development and financial markets.  
  
To advance this perspective, we ask two main questions: What are the 
collective beliefs for responsible investment and how have they evolved over time. 
Three objectives flow from these research questions. We first want to identify the 
collective beliefs of RI in mainstream finance. Second, we address the evolution of 
the collective beliefs over time. Third, we aim to discuss the implication of those 
collective beliefs for mainstreaming and RI in general. 
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The analysis of the collective beliefs is based on the RI media coverage in the 
UK financial press between 1985 and 2010. During this period, we identified 3,462 
articles to which we applied a bracketing method (Langley, 1999) in order to 
decompose the history of responsible investment into successive RI periods. We then 
performed an in-depth content analysis of the press articles for a sub-sample of 89 
articles. 
 
The data shows that five periods characterized the evolution of RI. Those 
periods are each marked with a very specific terminology and focus. It highlights the 
dynamism of the field but also the fact that RI is still in a process of 
institutionalization. The analysis has allowed us to identify collective beliefs around 
RI and revealed that the collective beliefs are not stable yet. The collective beliefs 
identified in our study can be classified in three main areas– ‘what is RI’, ‘why do RI’ 
and ‘how to do RI’. The content of the collective beliefs highlight the complexity of 
RI and tensions linked to RI mainstreaming. 
  
We primarily contribute to the literature on RI mainstreaming. Although 
mainstreaming has been widely discussed, very few studies, if any, have tried to 
theorize this phenomenon. We first provide a longitudinal study of RI supported with 
empirical data. Second we focus on the meso-level, between the individual actors and 
the institutional level, by considering collective beliefs. And third we provide insights 
in the capacity of RI to become mainstream. 
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Furthermore, our research on RI provides a new area of study for convention 
theory. Most of all, we offer an empirical exploration of collective beliefs as well as a 
method to examine collective beliefs. Most of the studies on collective beliefs are 
indeed either conceptual or remain rather vague on how to empirically examine 
collective beliefs.  
 
Finally our study contributes to theory development by refining the notion of 
collective beliefs. We identify two types of collective beliefs – justifying RI and 
practicing RI – and show that justification and action coexist and interact. It therefore 
participates in an ongoing conversation about how institutions influence our thoughts 
and behavior. 
  
This chapter is organized as follows. The first part outlines the theoretical 
framework and context of RI mainstreaming. The second part presents the research 
design, data and methods used in the study. The third part provides the analysis and 
findings with a focus first on the RI periods, then on the collective beliefs. The results 
are discussed in the fourth and last part, including their implications and ideas for 
further research in the area of RI mainstreaming. 
 
2.3 Collective beliefs and RI mainstreaming 
2.3.1 Collective beliefs 
The concept of belief is not common in economics and finance (Orléan, 2006). 
The financial system is largely based on economic analysis and neo-classical financial 
theory that both give great importance to quantitative measures. However, by 
disregarding the beliefs and social context in which these numbers are produced, 
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standard theories fail to explain anomalies such as speculative bubbles, confidence 
crises, excessive volatility, not the least of which is the latest financial crisis. They 
also fail to consider important dimensions of value (Orléan, 2011). 
Value is a representation constructed by a group (Orléan, 2011; Zajac & 
Westphal, 2004). This is true for religious value or aesthetic value but also for 
economic value, which neo-classical economics does not recognise. Even if economic 
value distinguishes itself from others because it is represented by a price, it still is 
largely a social construction.  
 
A well-documented illustration of this social construction of value is the 
Black–Scholes–Merton options pricing formula which gained exponential success in 
the 1970s among option traders, regardless of its accuracy in calculating option prices 
and of traders’ personal belief in the accuracy of the model. Economic actors used this 
model to coordinate their actions under uncertainty, based on the collective belief that 
a majority of other economic actors used the model, with the unintended consequence 
of changing patterns of prices in the option market (Beunza, Hardie, & MacKenzie, 
2006; MacKenzie, 2006 ; Millo & MacKenzie, 2009).  
 
The collective belief is a shared interpretation of the future evolution of 
financial markets, and plays a central role in Orléan’s research (2004). He defines 
collective beliefs as follows:  
“An individual I believes that the group G believes the proposition P if he believes that, 
in the majority, the members of the group G believe that the group G believes P” (Orléan, 
2006, p.171).  
 
A collective belief can therefore be disconnected from what individual agents 
believe: this is its self-referential nature. As a result, the market has its own 
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autonomous belief, which is not the sum of individual beliefs. This becomes evident 
when investors make decisions based on their anticipation of the future behavior of 
“the market”, and when we observe discourse such as “the market believes bonds are 
over-priced” (Schaefer, 2013) or “the market does not believe the FED” (Shellock, 
2013).. Under uncertainty, collective beliefs will serve investors to make decisions, 
thereby influencing economic value and the adoption of new practices.  
 
A number of empirical papers have explored how financial market participants 
coordinate their actions based on collective beliefs (Table 1). Bourghelle et al. (2011) 
and Guyatt (2006) address more specifically the case of RI mainstreaming, both 
suggesting that collective beliefs constitute impediments to mainstreaming. The 
former discusses this thesis theoretically, but is not backed up by empirical data. And 
though the latter refers to collective beliefs, these notions are presented in a 
behavioral finance perspective rather than according to Orléan’s framework.  
Table 1: Some illustrations of collective beliefs in literature 
Author Collective belief 
Brière (2005) Interest rates result from collective beliefs based on 
statements of the central bank 
Jemel-Fornetty, Louche, & 
Bourghelle (2011) 
Guyatt (2006) 
RI mainstreaming is slowed down by current collective 
beliefs 
Cheung, Chinn, & Marsh 
(2004) 
Foreign exchange spreads quoted by traders are based on 
collective belief due to strong market norm. 
Lordon (1999) EVA formula spread by collective belief pushed by 
consultants 
Gillet & Szafarz (2005) Market efficiency hypothesis is a collective belief, not a 
reality  
Orléan (1999) Asian miracle was based on a collective belief 
 
During a period of instability, coordination based on collective beliefs increase 
stability. Everyone considers the same references, which reinforces their legitimacy. 
But since this coordination is based on beliefs and choices which could have been 
different, it is regularly challenged and may be put in peril. The studies therefore 
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illustrate the content of collective beliefs and how they influence financial markets, 
but do not give much insight on how these conventions were formed or how they 
evolved. However, Bourghelle (2005) notes in his conceptual chapter that since 
financial actors all read the same press and listen to the same experts, the financial 
press is an essential mediator in the formation of collective beliefs.  
 
The concept of collective belief is part of a theory, convention theory, which 
has been developed by a group of institutionalist economists and pragmatist 
sociologists (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005; Dupuy, 
Favereau, Orléan, Salais, & Thévenot, 1989). Together they propose an enlarged 
model of rationality which becomes embedded in questions of coordination and 
values. Convention theory focuses on analyzing cognitive interactions and the 
multiplicity of equilibriums using discourse and conventions. Within this group of 
theorists, authors like Orléan, Bourghelle and Dequech focus more specifically on 
understanding economic value in financial markets and highlight the self-referential 
nature of collective beliefs. 
 
This self-referential approach is the one that we adopt in studying collective 
beliefs in RI mainstreaming. There is no scientific basis to determine the 
mathematical expectations (probabilities) of the impact of environmental, social or 
governance (ESG) factors on the return of an investment. In this sense, expectations in 
the future of an asset’s performance have a subjective component. They are informed 
opinions (which is indeed what ESG rating agencies say they deliver). Consider the 
following example: an individual fund manager believes a majority of other fund 
managers believe the market considers environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
38 
 
criteria as non-material. This does not result from the fund manager’s personal view 
on RI, or from other market players’ personal views, but it will influence his 
investment decision.  
 
In this chapter I examine the collective beliefs around the activity of 
responsible investment as one way to show how equity market participants' decision 
making informs the debate on sustainable development and financial markets. We 
argue that collective beliefs play an important role in mainstreaming a new activity in 
financial markets because they can either support or hinder it depending on their 
content. Therefore we need to better understand the collective beliefs that have 
formed around RI and their evolution over time to address the question of RI 
mainstreaming.  
2.3.2 Responsible Investment mainstreaming 
Although the definition of RI has been the object of ongoing debate 
(Sandberg, 2009; Dahlsrud, 2008), scholars often agree that RI is as a set of 
investment principles and practices defined as: 
 
… a set of approaches which include social or ethical goals or constraints as well as 
more conventional criteria in decisions over whether to acquire, hold or dispose of a 
particular investment. (Cowton, 1999, p.60) 
 
However, both practitioners and the media use varied terminology when 
speaking about “doing well while doing good”. A non-exhaustive lists includes 
«ethical investment», «green funds», «socially responsible investment», «sustainable 
investment» or «ESG investing» (Sandberg et al. 2009). This variety in terms of the 
vocabulary points to a high heterogeneity that characterizes RI (Sandberg et al. 2009) 
and which can partly be explained by its evolution over time. The roots of RI can 
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indeed be traced back to philosophical schools and world religions rather than to the 
business and investment community (Kreander, 2004; Louche & Lydenberg, 2010; 
Sparkes & Cowton, 2004). In the literature, it is often considered to date back to the 
influence of the Quakers at the beginning of the 19th century (Entine, 2003; Kurtz, 
2005; Louche & Lydenberg, 2010). In the 1970s RI gained a new political dimension 
with civil protests in the wake of the Vietnam War and apartheid. Environmental 
considerations were added next, leading to green investing, as a reaction to ecological 
disasters in the 1980s and ‘90s. Then the RI market also took into consideration 
corporate governance aspects, which were developed to promote better governance 
and more transparency. These different conceptions of RI coexist today, illustrating 
how the field is still under construction.  
 
Practicing RI is neither easy nor unproblematic, because the heterogeneity of 
RI is not limited to its definition (Sandberg et al. 2009). The varied terminology goes 
along with a variety of investment strategies and practices (Entine, 2003). Scholars 
have classified RI practices in different categories, ranging from exclusion based on 
screens, to shareholder engagement with companies, to selecting investments with a 
focus on having a community impact (Louche & Lydenberg, 2011). These approaches 
go along with a variety of strategies, exemplified by two claims commonly made by 
fund managers: superior financial return, and corporate change resulting from a lower 
cost of capital (e.g. Haigh & Hazelton, 2004) or engagement practices (e.g. 
Vandekerckhove et al. 2007; Logsdon and Van Buren 2009; Core et al. 2008, De 
Bakker and Den Hond 2008). These claims are far from supported by literature, and 
may even seem antithetic. For example, we know almost nothing about the impact 
these social investments have on their intended beneficiaries (Margolis and Walsh, 
2003, Hebb and Louche, 2014). Despite this heterogeneity and tension in logics, we 
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would argue that RI approaches share a long-term vision (Guyatt, 2004), a stakeholder 
focus (Williams, 2007), and a broad definition of materiality (AccountAbility, 2006). 
 
The process of institutionalization is ongoing and observable, despite the 
confusion and heterogeneity (Déjean and Le Theule, 2011, Louche, 2004, Penalva-
Icher, 2012). In parallel, mainstreaming is proclaimed by many RI practitioners 
(World Economic Forum and AccountAbility, 2005; Robeco and Booz & Company, 
2008) and has become a central question in the RI research arena (Lydenberg, 2009). 
But there is an implicit assumption within the field, in both academic and business 
community, that everybody knows what mainstreaming is about, so it has never been 
quite defined. Mainstreaming of RI is sometimes considered as the maturation of RI 
(Sparkes and Cowton, 2004). Lydenberg (2009) mentions the notion of 
professionalization, or even the notion of progress. These claims to RI mainstreaming 
recognize the evolution of the RI market in two directions: growth of assets under 
management and new investor categories. Mainstreaming is about the adoption or the 
practice of RI by major investors. Those are referred to as institutional investors 
which represent the most important ownership group of quoted companies, mostly 
represented by pension funds and insurance companies (Sparkes 2002, McCann et al. 
2003). Another element that we find in the literature on RI mainstreaming is the 
notion of RI spreading to every financial investment product category (Strandberg, 
2005; Lydenberg 2009). Amaeshi et al. (2010) argue that RI mainstreaming implies a 
fit between RI and the dominant financial market logic of calculation and 
singularization for profit, putting high emphasis on the financial performance of RI: 
“for the RI market to be mainstreamed, it has to be amenable to the mainstream 
financial market demands of objectivation and singularisation” (Amaeshi 2010, p.52). 
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All those arguments lead us to say that RI mainstreaming means the integration of 
social, environmental and governance issues into conventional finance.  
 
Following these claims to mainstreaming, recent scholarship has focused on 
the impediments to mainstreaming. Various impediments to mainstreaming have been 
highlighted in literature, both at the institutional level, the organizational level and the 
individual level. These include, but are not limited to, opposing logics, lack of 
adequate products and tools, and lack of evidence of effectiveness in terms of social 
return, and profitability (Amaeshi, 2010; Guyatt, 2006; Juravle and Lewis, 2008). 
These different impediments represent areas that may cause friction between RI and 
mainstream financial practice. Juravle and Lewis (2008, p. 287) state that “these 
views act almost as social paradigms within the finance community, facilitating or 
impeding the mainstreaming” of RI.  
  
A second set of results in these studies point to the importance of the 
economic value of RI. It highlights that this debate is important to legitimize ESG on 
economic grounds, grounds that prevail in the business world and financial market 
(Amaeshi, 2010). But economic value is also a key impediment if we refer to the 
number of studies attempting to prove the link between social performance and 
financial return. The question has been addressed from a management perspective (are 
executives taking money that would otherwise go to the firm’s owners?) and an 
investor perspective (are investments in RI underperforming, opposing fiduciary 
duty?). A few meta-analyses of these studies give an idea of the importance of this 
research topic: Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003) analyzed 52 studies, Allouche 
and Laroche (2005) analyzed 82, Wu (2006) analyzed 39 and Margolis et al. analyzed 
251 studies (2009). According to Margolis et al.’s meta-analysis, “after thirty-five 
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years of research, the preponderance of evidence indicates a mildly positive 
relationship between corporate social performance and corporate financial 
performance”, a result which neither satisfied the proponents of RI nor its detractors.  
 
Some authors state that the results are inconclusive because the question was 
not correctly addressed. They criticize “several important theoretical and empirical 
limitations” (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000), such as the sample size, insufficient 
historical data covering a short time span, aggregation of E(nvironmental), S(ocial) 
and G(overnance) issues which should be considered separately (Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Margolis et al., 2009). A more recent type of criticism, made by authors 
including Orlitzky (2013) and Vogel (2005), is epistemological: financial markets are 
not efficient, financial actors are not rational, and there is no such thing as an intrinsic 
value which the market supposedly reveals. In that context, determining the value, and 
legitimacy, of sustainability may require looking away from neo-classical theories and 
financial return. With such views, this scholarship also challenges the dominant, 
simplified view of markets as fully efficient, transparent, and rational.   
 
Together, these studies reinforce the importance of understanding a financial 
activity in terms of discourse, representations, and social context. Although previous 
studies have elaborated on a variety of consequences resulting from RI’s non-financial 
aspects (Arjaliès, 2009, Orlitzky, 2013), much is still unknown about the implications 
of RI in a theoretical context of market inefficiency, and how this matters for 
mainstreaming. 
 
The point to be made here is that another perspective is needed to address how 
ESG signals affect financial markets and to understand how we collectively make 
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sense of RI and its value. We argue that insights into the collective beliefs inform us 
on the capacity of RI to become mainstream. Our approach links RI mainstreaming to 
collective beliefs, as crystallized in the financial press. We see this as an opportunity 
to link convention theory research to the standard research on RI mainstreaming.  
 
2.4 Research design, data and methods 
2.4.1 Media as a proxy for collective beliefs 
To probe the concept of collective beliefs and to study their evolution in an 
emerging field with high uncertainty, we focus on the media coverage of RI in the 
financial press over time. We consider that the media crystallizes collective beliefs by 
repetitive coverage of a topic. Indeed, Barkemeyer et al. (2010, p.382) suggest that 
“whilst it cannot be proven that there is a direct correlation between coverage of a 
specific event and change in behaviour, there is no doubt that media coverage can 
influence the level of awareness of specific issues and could act as a general 
barometer of the contextual framing of issues such as business ethics, sustainable 
development, corporate citizenship, and accountability within society.”  
 
There is a tradition of CSR studies as well as of finance studies using data 
from the media. Many authors are currently investigating the role and influence of the 
media in financial markets either in terms of the influence of media on companies’ 
CSR (Baron, 2005; Dyck, Volchkova, & Zingales, 2008; Zyglidopoulos, Carroll, 
Georgiadis, & Siegel, 2010), or in terms of the influence of media on share prices 
(Fang & Peress, 2008; Palomino, Renneboog, & Zhang, 2009; Tetlock, 2007). 
However, the study of RI through media coverage is new to our knowledge.  
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Much of the existing research considers that one role the media plays is as a 
civic forum (Norris & Robinson, 2003). As such, the media have the ability to 
promote a greater understanding of topics and draw attention to examples of good 
practice. It also has a watchdog function, illustrated by the tales of widespread 
financial mismanagement and corporate fraud at Enron, Tyco and WorldCom that led 
to the enactment of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and greater scrutiny of the 
financial management of companies (Barkemeyer et al., 2010). While these examples 
demonstrate the power of media when it comes to informing society of business 
failures, scholars argue that the effect of the media on issues such as executive 
remuneration or corporate scandals remains inconclusive (Core et al., 2008). While 
our study does not enter into this debate – we do not attempt to prove an accelerator 
role of media for RI mainstreaming – it does build on these studies to consider media 
as a valid proxy for collective beliefs.  
 
Finally, media is highly selective in terms of content and speakers allowed in 
these platforms, as illustrated by Dyck et al. (2008) with the case of corporate 
governance advocates. A media bias arises from the news organization and its 
ideological orientation, from the journalists’ preferences and from the reader’s 
preferences and beliefs. We acknowledge this bias and try to mitigate it via data 
collection from multiple sources, which we describe in the next section.  
 
2.4.2 Data sampling and analysis  
The data we present comes from the UK financial press and was selected in 
several stages. Table 2 outlines both stages of the research, with their respective 
sampling and analysis. 
Table 2: Method in two stages of sampling and analysis 
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 Stage 1  Stage 2  
Objective  Periods of RI  RI collective beliefs  
Sampling  Full coverage  Theoretical years  
Sample size  3,462 articles  89 articles  
Analysis  Bracketing  Content analysis  
Unit of analysis  RI article  5 RI Periods  
Validation Prior research Duplication on new sample 
Result  5 RI periods  2 theoretical concepts  
 
We compiled articles by searching Factiva, a Dow Jones news database 
encompassing more than 28,000 sources2, including newspapers such as the Financial 
Times and magazines such as the Economist. We identified journals based on prior 
studies. According to Fang and Peress who studied the impact of media coverage on 
investors, “there is a considerable overlap – about 75% – in the different newspapers’ 
coverage. This overlap […] indicates that [if] we focus on only four papers, [the] data 
is representative of the newspaper media. To the extent that coverage is correlated 
across media types, [the] data is also a reasonable proxy of overall media coverage.” 
(2008, p.9). We therefore limited our search to the Financial Times which is a far 
reaching title in Europe (with a daily circulation of 399,862 as of May 2010), the Wall 
Street Journal Europe and The Economist, which all generally correlate closely with 
other sources of financial information such as Bloomberg, as suggested by Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (1999) and confirmed by Dyck et al. (2008). The press articles 
provided non-sensitive, publicly available material, from which the researchers were 
independent.  
 
Stage 1: Determining the RI periods  
 
                                               
2On Factiva’s content, see 
http://factiva.com/sources/contentwatch.asp?node=menuElem1522 (accessed July 
12, 2010). The data was collected in July 2010. 
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Sampling. In the first stage we constructed a large sample of all UK press 
articles addressing RI. We identified these articles by keywords searches using an 
iterative snowball process. The first set of keywords, selected based on their 
appearance and frequency in RI academic literature, included: “responsible 
investment”, “ESG”, “sustainable investment” and “ethical investment”. This led to a 
first set of articles, in which we identified key RI actors over time that we added to 
our list of keywords to complete the sample of articles with new searches. EIRIS, 
FTSE and UN PRI are some examples of such actors that we collected, much like 
names of informants are collected in interviews as a basis for snowball sampling 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The process was reiterated until searches using the names of 
field actors led to no new relevant articles: the saturation point. At the end of the first 
round of data collection, we had 3,982 articles on RI published between 1982 and 
2010, as illustrated in Figure 4. The first articles we found in the database were 
published in March 1982.  
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Figure 4: The number of responsible investment articles per year increases cyclically. 
 
Analysis. In the first stage of analysis, I organized the data with a bracketing 
method (Langley, 1999) for its descriptive utility in a longitudinal analysis, but also as 
a structuring process for analyzing and sensemaking. The bracketing lead to the 
identification of five RI periods over time, which constituted new units of analysis for 
the exploration of the collective beliefs in the second stage of analysis. According to 
Langley, “this [temporal bracketing] approach involves decomposing time lines into 
distinct phases where there is continuity in activities within each phase and 
discontinuity at the frontiers”. (Langley, 2009, p920). We identified the 
discontinuities based on the discourse, using word counts in Nvivo 9. For example, 
between 2000 and 2001 the word “ethics” practically disappears and words such as 
“pension fund” and “pension manager” become salient in the data. This was the third 
discontinuity we identified, leading to the fourth RI period as described in the table 
below. This delineation based on content offers a stronger theoretical meaning than 
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delineation based on coverage frequency, which can be influenced by economic 
cycles.    
Table 3: Five periods in the history of RI 
Periods   Salient discourse  
1982-1991:  Civil rights years Civil rights, South Africa  
1992-1997: Green niche years Niche ethical investment (green funds etc.). Limited press 
coverage  
1998-2000: Professionalization years Pension funds as key actors. More neutral wording. 
Transition period.  
2001-2004: SRI years Ethical discourse replaced by responsibility discourse 
2005-2010: ESG years RI linked to corporate governance; climate change as 
main issue 
 
Our approach is the first to provide empirical evidence of the evolution of RI 
over time, although several studies do trace the history of RI. We therefore verified 
the validity of our periods against periods proposed in literature (Giamporcaro & 
Gond, 2010), leading to similar conclusions with one exception: the early religious 
period of RI, which takes place before any coverage of RI in the financial press, that 
is before any sign of mainstreaming, and is therefore not represented in our time line.  
 
Media studies tend to concentrate on this type of quantitative content analysis 
that is relatively easy to measure (Fico, Lacy, & Riffe, 2008). But this type of analysis 
does not allow examining the symbolic meaning of the content. Our second stage of 
analysis focuses on this content, which is more difficult to measure and requires 
smaller samples.  
 
Stage 2: Identifying collective beliefs  
 
Sampling. To preserve the representativeness of the sample while reducing its 
size, we then constructed theoretical two-week years, a recommended sampling 
method in media studies (Hijmans, Pleijter & Wester, 2003). Studies like those of 
Riffe, Austen, and Lacy (1993) show that a qualitatively good newspaper sample 
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should be based on at least twelve editions, where each day of the week is represented 
proportionally. For magazine articles in our data, such as articles from The 
Economist, we followed Wester (2006) according to whom an analysis of a weekly 
magazine can also be performed with a randomly selected issue per month, thus 
constructing a theoretical month, in some way similar to the process of theoretical 
weeks. We constructed our theoretical years after verifying that there was no 
seasonality in RI media coverage. The theoretical sub-sample is a selection of 89 
articles distributed over the 18-year timeframe, a more manageable size for our 
second level of analysis which consists in identifying the RI collective beliefs.  
 
Analysis. The data analysis to identify collective beliefs was conducted in 
three main stages, a process which allowed us to move back and forth between the 
data and the emerging concepts to finally reach two abstract theoretical concepts. Our 
initial approach to code development was prior-research driven (Boyatzis, 1998). We 
started the code list using literature on impediments to RI mainstreaming (Juravle and 
Lewis, 2008, Guyatt, 2006) based on the idea that these impediments are issues 
around which there is uncertainty and confusion. These are typically situations where 
investors will need to rely on collective beliefs to coordinate their decisions. Since 
using an existing code requires rater-to-expert reliability (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 37), this 
was achieved through a discussion with the author of the prior research driving the 
code. Juravle was interviewed on the meaning and academic background of each 
category to refine our definition of the code. Some codes were modified as a result of 
this discussion.  
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We read a first selection of articles searching for salient representations of RI, 
in the light of our prior-research driven list. Very soon it became apparent that we 
needed additional codes to cover the issues discussed in the articles. We therefore 
completed the list of codes with a few codes based on the data. Once all codes were 
named and grouped in categories, we returned to our data to verify fidelity with the 
data. We either corrected a category or reconceptualised it when the revisited data did 
not fit it well. For instance, after several discussions we agreed that our initial 
category “conflict of interest” which was identified in literature as an impediment was 
too restrictive, and did not allow us to capture different types of conflict between asset 
managers and asset owners or final beneficiaries. So we changed it to “conflicts of 
logic”, a broader category. This was an iterative process during which we drafted a 
coding tree which included examples and counter examples for each code, to serve as 
a basis for our discussions. Intra-rater reliability was achieved by coding the same text 
twice on different days, on the one hand, and inter-rater reliability was achieved by 
comparing the coding of a sample of texts by two researchers.  
 
The second step involved axial coding (Corbin & Strauss, 1998), where we 
compared first-order codes with one another looking for patterns and themes to create 
second-order constructs. This process consisted in trial and error constructions of 
models, regrouping different codes based on their characteristic in order to develop a 
set of more abstract, theory-rich constructs. To illustrate, when comparing codes we 
found that the distinction used in Juravle and Lewis (2008) between institutional level 
issues, organizational level issues and individual level issues, had little explanatory 
power in terms of collective beliefs. On the other hand, codes linked to people’s 
arguments to defend ideas or practices, appeared more helpful in terms of collective 
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belief. “Screening”, for example, which was sometimes discussed as a desirable way 
to do RI, or an impractical way to do RI, seemed to correspond better to a belief 
among market players to coordinate their actions. The axial coding was done by one 
researcher and put to test by the other researcher in a series of meetings. Through 
these iterative discussions, three second-order constructs appeared to have useful 
explanatory power in terms of collective beliefs.  
 
We tested the validity of the second order constructs quantitatively for the fifth 
RI period. The frequency of each second order construct was set as a hypothesis, 
which we tested by duplicating our analysis on a new random sample of 20 articles 
selected from within the universe of 1710 RI articles published during the fifth period 
(2005 to 2010). The results do not permit to affirm the existence of significant 
differences, with a confidence level of 1%.3 
 
Finally, in the third step we identified important dimensions from the sets of 
second-order constructs. For example, some codes like ethics or conflicts of logic 
appeared earlier in the history of RI. They were attempts to define and justify RI and 
they addressed more directly a critique, which was either implicit or explicit. Other 
codes, like engagement or innovation opportunity, appeared later in the history of RI. 
They were linked to success stories, or challenges met by RI practitioners. We saw 
these as linked to the practice of RI and its challenges. Working in such a way through 
                                               
3When a confirmatory analysis is performed using a chi-square test, it appears that a 
difference exists between the proportions of occurrences of the three second order constructs 
“How”, "Why" and "What". The confidence intervals constructed for the percentages of these 
occurrences indicate that the occurrences of “How” may be slightly over-estimated in the 
tested two-week-year sample, and the occurrences of “Why” may be slightly under-estimated, 
while the percentage of “What” falls within the constructed confidence intervals when the 
significance level was under 5%. Furthermore, with a 1% significance level, the data collected 
does not sanction the assertion of significant differences between the pi proportions of these 
three occurrences for Period 5 and the p*i estimations of the theoretical two-week-years. 
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the relevant insights each construct provided, we consolidated the second level 
constructs into two broad theoretical dimensions: “justifying SRI” and “practicing 
RI.” The theoretical dimensions resulting from the data resonate with convention 
theory literature, with a focus on the multiplicity of equilibriums and institutional 
maintenance or change. Most importantly, they provided guidance to understand the 
financial actors’ collective beliefs around RI.  
 
Figure 5 provides a schematic overview of this process, showing our first-
order codes, second-order constructs, and derived theoretical dimensions which we 
use to study the mainstreaming process of RI among financial actors. 
 
Figure 5: Three levels of coding lead to two theoretical concepts 
3
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2.5 Analysis and Findings 
Our analysis explores the collective beliefs for responsible investment and 
how have they evolved over time, in order to contribute to the discussion on RI 
mainstreaming. In this section we present our findings organized in two subsections. 
We first present the five periods we have identified. They are both a result for the first 
level of analysis, as well as a step in the methodology providing units of analysis for 
the second level of analysis. Second we analyze the evolution of the collective beliefs 
throughout the five periods of RI. Our investigation of RI collective beliefs also 
surfaced two key sets of mainstreaming activities around RI: (1) justifying RI and (2) 
practicing RI, which we develop at the end of the section. The implication of those 
collective beliefs for mainstreaming and RI in general will be addressed in the 
discussion section.  
 
2.5.1 RI periods 
We found five RI periods in our data, spanning between 1982 and 2010: the 
«civil rights» years (1982-1991), the «green niche» years (1992-1997), the 
«professionalization» years (1998-2000), the «SRI» years (2001-2004) and the “ESG” 
years (2005-2010). Because our data consists in articles from the financial press, read 
by mainstream investors, the first RI period begins with the appearance of RI linked 
terminology in the Financial Times, which dates back to 1982. This corroborates 
Boxenbaum and Gond’s observation that “RI” terminology first appeared in the New 
York Times in the late 1980s” (2013, p. 13). In addition, the last period is not yet over 
as no discontinuity in the RI discourse in the press was identified despite the 2008 
financial crisis. From our data we can say that the financial crisis did not provoke any 
change in the normative arrangement in finance. However the impact of the crisis may 
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be long term rather than short term. Therefore it would be interesting to further 
monitor this last RI period to determine when it gives place to a new RI period, with 
new characteristics in terms of discourse and salient representations of RI.  
 
Civil rights years. Media coverage during this period is overwhelmingly 
turned to South Africa, apartheid, black worker wages, and targeted campaigns 
against companies. The main RI strategy discussed is the divestment practice. In the 
data, finance is linked to ethics during this period. We label it the “civil rights” period 
(1982-1991) because of the focus on social issues.  
 
Green niche years. The second period (1992-1997) corresponds to the end of 
the apartheid coverage in the financial press. This period is characterized by low 
media coverage of RI. Still, there are a few references to niche financial initiatives, 
mostly environmentally oriented such as “green funds”. The concern for financial 
return linked to these ethical investments comes up for the first time in the discourse.  
 
Professionalization years. The third period (1998-2000) corresponds to the 
early professionalization years. Pension funds start to get a lot of attention in the 
financial press, along with the issue of their social responsibility. This is a transition 
period during which the word “responsibility” becomes the preferred terminology 
when discussing ethical investments.  
 
SRI years. In this fourth phase (2001-2004), the term “ethical” is abandoned, 
and the term “SRI” is introduced. The professionalization is increasing and “fund 
managers” and “fund management” become some of the most frequent words of the 
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sample. With the boom in the coverage of pension funds come the first discussions on 
materiality and regulation linked to RI.  
 
ESG years. The fifth period begins in 2005, when the focus of RI shifts to 
climate change. It is also characterized by the combination of RI and corporate 
governance, which were so far treated separately. We label this last period the ESG 
period because media coverage is characterized by a search for neutrality in its 
wording, away from any ethical shade. It is also during this period that the term ESG 
appeared. Although our sample ends in 2010, there is no discontinuity so far that 
would allow closing the bracket. We therefore consider this period to be ongoing.   
 
2.5.2 Collective beliefs 
Our findings in terms of collective beliefs regarding RI (Table 4) consist in 
three second-order constructs: defining or redefining what RI is, justifying the 
practice or non-practice of RI and clarifying how to approach RI, which we also refer 
to respectively as “what is RI”, “why do RI” and “how to do RI”. These collective 
beliefs are representations that emerge as focal points for individuals who, faced with 
uncertainty regarding the nature of RI, attempt to determine what the market will act 
upon. The collective beliefs for RI mainstreaming evolved over time around each of 
the three constructs. Table 4 highlights this evolution from period 1 to 5 for each 
second order construct from one period to the other, showing how the content of 
collective beliefs evolved, and how the number of collective beliefs increased.  
Table 4: 3 types of collective beliefs for RI mainstreaming evolve over time 
Content of  
collective belief 
Defining what 
is RI 
Justifying the 
(non-)practice of RI 
Clarifying how 
to approach RI 
period 1    
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RI is about ethics 
business and ethics are 
separate concerns 
RI demand will grow in 
the future 
NRQ* 
period 2    
 
NRQ RI demand will grow in 
the future. 
RI returns underperform 
NRQ 
period 3    
 
RI is not all black or 
white 
RI’s financial 
performance is unclear 
NRQ 
period 4    
 
RI is long-term 
lack of information 
demand for RI exists materiality is unclear 
RI requires a more sophisticated 
approach 
period 5    
 
NRQ inconclusive financial 
performance 
growing demand for RI 
RI initiatives are multiplying 
RI networks are important 
Do RI through  engagement 
RI needs better data 
*NRQ = no relevant quote 
 
A more detailed examination of the collective beliefs shows that they are 
dynamic and contribute to a changing landscape. The “civil rights” years (1985-1991) 
are dominated by the belief that RI is about ethics, where business and ethics are 
separate concerns and thereby disconnected. However there is a belief that RI will 
grow in the future. The «green niche» years (1992-1997) emphasize the belief that RI 
does not lead to better (financial) performance than regular investment strategies, but 
that demand may grow. The «professionalization» years (1998-2000) highlight the 
complexity of RI, complexity which reappears in the «SRI» years (2001-2004). 
However this fourth period also shows an increasing number of collective beliefs 
around RI including the long term perspective of RI, the need for a more sophisticated 
approach to practice RI, the issue of materiality and the lack of good information to 
evaluate companies on ESG factors. The «ESG» years (2005-2010) bring in the 
notion of collaboration among actors and the importance of networks. The discourse 
in this period highlights the importance of engaging with companies rather than 
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merely confronting them. In this last period we witness an evolution of the collective 
belief justifying the practice of RI: demand for RI is collectively believed to be 
growing, whereas in the previous periods demand for RI was seen as potentially 
growing in the future.  
We can see that the number of different collective beliefs around RI increases 
over time, meaning that constituents increasingly share common beliefs around this 
activity. The results also show that the debate around RI has shifted from “what is RI” 
to “how to do RI”, highlighting the professionalization of the field (Figure 6). Indeed 
the questions of definition and understanding disappear from the debate. The same is 
true for the justification discourse related to “why do RI”. Although RI is not yet 
mainstream, it has gained recognition among mainstream investors.  
 
In the next two subsections we go in more details into the content of the three 
identified collective beliefs.   
 
Figure 6: Three second-order constructs represent varying proportions of the discourse over 
time.  
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Much of the RI discourse describes, defines or redefines responsible 
investment. This is particularly true in the early years of RI. We captured this 
discourse in the “Redefining what is RI” second order construct. 
 
Our data shows that discussions around the ethics of RI play an important role 
in the first three periods. However references to ethics are often located at the 
personal level rather than collective. In 2001 Sparkes raised the question «whose 
ethics?» is RI referring to. Personal ethics may lead to many contradictions and 
tensions and hinder the process of mainstreaming. To mainstream RI a higher level of 
abstraction may be necessary, what Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) refer to as 
hypernorms. Hypernorms are transcultural values that include fundamental concepts 
of rights and social good common to most major religions or countries. The reference 
to personal ethics tends to disappear as from the professionalization years.  
  
With the professionalization of RI comes a need to define the conditions and 
methods of their work (DiMaggio et al., 1983). During this period, there is an attempt 
to obtain a certain normative control by standardizing professional norms. As a result, 
the predominant preoccupation relayed by the press in recent years has to do with 
information availability and standardization,  which have been documented by 
academics. Slager et al. (2012) document the standardization role of the FTSE4Good 
index, a public metric which was co-opted by its users. They show how the 
organization recaptures and mobilizes the regulative capacity of its standard, in a way 
that is not always visible or planned. When it comes to standardization by 
multistakeholder initiative, IS26000 is an example discussed by Ruwet (2010) who 
highlights the alternative to democracy presented by such a governance model. The 
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Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is another example, investigated by Brown et al. 
(2009) who show how the GRI’s institutional entrepreneurship strategy left a “legacy 
of unresolved tensions”, while Etzion and Ferraro (2010) highlight the role of analogy 
used by GRI to resolve some of the tensions in institutional entrepreneurship. The 
collective belief is that there is a lack of good data. And when information is 
available, it is often perceived as of low quality and very dispersed, which does not 
allow benchmarking.  
 
“First comes greater standardisation of SRI performance measurement. The Social 
Investment Forum concluded: "With different definitions of SRI, market factors, cultural 
concerns and methodologies for collecting data, it is difficult to make controlled 
comparisons on a global scale." Source: 20070305FT 
 
The collective beliefs (re-)defining RI are characterized by ambiguity and 
differentiation over time: the data shows a difficulty in being coherent. How can RI 
have values and bring financial return? Uncertainty around what is RI seems to be 
reduced during the green years: the belief during that period is that RI is green funds. 
The challenge of defining RI is not resolved for long, and resurges with the 
professionalization of the field. Funds cannot be “all things to all people” as one fund 
manager states (source: 20001026FT). This has practical implications when faced 
with investment decisions in grey areas and suggests a fragmentation of the RI 
market.  
 
During the green years, RI has a narrow definition, making it easier to 
circumscribe. After the green years, RI has a broader definition. The discussion on 
defining RI still goes on but on a different, more granular level. The RI press coverage 
of recent years highlights the notion of short-termism: the focus of financial markets 
is short-term, for many reasons, including quarterly reporting and remuneration 
60 
 
structure linked to short-term objectives. In contrast, RI is believed to have a long-
term focus. Investors are left to interpret this salience in different ways. If RI is long-
term, it does not fit the short-term focus of financial markets. But it also means RI can 
offer the long-term vision missing in financial markets. Finally, it means that any 
effect of RI (performance or materiality for example) would be visible in the long-
term.  
 
To conclude, the collective beliefs for defining what RI is, tell us about 
investments driven by personal values versus hypernorms, a heterogeneous market, 
and long-term horizon. In addition, RI is perceived as a boundary object, with few 
shared representations regarding what RI is, beyond the idea that it has varying 
definitions, interpretations, and practical applications.  
 
Table 5: illustrative quotes of collective beliefs for RI: (re-)defining what is RI 
Civil rights 
years 
Green niche 
years 
Professionalization SRI years ESG years 
Personal values 
“Most ethical 
investors think 
the time is not yet 
right to relax their 
restrictions on 
groups with 
South African 
interests” Source: 
19911012ft 
Personal values 
“The deposits are 
used as loans for 
environmentally 
friendly projects in 
construction, 
farming and 
industry. You could 
say these 
depositors are 
idealistic," says Mr. 
Schwarz. "But 
there's satisfaction 
in their money 
cleaning up the air. 
" Source: 
19960306WSJ 
Hypernorms 
"We have been taking 
heed of the active side 
of stock picking for 
some time now," says 
Simon Baker, fund 
manager of the 
Jupiter Ecology Fund. 
"When we first 
started out we 
focused on the 
negative side, 
excluding companies 
and trying to be all 
things to all people, 
but now we're moving 
into SRI." Source: 
20001026FT 
 
Boundary object 
“There are several 
debilitating 
limitations. One is 
the lack of a broad 
consensus on what 
actually 
constitutes socially 
responsible 
corporate 
behaviour.” 
Source: 
20030303.2FT 
Common 
principles 
“Efforts should 
accelerate to find 
greater common 
ground and build 
from there, 
perhaps around 
widely agreed 
upon benchmarks. 
Investors' ability 
to evaluate 
options and make 
informed choices 
is critical to 
efficient, liquid 
capital markets 
worldwide.” 
Source: 
20070305FT 
 Personal values 
"I can think of 
nothing more 
ludicrous than 
investing in 
companies which 
make our future 
worse," says Tessa 
Conflict of logics  
He offers a word of 
caution to those 
marketing such funds, 
however, not to rely 
too heavily on 
religious sentiment at 
the expense of 
 Boundary object 
“When people say 
they want to 
invest ethically, 
we ask them what 
they mean," he 
explains. Source: 
20090411FT 
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Tennant, head of 
global-care 
research at NPI. 
"Ethical investing 
isn't idealism, but 
ultimate 
pragmatism." 
Source: 
19960306WSJ 
fundamentals. Even if 
something is Shari'ah 
compliant, he says, 
"Muslims are shrewd 
investors. They will 
still want something 
that is well managed, 
and they will want 
returns.” Source: 
19990305WSJ 
 
Justifying the (non-)practice of RI 
 
Justifying the (non-)practice of RI is a second order construct that answers the 
question “why do RI”. An important proportion of the discourse throughout all 
periods attempts to legitimize RI by building business cases and disseminating 
examples of RI success. This covers discussions on the link between RI and financial 
return, risk management arguments, professional legitimacy considerations, as well as 
the market demand for RI. This theme peaks during the green niche years, then 
fluctuates without ever being the main issue. Interestingly, the discourse justifying the 
practice of RI and the discourse defining RI evolve in opposition. 
 
In the data, the question of financial return is key and even by the last period, 
the data shows that RI funds have not yet truly proven their performance. In addition, 
a new consensus seems to form around the idea that it is complex to prove 
performance. For example, articles relay the academic and practitioner studies trying 
to prove the link of financial return. Depending on the article, or even within a same 
article, statements on the financial performance of RI are inconclusive. Within our 
sample of articles we found the following positions: a link between RI and 
performance exists but is unclear; RI leads to underperformance; RI does not lead to 
underperformance; or RI gives superior performance. We see a difference between the 
first four periods, mentioning more underperformance, and the last period. By the 
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ESG years, the financial return discourse becomes mostly positive. More specifically, 
our data for the ESG years affirms a positive link in 27% of cases and claims no 
financial underperformance due to RI in another 27% of cases. The other 45% is 
discourse saying there is a link but it is unclear, or noting that financial performance is 
key but that nothing more can be said about it. The collective belief is that the link 
between RI and financial return is inconclusive, unclear and complex, reflecting a 
very similar debate in academic literature.  
Witness the conflicting results from analyses to determine whether investors sacrifice 
returns for ethical investing. According to Morningstar, US domestic equity SRI funds 
had an average annualised return of 8.53 per cent over the past three years, while the 
Standard &Poor's 500 Index posted 10.32 per cent. By stretching the period to 10 years, 
which includes the dotcom boom, this gap narrows, largely because of SRI funds' 
technology holdings - a 7.21 per cent gain on average each year versus 7.93 per cent for 
the S&P 500. A Wharton School study over a longer period equally shows SRI funds 
underperforming a broader universe of funds. Other research, though, finds (...)"" 
Source: 20070305FT 
 
Demand for RI is the second most important justification discourse for 
practicing RI. As for financial return, it is also a market driven discourse. In the first 
four periods, the collective belief is that there will be a demand for RI, and that it will 
grow. This demand is mostly believed to come from the base (private investors) and 
from unconventional institutional investors, such as faith based investors or NGOs. In 
the ESG years, the collective belief changes to there is a demand for SRI and it is 
growing.  
 
Table 6: illustrative quotes of collective beliefs for RI: justifying the (non-)practice of RI 
Civil rights years Green niche years Professionalization SRI years ESG years 
Lower return 
“There are some 
circumstances in which 
that duty [of getting 
the best possible 
return] has to give way 
to considerations 
derived from Christian 
morality» argued 
Growing demand 
"Not everyone 
agrees, of course. But 
interest in ethical 
investment funds 
appears to be 
growing, […] "there 
are not enough of 
these trusts to satisfy 
Growing demand 
 “In the U.K., money in 
funds tailored along 
religious or ethical lines, 
which tend to overlap in 
their investment 
philosophies, 
quadrupled in the past 
five years to GBP 2.2 
Growing demand 
“The quest for fund 
managers willing - or, 
rather, able - to run 
pension fund money 
over the long term is 
well and truly on. A 
consortium of big 
investors - led by the 
Performance, an 
important issue 
"It's no good our 
saying, 'we don't 
perform so well but 
count on us to save 
the world' “. Source: 
20060407FT 
63 
 
Robert Walker QC, for 
the Church 
Commissioners in the 
High Court this week." 
Source: 19911012ft 
investor demand." 
Source: 19960306WSJ 
billion ($3.55 billion) as 
of last June, according to 
the Ethical Investment 
Research Service, 
reflecting growing 
investor demand for 
these kinds of 
specialised vehicles. 
Source: 19990305WSJ  
Universities 
Superannuation 
Scheme - is today 
launching a 
competition to find 
specialists who can 
implement a Euros 
30bn long-term 
mandate in a 
genuinely responsible 
manner. Source: 
20030303.3FT 
Inconclusive 
performance 
Over the three year 
period, seven ethical 
funds were in the 
bottom half of their 
sectors and four in 
the top half. The 
record is better for 
the one year period 
with ethical funds 
split evenly into the 
the two halves 
making a long-term 
assessment of their 
performance 
impossible. But in 
that period the 
average ethical fund 
has outperformed 
the average unit 
trust. Source: 
19911012ft 
Performance, an 
important issue 
 “The novelty of 
Islamic funds has 
long ago worn off. 
Now, the issues are 
the performance of 
these funds 
compared with 
conventional funds, 
and the depth of the 
market. Source: 
19921005ft 
Performance, an 
important issue 
“This brings us to the 
much debated question 
of company profits/fund 
performances versus 
morality. Can ethical 
investment and 
shareholder value really 
make comfortable bed 
partners? Investors at 
times have had to 
sacrifice some of their 
returns to satisfy their 
convictions in the short 
term, but research 
shows that many 
individual ethical funds 
have outperformed their 
mainstream 
equivalents.” Source: 
19990305WSJ 
  
 
Clarifying how to practice RI 
 
A third type of collective belief contributes to clarifying how to practice RI. It 
is an RI implementation oriented discourse, addressing and discussing methods, 
regulations, RI initiatives, available resources and skills, accountability and 
materiality challenges. It steadily increases over time, and becomes the main topic in 
the last RI period.  
With the professionalization of RI comes a need to operationalize RI. Before 
the SRI years, our European data makes very few mentions of professional 
associations or RI training, and there is no mention of RI organizations with enough 
visibility to organize and regroup mainstream investors (except for the ICCR). In 
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contrast, in the last period the focus of many articles is on networks, with statements 
such as “I invite all institutional investors to consider becoming signatories to the PRI 
and join a global network of peers working to address these priorities” (source: 
20090302FT.2) or “an increasing number of networks are sharing information, 
developing knowledge centres and finding new ways to communicate". The collective 
belief at this stage is that RI requires collaborative engagement: active investors 
working together as described in the following quote.  
“As active owners, investors should work with investee companies to ensure 
comprehensive and systematic disclosure of the information they need in order to make 
responsible investment decisions. Ensuring the disclosure of information on ESG and 
other issues will enhance investors' understanding of their underlying investments and 
avoid a repeat of recent mistakes.” Source: 20090302FT.2 
 
The collective belief of “how to do RI” is that RI requires a more sophisticated 
approach. And until this approach is available (in terms of models, of materiality 
assessment, of analyst skills...), the coordination process based on this collective 
belief may lead mainstream funds to cautiously not engage in RI. Another result of the 
belief may be to push institutional investors to develop the tools and models currently 
missing for RI mainstreaming.  
Table 7: illustrative quotes of collective beliefs for RI: clarifying how to practice RI 
Civil 
rights  
years 
Green niche years Professionalization SRI years ESG years 
NRQ Uneven quality of 
research 
 “Some of continental 
Europe's 'green' 
investment funds 
which make 
environmental or 
ethical claims could 
lose the confidence of 
investors because of 
poor definitions and a 
low level of supporting 
research.” Source: 
19930306ft 
Changing methods 
"Fundamentally the 
ethical market has 
changed over the past 
ten years," says Lee 
Coates, director at UK 
ethical financial adviser, 
Ethical Investors Group 
(EIG). "When the 
market first started it 
had absolutist notes and 
focused on exclusion. 
But now institutional 
investors are coming in 
on a more proactive, 
positive stance on 
Materiality, key criteria 
“The key litmus test will 
be whether performance 
on a given social or 
environmental issue 
provides useful insights 
into the company's 
strategic management 
capabilities and 
organizational agility. For 
instance, the extent to 
which a company 
manufactures 
contraceptive devices 
does not - in my view - 
provide such insights. On 
the other hand, the 
Uneven quality of research 
“Another complication is this: 
how does one independently 
confirm proprietary analysis? 
More work is needed to 
develop objective, 
comprehensive and verifiable 
processes that enable 
investors to compare 
companies' ESG 
performances.” Source: 
20070305FT 
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behalf of their clients." 
Source: 20001026FT 
quality of its labor 
relations and human 
capital development 
capabilities - arguably - 
does.”Source: 
20030303.2FT 
 
 Changing methods 
"You can't be ultra-
ethical if you want to 
make money. 
European 
multinationals 
investing in China 
would be out on 
ethical grounds. 
There's a new trend in 
ethical investment, a 
pragmatism built on 
compromises. You 
take five hotel chains, 
for example, and pick 
the one which offends 
the least." Source: 
19960306WSJ 
Engagement required 
Constructing such 
funds, however, 
presents a delicate 
balance between 
ideology, investment-
management strategy, 
and, occasionally, 
shareholder activism.” 
Source: 19990305WSJ 
Need for comparability 
“The Johannesburg 
Securities Exchange 
hopes to capitalise on 
both trends by launching 
a socially responsible 
investment (SRI) index. 
The index will include 
only companies that 
meet "triple bottom-line" 
criteria, covering 
financial, social and 
environmental 
responsibility. It will be 
the world's third such 
index, and the developing 
world's first, with a 
launch expected early 
next year. Source: 
20031006FT 
 
Need for comparability 
“But data are often too 
vague, lacking order and 
integrity, and there is no 
agreement internationally 
over what a sustainability 
report should comprise." 
Source: 20101004FT.2 
  Insufficient transparency 
“strengthening regulatory 
pressure for greater 
transparency and 
stronger environmental 
and social responsibility 
from both companies and 
institutional investors” 
Source: 20030303.2FT 
Insufficient transparency 
“Screening is also hampered 
by the difficulties inherent in 
quantifying environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) 
issues. Data points may not 
be readily obtainable. 
Opaque corporate disclosures 
may obstruct data gathering.”  
Source: 20070305FT> 
 
2.6 Discussion and conclusion 
 
This chapter focuses on responsible investment in financial markets, informed 
by an alternative theory of market participants' decision making. Our analysis of the 
collective beliefs for responsible investment and of the evolution of these beliefs over 
time allows us to develop two categories of collective beliefs which influence the 
capacity of RI to become mainstream: justifying RI and practicing RI. We now 
elaborate on how our findings contribute to RI literature and extend existing accounts 
of collective beliefs.  
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2.6.1 On the RI periods 
 
The history of RI can be decomposed in five different periods, each with their 
specific characteristics. In this chapter I build on existing research on RI’s history to 
understand the roots and heterogeneity of RI today, but we construct the RI periods 
empirically, giving a solid basis to what was so far mostly intuition. Our data reveals 
the existence of RI’s “civil rights” years (1982-1991), “green niche” years (1992-
1997), “professionalization” years (1998-2000), “SRI” years (2001-2004) and “ESG” 
years (2005-ongoing).  
 
Our findings show that RI is regularly reformulated in new terms, translated to 
fit the collective beliefs of the time. Each period is characterized by its own 
terminology for RI, particularly the latter two in which the terms SRI and ESG were 
coined. Many publications give empirical evidence of RI translation in space (e.g. 
Sakuma & Louche, 2008, Lozano et al. 2006). Gond and Boxenbaum (2013) in 
particular followed the steps of RI translation to fit geographical contexts, through 
glocalization. They distinguished the translation in meaning brought by glocalization 
from an “interpretative translation, which solely involves symbolic, rhetorical or 
discursive changes” (p.7). In this chapter I illustrate a case of translation over time 
rather than through space, and more specifically translation to fit collective beliefs. In 
fact, we add to their assertion that translation goes beyond discursive changes if it 
reflects the content of the new collective belief.  
 
These first findings are helpful in understanding the current RI terminology, 
and in providing sound units of analysis for further research on discourse and meaning 
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within these periods. Furthermore, they highlight the transition years between each 
period, which will require further research with different data and fieldwork methods, 
to understand what happened in between periods. So far, our data highlights that both 
actors and events play a determining role in the period change. For example at the end 
of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, many environmental events took place. 
These are the Brundtland report in 1987, Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion in 
1987, Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992, just to mention a few. 1991-92 marks a 
turning point for the first period during which RI takes a more environmental focus. 
At the end of the 1990s, many new actors came into the RI field, such as rating 
organizations, consultancy firms, but also pension funds. These new actors generated 
the launch of the third period. So each period is characterized by a very specific set of 
actors and events that can explain the transition to the next period, warranting a 
refocus on these groups of actors.  
 
2.6.2 On the collective beliefs of RI 
 
Our data illustrated that beliefs are not fixed but evolve over time: from “RI 
underperforms” to “RI performance is inconclusive”; from “RI demand will grow in 
the future” to “RI demand has now grown”. They thereby contribute to a changing 
landscape of RI. But a significant amount of coordination work is required for the 
prevailing collective beliefs to evolve. As Boyer and Orléan wrote, “agreements are 
typically harder to change than individual decisions” (1992, p18). Changes in the 
collective beliefs are difficult because of the behavioral and institutional resistances, 
but possible. Boyer and Orléan (1992) put forward a taxonomy for changes in 
conventions, including: general collapse (a general collapse annihilating the existing 
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structure of conventions), external invasion (slow increase of the number of 
individuals adopting the new convention until it reaches a critical mass where all will 
convert to the new convention), translation (the new convention integrates certain 
properties of the old one and is being reformulated in its proper terms) and collective 
agreement (the community as a whole may recognize the superiority of the new 
convention and triggers a coordinated change in collective behavior).  
 
It is the latter three conditions – external invasion, translation and collective 
agreement – that are of particular interest for considering the adaptation of 
conventions that investment professionals and their agents adhere to, since the 
industry is by nature conservative and mindful of fiduciary obligations to 
beneficiaries. The importance of legitimacy within the conventions framework also 
makes collective agreement, or collaboration, preferable to going alone (Guyatt, 
2006). Our data shows that these processes are taking place. Translation occurred at 
each change of period, with the adoption of new discourse, new terminology as one 
element of translation. A large increase in articles discussing RI occurred since the 
SRI years in 2001, illustrating external invasion by institutional investors and hinting 
toward mainstreaming. However, the content of the collective beliefs shows little to 
no sign of collective agreement: in our data the community as a whole does not 
recognize the superiority of a new way of coordinating itself. Instead, the collective 
beliefs recognize the complexity of RI and the need for new tools and approaches. 
These collective beliefs tell us RI is still under construction. Our findings raise an 
interesting question for future research: how do suboptimal solutions persist. There 
are many cases in finance where sub-optimal solutions are long lasting, or non-
desirable ones, such as the efficient market hypothesis. 
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This study follows the trajectory of multiple collective beliefs to finally 
identify two distinct categories of collective beliefs: “justifying RI” and “practicing 
RI”. Both types of beliefs allow coordination among market participants who need to 
make decisions under uncertainty. Our data reveals that in the case of RI, collective 
beliefs “justifying RI” come first. It is not until these are largely resolved that 
collective beliefs about “practicing RI” dominate the discourse. These two types of 
collective beliefs emerging from our data reinforce an ongoing conversation about 
how institutions influence our thoughts and behavior or, as Dequech (2008) puts it, 
about logics of justification (referring to Boltanski and Thévenot’s principles of 
justification [1999]) and logics of action (defined a set of shared and regular ways of 
thinking and acting). Our findings support a perspective on legitimacy in which both 
logics of justification and action coexist. In addition, our findings illustrate how 
justification comes before action. This result may seem to contradict previous 
suggestions that the adoption of procedures comes logically prior to justification 
(Dequech, 2008). Although our data does not allow to explain this observation 
empirically, we would like to suggest that, in the case of RI mainstreaming, 
justification can come before action because both take place in the pre-existing 
context of financial markets. As a result, the objects, people, units of measurement 
according to which RI will be justified already exist – even if they are subsequently 
reinvented. In sum, the interaction between justifying and practicing plays a role in 
legitimizing RI and further analysis should tell us more about the implications of 
justification before practice.  
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I also contributes to the existing scholarship on collective beliefs by 
developing a method to identify and study the collective beliefs. While interviews 
dominate in qualitative studies (Kvale 2008), the use of interviews to identify beliefs 
and justification may force the respondent into artificial discourse. The use of media, 
on the other hand, provides a forum independent from the researchers on a sensitive 
topic of auto-referential beliefs. Our study represents an attempt to achieve 
methodological fit for convention theory by applying a particular method of data 
collection.  
 
2.6.3 On the implication of collective beliefs for RI mainstreaming  
 
From our findings, it appears that investors can no longer reasonably really 
ignore the topic of RI. Between 1982 and 2010, 3,462 financial press articles 
discussing RI were published. However is it enough to claim that RI has moved from 
a niche activity to a mainstream practice? Some have argued that RI has become or is 
becoming mainstream (World Economic Forum and AccountAbility, 2005; Robeco 
and Booz & Company, 2008) while others are claiming that RI remains a niche 
(Entine, 2008). In this chapter I do not intend to directly answer the question whether 
or not RI is mainstream but instead we explore the collective beliefs of RI over time 
to understand how we collectively make sense of RI. We argue that insights into the 
collective beliefs inform us on the capacity of RI to become mainstream.  
 
The data highlights uncertainty and confusion around RI. The confusion 
regarding which methods to follow, which criteria are material, and the need to 
collaborate make it necessary for RI players to consider the opinion of other market 
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participants. To do this, they need to adopt and follow collective beliefs. This helps RI 
market players to coordinate, meaning that they can form opinions that do not go 
against the dominant opinion on the market. These collective beliefs should also allow 
them to process information in a simpler way.  
 
From the collective beliefs identified in the press, it seems difficult and 
premature to conclude that coordination has taken place among mainstream investors 
in terms of RI integration in mainstream finance. The nature of the collective beliefs 
remains confused and portrays a diffused perception of RI, but above all highlights 
the numerous impediments for practicing RI. Those beliefs may well lead investors 
and analysts not to consider ESG factors. This cannot be described as an intentional 
strategy – this is not a case of dominant convention based on the belief that «no one 
uses ESG factors» – but rather as a result of the lack of clarity about RI. However, 
collective beliefs around RI are still evolving. As long as there is no collective belief 
encouraging the adoption of RI, the market for sustainability remains a niche market. 
Although we cannot conclude on the existence of a collective belief leading to the 
integration of RI, we can say that the process of mainstreaming of RI is under way 
(Louche, 2004).  
 
Our findings support that as the discourse shifted from ethics to market logics 
(Mehrpouya, 2011), RI matured, attained greater professionalization, and has become 
less critical of mainstream finance. The collective beliefs in the fifth, “ESG years”, 
period show no sign of RI altering the financial order, but point rather to RI being 
modified by conventional finance as it is slowly co-opted by the financial community. 
Do the collective beliefs identified in the “ESG years” still support our definition of 
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RI as an investment that acknowledges its impact on society, and accepts its social 
and environmental responsibilities? We would suggest that the definition of RI is still 
sufficiently vague to allow this strong interpretation.  
 
The financial market often seems impervious to critique and to change, as 
illustrated by the RI periods and collective beliefs which did not change after 2008. If 
RI has the ambition to change mainstream finance’s supply and demand for 
sustainability, the collective beliefs of RI have important implications. These beliefs 
indeed influenced the value and desirability of RI, which they do not endorse so far.  
 
2.6.4 RI in a theoretical context of market inefficiency  
 
With collective beliefs, our study emphasizes the meso-level, which tends to 
be understudied in the field of RI. Most studies on sustainability focus on the 
individual actors or on the institutional level. Convention theory is a middle-range 
theory which allows us to look in between the individual and the institution. We 
consider that value is created at the collective level, through coordination processes. 
In this way, convention theory is very different from typical economic theory: we are 
not studying micro-level individual preferences, like economic theory that presents 
equilibriums resulting from personal utility functions. Similarly, the focus of 
behavioral finance stays on the micro-level – individual’s irrational beliefs – when it 
proposes to reconsider the rationality of actors and the efficient market hypothesis 
(Schleifer, 2000, p.50.). But that framework creates new challenges, in terms of how 
to assess value. If there is no such thing as intrinsic value then value cannot be 
calculated by discounted cash-flows. Furthermore, while these critiques are founded, 
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they do not facilitate the case of RI mainstreaming because they do not fit in the 
financial language, which focuses on commensuration and mathematical models. If 
actors are irrational there is no commensuration, there is no benchmarking possible. 
This dilemma highlights the need for alternative models to neo-classical theory that 
can be translated in a market logic (Orlitzky, 2013). 
 
With the convention theory lens, we also consider the RI market to be 
uncertain and confusing, thus not an efficient market. But we do not consider market 
players as irrational. Rather they take rational decisions based on their anticipations of 
collective beliefs. We built on Orléan’s questioning regarding financial markets’ 
efficiency and regarding the fallacy of intrinsic value to better understand the 
collective beliefs around which actors coordinate. Our findings help us develop our 
proposition that the meso-level is the missing piece of a theoretical puzzle.  
 
Much effort has gone into demonstrating the value of responsible investment 
by measuring the link between RI and financial return. Those attempting to make the 
business case for RI, however, end up with inconclusive or unsatisfactory results. We 
suggest that these studies struggle to demonstrate the value of sustainability, because 
they approach value as an intrinsic notion instead of considering value as resulting 
from coordination processes. It is not that sustainability has little or no value; rather, 
its value is influenced by collective beliefs.  
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3 Disputes and resolutions around responsible investment 
3.1 Chapter Summary 
After having identified the collective belief on RI in the previous chapter, I 
now move on to study to what extent RI manages to legitimate itself through 
discourse. I have shown that whatever definition or intentions we put behind RI, it is 
not a subversive practice. RI does not challenge conventional finance. Rather, RI 
purifies finance, bringing it back to its normative foundations. This is how RI might 
be making a difference and contributing to society. This statement is quite different 
from most of the management research on responsible investing which consists in 
demonstrating how RI is good for business and good for society. But the belief that 
business and market-based strategies will bring positive social and ecological change 
is far from natural and results in disputes.  
This chapter4 shows how the mainstreaming of RI requires developing and 
combining arguments in order to construct and defend a valid and plausible discourse. 
This will allow RI to resist the critiques and appease the disputes resulting from its 
institutionalization. 
I collect articles in the media to identify the RI controversies. For these 
disputes, I look at the attempts of RI to give a robust justification of the particular 
arrangement it promotes, vis-à-vis a public audience, and discuss possible resolutions. 
I find that RI focuses on appealing to conventional finance with a market logic, 
resulting in very few challenges of the legitimacy of the existing institutional order. In 
a few cases, RI seeks a resolution based on a competing principles resulting in hybrid 
constructions of compromises, which could be consolidated by RI models and tools. 
                                               
4
 This chapter was published as a book chapter : Dumas, C., & Michotte, E. (2014). Where 
do-gooders meet bottom-liners: Disputes and resolutions surrounding socially responsible 
investment. In Socially Responsible Investment in the 21st Century: Does it Make a 
Difference for Society? (pp. 119-148). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. It was awarded the 
Outstanding Author Contribution in the 2015 Emerald Literati Network Awards for Excellence. 
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The results contribute to a better understanding of RI as it is perceived today, and of 
how the disputes around its mainstreaming may unfold in the future. This helps us 
clarify our expectations towards RI and shows that if we want to address 
shortcomings in finance, we should probably not rely on RI as it is defined and 
practiced today. 
3.2 Introduction 
The history of responsible investment (RI) and the variety of RI practices  
suggest that there is more to it than the often cited process of including “social, 
environmental, governance and ethical considerations into investment decision 
making” (Cowton, 1994; Eurosif, 2010; Hudson, 2005; Renneboog, Terhorst, & 
Zhang, 2008; Sparkes, 2002; Waddock, 2003). RI is also about aligning investors with 
broader objectives for society (PRI, 2012, p. 24). Of course RI should not be confused 
with advocacy as practiced by nonprofits, and it does not limit itself to the fast 
growing area of impact investing, which both focus on having an impact on society 
(Sparkes, 2002). But RI does claim to make companies act in a more socially 
responsible way (Eurosif, 2010), and acknowledges that investments have an impact 
on society. Therefore, RI aims to “evaluate that impact and to direct it, as much as 
reasonably possible, to societally productive ends, while achieving a competitive 
return” (Louche & Lydenberg, 2011). With such claims, RI seems to position itself 
differently than mainstream finance. Some authors even suggest that RI introduces an 
alternative – potentially subversive (Markowitz, Cobb, & Hedley, 2011) - vision of 
the role and ends of financial markets.  
 
The proponents of RI thus defend the idea that finance not only must but also 
can have a positive impact on society. However, looking at it more closely, RI seems 
81 
 
to be a fuzzy concept for different reasons. First, the principle of competition on the 
market that is characteristic for conventional finance, and that goes hand in hand with 
a particular representation of the common good, is in RI "completed" by, if not “in 
competition" with other principles pertaining to the environment and to society as a 
whole. By nature, RI combines principles that could be seen as different from each 
other, or even antithetic. Second, the RI actors put different meanings behind this big 
idea of "doing good by doing well", and translate it differently in practice. RI is still 
under construction. Third, despite this heterogeneity, RI is nowadays undergoing 
institutionalization (Déjean and Le Theule, 2011, Louche, 2004, Penalva-Icher, 2012). 
But this attempt to stabilize RI inevitably results in tensions precisely because of the 
two first reasons. Fourth, the literature on RI mainly focuses on its expected financial 
return (2006; Derwall, Bauer, & Koedijk, 2005; Renneboog et al., 2008) and rarely 
investigates other types of return for society, with the exception of a stream of 
literature which focuses on the impact of shareholder engagement on corporate social 
performance (Carleton, Nelson, & Weisbach, 1998). The proof that RI has a positive 
impact on society is therefore currently rather weak. Considering all these issues, it is 
probably not an easy task for the RI proponents to convince a financial and a non-
financial audience alike that RI not only must but also can have a positive impact on 
society.  
 
In order to convince, RI must be "valid" from a normative point of view, and 
also "plausible" from a cognitive point of view (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). The RI 
proponents have to develop and to combine arguments in order to construct and 
defend a valid and plausible discourse on RI that could resist the critiques and appease 
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the controversies, which we call "disputes" according to the theoretical framework 
that will be presented in the next section. This chapter aims to  
a) Identify the disputes around RI’s mainstreaming 
b) Analyze the arguments and counter-arguments around those disputes  
c) Explore potential resolutions of the disputes surrounding RI.  
 
To answer these questions, we analyze the UK media coverage of responsible 
investment in the past 10 years. We rely on the framework of Boltanski & Thévenot 
(2006) as a tool to identify how the RI discourse negotiates different representations 
of common good. We first find a number of expressed tensions regarding the justness 
of a particular social order. We then look at the attempts of RI to give a robust 
justification vis-à-vis a public audience. In doing so, we show to what extent RI 
discursively not only justifies competing visions of how the world should be - what is 
worthy and what is just -  but also proposes a way to bring them together, through 
compromises. We thereby contribute to a better understanding of RI as it is perceived 
today, and how of the disputes around its mainstreaming may unfold in the future.   
 
This chapter first recalls how RI evolved over time through multiple 
definitions, to focus on its current characteristics in the 21st century: a fragmented 
concept which moved away from ethics towards investment practices based on the 
integration of environmental, social and governance criteria (ESG) integration. 
Following that, we present the main concepts of the theoretical framework. We then 
describe the data and method applied to select the topics of disputes for a multi-level 
content analysis of press articles on RI. Follows, for each topic of dispute, a set of 
results identifying whether the dispute challenges the legitimacy of a specific 
institutional order. Another set of results determines the possible resolution of these 
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disputes among a plurality of forms of agreement such as compromise seeking or 
shorter term arrangements. This development places our chapter in the new strand of 
RI literature on the legitimacy of ESG issues, which Gond and Piani (2013) recently 
referred to in their call for research on processes of deliberative negotiation by 
investors and managers over claims’ moral legitimacy, using convention theory.  
 
3.3 Disputes and Justification for Socially Responsible Investment 
3.3.1 RI Over Time  
The history of responsible investment can shed light on the current disputes 
surrounding the institutionalization of RI. RI went through different periods, as 
explained in the previous chapter, during which not one, but plural visions of justice 
were defended by RI actors. In its early days, the first RI actors, who were Quakers, 
were governed by principles derived from religion (Kurtz, 2008; Louche & 
Lydenberg, 2011), which lead in practice to the exclusion of sin stocks from 
investment portfolios. The RI actors of the 1980s were more inspired by a civilian 
representation of justice, where collective solidarity and human rights played an 
important role. This resulted for example in investment decisions against apartheid. 
The RI actors of the 1990’s were mostly green funds governed by ecological 
principles.  
These different “anti-market” and “anti-corporate” visions precede thus what 
became today ESG-integration: an approach consisting in the integration of 
environmental, societal and governance criteria into investment decision-making. This 
is a very corporate focused view of RI involving quantification in the form of key 
performance indicators, ratings, and financial modeling. With this approach comes the 
quest for materiality (AccountAbility, 2006) (what criteria influence financial 
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performance) and commensuration (Déjean, Gond, & Leca, 2004) (how can the 
criteria be measured). But the legitimacy of these ESG issues have to be built in the 
RI institutional context as they are quite different from the original drivers of RI.  
While RI continued to evolve, these various approaches did not disappear. In 
fact, they coexist today, illustrating how the institutionalization of RI leads to disputes 
that must be resolved if RI wants to survive. This makes RI an ideal place to 
understand how different representations of justice, relying each one on disparate 
notions of common good, are conflicting. It also makes convention theory, with its 
ability to take pluralism into account, an indicated framework to deal with RI, which 
we explain next. 
 
3.3.2 Dispute and Justification Through the Lens of the Orders of Worth 
In the thriving literature on convention theory, the orders of worth of Boltanski 
and Thévenot (2006 [1991]) are usually used as a means to study plural social orders, 
typical of complex and fragmented institutional environments. The original intention 
of the authors, however, was not only to develop a functional tool as such, but also to 
better understand how people practically qualify other people or things in their daily 
lives and can create or use categories that help to distinguish them from each other. 
They particularly paid attention to the kind of qualifications that are taken for granted 
because they are seen and experienced as legitimate in a certain situation. These are 
legitimate in terms of coherence or logic (justness) but also in terms of justice – 
which, in our view, Berger and Luckmann (1966) identified as the plausibility and 
validity of an institution. These qualifications rest on general conventions oriented 
towards specific conceptions of the common good, and allow to assess if someone or 
something is a worthy being or not through a "test". This is possible because everyone 
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is well aware of the principle that governs the situation. The authors call this kind of 
principle the higher common principle. This principle can take various forms, but it 
always has the characteristic that it is a very general principle on which people can 
base themselves to find an agreement. It functions as a landmark that contributes to 
the coordination of human activity. It makes it possible to evaluate the beings 
(persons or things) and to articulate them logically to this principle. The social order, 
the "world" as the authors say, is seen as legitimate, and what is judged as worthy is 
considered as contributing to the common good as it is represented in this social order.  
 
According to the authors, the invisible hand of Adam Smith is the most 
accomplished way to justify an unequal distribution of the wealth held by rich people. 
The 'market world' is harmonious in this sense that competition, as higher common 
principle, guides human activity. Of course, social life is far more complex and 
fragmented. The market world is only one of the different ways to organize social 
order around a higher common principle.  To reflect this multiplicity, Boltanski and 
Thévenot (2006 [1991]) identified five other worlds, namely the  “domestic”, “fame”, 
“industrial”, “civic”, and “inspired” worlds (Thévenot, 2007). New worlds were 
added later such as the "green" one and “information” world (Lafaye & Thévenot, 
1993; Thévenot, Moody, M. and Lafaye, C., 2000) and the "connectionist" one, also 
called project oriented world (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, Chiapello & Fairclough, 
2002). Table 8 presents these worlds and the higher common principles in relation to 
which people and things are evaluated as being more or less worthy. 
Table 8: Worlds organized around a higher common principle to determine what is most worthy. 
World Higher common principle Highest worth 
Market Competition Desirable, wealthy 
Industrial Efficiency Efficient, productive, operational 
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Civic The preeminence of collectivities Representative, statutory 
Domestic Anchored tradition Hierarchically superior 
Inspired Inspiration Graceful, singular 
Fame The reality of the opinion Renowned, famous  
Green 
Respecting and protecting nature; 
Sustainability Environmentally friendly 
Connectionist Project oriented activities in networks  Committed, mobile, engaging others 
 
Within each of these worlds, there can be disagreements among the actors 
about how a being has been evaluated. The judgment is thus subject to critiques, and 
those who criticize as well as those who defend the judgment both need to justify their 
point of view in relation to the conventions of the world in question. This is what the 
authors call a dispute. In order to take back the course of the action, people have to 
appease this dispute and to find an agreement. One example among many (Boltanski 
& Thévenot, 2006 [1991]) is a situation of the selection of a candidate for a job. It 
appears, after the selection process, that the chosen candidate is the nephew of one of 
the jury members, the one who precisely gave him a very positive evaluation. Because 
of the preeminence of the industrial world in terms of efficiency of the selection, and 
not the domestic world in terms of personal ties, the selection of this candidate is 
questionable and subject to criticism. After a debate made of critiques and 
justifications, those who are responsible for the selection process agree that a new test 
has to be organized and that the candidate’s uncle has to be replaced in the jury by a 
non-relative. In this case, the test had been purified without betraying the higher 
common principle. This example illustrates how a dispute can arise within a situation 
which is dominated by one world where the persons (the candidates, the jury 
members) and the objects (the tests) have to be well articulated from a logical point of 
view as well as from a normative point of view if they want to be seen and 
experienced as legitimate.  
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But disputes also arise in situations where multiple worlds are at stake. 
Suppose we take the same situation in the context of a family business where the 
industrial logic competes directly with the domestic one wherein loyalty, tradition, 
and personal ties are very important. It is then more difficult to find a legitimate 
agreement because of the presence of different conventions and higher common 
principles. The answer to the question of which one is the best candidate is not the 
same depending on the logic that are seen and experienced as legitimate, not only to 
take a decision but also to justify it in front of those that (could) contest it. Still, 
people can try to find a resolution of the dispute, through a local arrangement, or 
through a compromise. The first one does not pretend to preserve the common good, 
whereas the second one does. However, a compromise can't go back to one higher 
common principle and to one representation of the common good. This is why a 
compromise remains fragile, especially when a dispute about it may lead to the 
clarification of the common good (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p.410).   
 
As De Blic & Lemieux (2005) stress in their study on the institutionalization 
role of scandals, conceiving a scandal or a dispute (such as those we will identify 
below) as a test situation means that we recognize the uncertain outcome of the 
dispute. The values, or rather “worths”, which are disputed may be shaken, but may 
also come out strengthened by the dispute.  Boltanski (2009) identifies three types of 
tests, leading to different resolutions. The “test of truth” attempts to defend what is. It 
is characterized by a tautological discourse to defend the constructed reality with the 
intent of confirming it rather than criticizing it, with readymade formulas, glorifying 
or blaming, and by opposing good and evil. The next level is the “test of legitimacy” 
during which actors question the reality as it is constructed by confronting it with 
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what they are experiencing. As illustrated by Patriotta, Gond & Schultz (2011) in the 
case of a nuclear crisis in Germany, it may lead to a institutional change while 
preserving the legitimacy of existing institutions (political parties, media…). Finally 
comes the “existential test”, which takes place at an individual level, based on 
personal experience of injustice or humiliation for example and which therefore does 
not have the same institutionalization role as the previous two tests. These tests have 
uncertain outcomes but may lead to arrangements or compromises as a result of the 
institutional work of justification (Patriotta et al., 2011), which is one reason why they 
are relevant to discuss how responsible investment might impact the financial system.  
 
There are many other approaches than convention theory that could be 
appropriate to perform discursive analysis of institutions. However, based on the 
above, and confirmed by Cloutier and Langley (2013), we see several arguments 
supporting this approach to study RI. First is the micro perspective, including a way to 
relate to the macro level through daily narrative accounts, which counter-balances the 
meso scope of institutional theory. Then comes the focus on legitimacy struggles and 
how they are resolved on a day to day basis, since the framework offers more than just 
a grammar to quantify worlds of worths. In addition, there is the pragmatic view 
according to which Boltanski and Thévenot bet on actors’ capacity to define by 
themselves what is fair or unfair, and hence the focus on the “critical capacities of 
actors”. For these reasons, and while not a common approach, researchers have 
recently reached a similar conclusion regarding its appropriateness to study financial 
and CSR related topics (Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011, Gond & Piani, 2013; Taupin, 
2013). 
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3.5 Results of Justification in RI 
The proponents of RI seem to bring to the marketplace principles that, at least 
discursively, endorse other conceptions of the common good and of justice than those 
of the "market world" which is the main justification for conventional finance. To 
decide on the issue of a test (typically to decide to invest or not in a certain company) 
is, in the context of RI, problematic by nature. As a result, it is correct to believe that 
RI is profoundly crossed by tensions between different "worlds", and that these 
tensions are harmful in terms of the validity and plausibility of RI. In this chapter, we 
ask ourselves which kind of resolutions RI proposes to appease these tensions 
(arrangement, compromise), depending on their justness. 
 
We thus need to identify the main disputes surrounding RI. This can be the 
contested financial performance of RI, the lack of key performance indicators for RI, 
or the shareholder versus stakeholder debate, to name a few. Three different scenarios 
need to be considered for these disputes and their resolutions.  
 
A first possibility is that the disputes stirred by RI are about the products and 
practices in financial markets, rather than about the underlying principles. In other 
words, RI uses mainly the same conventions as in conventional finance, and complies 
thus with the same logic. In this vein of thought, a recent report has challenged the 
presupposition that RI is different from mainstream finance, suggesting that 
conventional funds invest in a similar way as RI funds (Aeby, 2012), echoing some 
earlier vocal RI critics (Entine, 2003; Hawken, 2004). As noted by Hoffman and 
Ventresca (1999), remaining within the confines of a clearly defined logic cannot lead 
to evolution to profoundly different institutions. As a result, RI would be a way for 
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conventional finance to continue business as usual while appeasing the critique of 
outside actors. Daudigeos and Valiorgue suggest similar results for the evolution of 
corporate responsibility strategies (2010), which were absorbed by the corporate 
system as they matured. Some of the most damaging financial products and practices 
could be halted, but the underlying principle would be confirmed and reinforced.   
 
A second possible vision for the RI discourse is to circumscribe conventional 
finance, by showing that the financial sphere must comply with other spheres of 
justice (democracy, ecology, civil rights…) rather than constantly relying on the 
principle of competition and the dominant conventions of the financial markets. If it 
justifies visions of justice that compete with the one promoted by conventional 
finance, RI is subversive (Markowitz et al, 2011). In this case, the dispute questions 
competing representations of common good and may imply an in-depth reform of the 
financial system. For example, it could argue that, with competition as higher 
common principle, finance doesn't serve the real economy and, in the end, doesn't 
serve society as a whole. Such a critique calls for a significant shift of focus and 
power. In this scenario, RI would be more consistent with the assertion that business 
should generate wealth for society, within social and environmental frameworks 
(Sparkes, 2002, p. 42). 
 
A third possibility, which we hypothesize as the most likely, is that RI is 
neither completely compliant nor completely subversive in relation to the market 
logic. In this third possible type of RI discourse, there is no clear vision of the 
common good and of justice. RI in the 21st century proposes hybrid practices and 
language, but does not discuss the underlying principles that it is built on, because this 
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would probably lead RI to a dead end. RI would be a form of temporary compromise. 
But as suggested by Boltanski & Thévenot, compromises as the resolution of disputes 
are by nature fragile because it is never possible to go back to one higher common 
principle in order to find an agreement.   
 
3.6 Method: Use of Media Discourse 
For a methodological fit with the theoretical framework, we need to collect 
data in a way that brings us to the actors and to what they are really saying, and in a 
way that does not force actors’ discursive engagement. It is indeed not so much how 
the worlds interact which is key in convention theory but rather how the actors call 
upon the different worlds to justify a situation. Because we did not want to force 
artificial discourse and justification, a risk particularly present in interviews with 
“why” questions, we chose to collect data in the media.  
 
A stream of research in media studies presents news reports as a “social 
thermometer”, an important source of information about society (Montes-y-gómez, 
Gelbukh, & López-lópez, 2008). According to this view, their textual analysis allows 
the measurement of current social interests, and the trends for these main opinion 
topics. This vision of media as a platform for discussion (Norris & Robinson, 2003), 
while very convenient for this study, requires a note of caution. Media is indeed much 
more than a platform. On the one hand, we cannot omit to mention the power games 
and agenda setting that form the media content. And on the other hand, general 
audience media as forums for public discourse on an issue, and their impact on public 
opinion, should not be overestimated (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). When 
researching how media discourse and public opinion interact, Gamson notes the 
relatively marginal role media discourse plays for the respondents’ understanding of 
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issues that are close to their everyday experience (i.e. nuclear power in his example). 
In these cases, their own experiential knowledge and popular wisdom take precedence 
over media discourse, which is merely used to “spotlight” (p. 134) particular facts and 
public figures but not to inform respondents’ understanding. The author shows the 
role of framing of an issue in media, by developing the idea of a “media package” 
which conceives of media discourse as a set of interpretive packages that give 
meaning to an issue. These packages, or frames, include a range of positions, allowing 
a certain level of controversies on the issue (Gamson, p3) as we see in the responsible 
investment media discourse. Our data includes the discourse of many different actors, 
reflecting the range of positions around the RI mainstreaming. Most speakers in our 
data are service providers. Specialized responsible investors come next, followed by 
mainstream investors, and RI advocates. Each of these will have different 
interpretative packages and justifications. 
 
In addition to the framing done by media, we need to bring the notion of 
power into the analysis of media and its framing (Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). 
This was highlighted in particular by Golding & Elliott (2006) who show the 
ideological consequences of the way news is produced, for example by demonstrating 
how production routines maintained the societal status through power. Because media 
production and interpretation are affected by social context, media frames, power 
games and agenda setting, we need to avoid an individualist and voluntarist 
orientation assuming that both individual journalists and individual audience members 
are relatively autonomous in their news production and consumption (Vliegenthart & 
van Zoonen, 2011). These notions highlight the importance of multiplying media 
sources with different ideological backgrounds, as we do in this study with three 
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different media samples, and by developing a solid qualitative method of analysis, as 
described in the next section. 
 
3.5.1 Sampling of Newspapers and Articles 
We tracked the evolution of responsible investment disputes through the UK 
press from 2001 to 2012, with three samples of data. A first sample of articles comes 
from the financial press, represented by the Financial Times, Wall Street Journal 
Europe, and the Economist. These media provide good data in terms of articles on 
responsible investment, since they all largely coincide with other sources of 
information, as confirmed by Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) and applied by Dyck 
et al. (2008). Two other samples of articles were collected in the non-financial press, 
represented by a sample of 11 newspapers from the UK and split in two groups: the 
tabloid and the non-tabloid press. For each non-financial newspaper, the typical 
selection criteria of significant circulation size, and area of circulation was amended 
to take cultural aspects into account. Broadsheet press was added to the sample for its 
content and nature, despite a smaller circulation than tabloid press. When newspapers 
were not accessible through the databases over the full period of analysis, they were 
included in the sample from the first full month they became available. This sampling 
resulted in a selection of articles from broadsheet press (The Times, The Guardian, 
Daily Telegraph, The Sunday Times) and another selection from  tabloids (Daily 
Express, Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Star, The Sun, News of the World, Sunday 
Mirror, The Mail on Sunday), including both daily and Sunday papers. In the pursuit 
of efficacy for a qualitative analysis, we constructed theoretical two-week years, a 
principle used in media research as discussed by Hijmans, Pleijter, and Wester (2003), 
leading to a sample of 97 financial press articles for the 2001-2012 period, 112 
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broadsheet press articles and 25 tabloid articles. Levels of coverage are used as 
surrogate measures of the penetration of RI questions into society, similarly to 
previous research by Barkemeyer et al. (2010). 
 
Figure 7: RI press coverage increases cyclically over time 
 
Since 2001, when the first article on RI appeared in the UK financial press, the 
coverage in the financial and non-financial press follows similar cycles. One 
exception is the financial crises year 2008 where coverage dropped in the financial 
press but peaked in the non-financial press. The coverage in tabloids is negligible.  
 
3.5.2 Data Coding and Analysis 
Our coding process went through three stages, leading to our analysis of the 
type of disputes. 
 
1) Open coding. We began the analysis by identifying initial concepts in the 
data and grouping them into categories. This open coding was performed with the 
NVivo software. This first descriptive coding focused on the categories of dispute 
between responsible investment and mainstream investment, which was then 
confronted with the impediments to RI mainstreaming identified in literature for 
validity (Guyatt, 2006; Juravle & Lewis, 2008). Indeed, impediments are likely to 
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coincide with the areas where mainstream investors’ practices are challenged. 
Impediments flow from characteristics of RI that are new, or different, resulting in 
tensions or conflicts. Each utterance in the discourse was taken to be a “unit of 
meaning” (Miles & Huberman, 1994), that is, a phrase bound by a clear ending and 
that expressed at least one clear idea. Sixteen themes of disputes emerged from this 
coding (see Table 9).  
Table 9: How RI justifies itself for 16 main disputes 
* the number in parenthesis corresponds to the ranking of the disputes according to its frequency in the 
media discourse. 
2) Axial coding. We applied the orders of worth to give sense to the first 
results, showing, when aggregated, which orders of worth are called upon and coexist 
for each type of dispute. When an utterance referred to multiple worlds, based on a 
list of words identified by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]) and by further 
research, presented in Table 10, it was assigned to more than one code, as suggested 
by the authors.  
Critique from 
market world  
to market 
world 
Critique from 
domestic 
world  
to market 
world 
Critique from 
industrial 
world  
to market 
world 
Critique from civic 
world   
to industrial 
/market/domestic  
world 
Critique from 
fame world  
to industrial / 
domestic 
world 
Inconclusive  
financial 
performance 
(2) 
 
Short-termism 
(5) 
Lack of 
information (3) 
Environmental  
concerns (1) 
Accountability  
deficit (10) 
Agency 
problem and  
inactive 
shareholders 
(11) 
 
Unknown 
materiality  
of factors (6) 
Inappropriate  
investment 
methods (4) 
Lack of ethics  
in financial markets 
(12) 
RI no different 
than traditional 
funds (15) 
Claim to 
financial return  
with limited 
diversification 
(16) 
Fiduciary duty 
(7) 
Lack of  
clear 
methodology  
(9) 
Need for regulation 
(13) 
 
 Missing 
resources and 
skills  
among 
analysts (8)  
 
   
 Shareholder 
vs. 
stakeholder 
debate (14) 
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Table 10: Terminology for nine worlds of worth that guided the axial coding 
World Content 
Key words used during the axial coding to link ‘units of sense’ to ‘worlds of worth’. Italicized terms reflect 
additions to the original list provided by Patriotta et al. (2011) based on Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) 
Market 
Competition, rivalry, value, saleable, interest, love, desire, selfishness, market, wealth, luxury, 
opportunism, liberty, opening, attention to others, sympathy, detachment, distance, possess, 
contract, deal, price, money, benefit, result,  management, conversion, costs, calculation, 
liberalisation, profit, allowance, economy, profit maximization, success, compensation, services, 
business processes, forfeit, dividends, euro, calculation, finance, payment, wages, oligopoly, 
monopoly, commerce, price, politics, saving, margin, asset, ownership, demand, supply, 
economy, production, millionaire, winner, competitors, client, buyer, salesman, independent 
worker, employee (worker), investor, supplier, buy, get, sell, economically, business, cheap, 
expensive, economical efficiency, growth.  
Industrial 
Efficiency, performance, future, functional, predictability, reliability, motivation, work energy, 
professionals, experts, specialists, operator, person in charge, means, method, task, space, 
environment, axis, direction, definition, plan, goal, calendar, standard, cause, series, average, 
probability, variable, graph, time models, goals, calculation, hypothesis, solution, progress, 
dynamic control (security, opposite of risk), machinery, cogwheels, interact, need, condition, 
necessary, integrate, organize, stabilize, order, anticipate, implant, adapt, detect, analyse, 
determine, light, measure, formalize, standardize, optimize, solve, process, organize, system, 
trial, setting up, effectiveness, measure, instrumental action, operational, measurement 
instruments, technique, technological, technological event, technological effects, nuclear power, 
degree of efficiency, coal, technological production process, faults, security, security 
management, security system, lack of danger, production, uncontrollability, consequences, 
analysis, report, information, causes, construction, knowledge, scale, security tests, time, 
emergency power supply system, aggregators, perturbation, supply system, components, 
construction, check, proof, solution, energy, technology, system, installation, approach, 
(intagible, market, ESG) factors, tobacco, pornography, armament,  
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Civic 
Collectives, collective will, legal, rule, governed, official, representative, common objectives, 
unitary concept, participation, rights and obligations, solidarity, moral beings, democratically, 
legislation, formality, code, statement, organizational goals, membership, mobilization, 
unification, freeing people form selfish interest, escape from chaos (division) and isolation, 
aspiration to civil rights, renunciation of the particular, transform interests of each into a 
collective interest, gathering for collective action, exclude, join, assemble, association, 
recruiting, extending, active mobilization, liaising, constant contact with organization, the legal 
text, republic, state, democracy, assembly, movement, election process, consultation, 
corporatism, rules, law, legal and formal steps, actions, processes, decisions and orders, 
reaction of state institutions, orderliness, legal way, socialization, central state  control, control, 
agreement, precept, political interests, approbation, political negotiation, legality, legal 
evaluation, legal precondition, right/false, political commission, political intervention, state 
regulation, political misuse, political report, anticompetitive, legal force, cartel, nuclear 
consensus, state observation, violation of law, resolution, proposal, democratic principle, public 
interest, corporate secrets, suing, ethical.  
Domestic 
Engenderment, tradition, generation, hierarchy, leader, benevolent, trustworthy, honest, faithful, 
determination of a position in a hierarchy, inscription of signs of worth (titles, heraldry, clothing, 
marks), punctuality, loyalty, firmness, honest, trust, superior, informed, 
cordial behaviour, honest, trusting, good sense, leaders, family, rejection of selfishness, duties 
(even more than rights), loyal, harmonically, respect, responsibility, authority, subordination, 
honour, shame, hierarchy, cooperation, celebrations, family ceremonies, responsibility, 
transparency, duty, task, dialogue, seriousness, information, German nation, irresponsible, 
arrogant, euphemism, common identity, integration, common sense within organization, vice. 
Inspired 
Anxiety of creation, passion, dream, fantasy, vision, idea, spirit, religion, unconscious, 
emotional, feeling, irrational, reflex, invisible, un-measurable, magic, myth, ghost, 
anthroposophy, super-human beings, affective relationships, warmth, creativity, escapism, 
intuition, fantastic,  memories, genius, fascination, harmony with beliefs. 
Fame 
Public opinion, public, audience, public attention, reputation (through mass communication), 
desire to be recognized, public debate, boycott, public pressure, public legitimating, opinion 
leader, journalist, PR-agent, sender, receiver, media contact, communication strategy, banner 
headlines, reporting, personality, advertising, brand, message, campaign, recognition, public 
image, persuasion, influence, propaganda, promotion, mobilization, down playing, misleading, 
camouflage, fig leaf, red herring, lip service, pillory, populism, rumour, lie, breach of promise, 
best, biggest, largest, transparency (to signal good image).   
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Green 
Environment, influence or danger on environment and human beings, ecological, environmental 
protection, protection of the nature, plants, climate, environmental pollution, atomic waste, 
climate protection, climate change, radioactive pollution, rescue of the planet, reduction of CO2-
emissions, global warming, climate catastrophe, earth, renewable energies, sustainability, 
biomass, protection of the nature, fauna and health, ecology, carbon, green. 
Connectionist 
Engaged, engaging, mobile, enthusiastic, involved, committed, flexible, adaptability, evolving, 
automony, employability, tolerant, team lead, reputation (through personal relationships), 
corruption, privileges, old-boys networks, a group, signatories, members, initiative, in 
association with, UN PRI, CDP, community, part of, involved in.  
Information 
information, data availability, data quality, data gathering, CSR data, Carbon data, report, 
questionnaires, forecast, advisers.  
Source: adapted from Patriotta (2011)
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3) Stakeholder coding. To be able to interpret discourse based on the speakers, we 
coded categories of speakers in the financial press and broadsheet press. We did not code this 
in the tabloids once it appeared that the sample was much smaller and the content less 
relevant. As highlighted in table 11, the main speakers in the financial press are service 
providers such as consultants and rating agencies, who are concerned by the practicalities of 
doing RI, while the main speakers in the broadsheet press are RI investors and RI advocates.  
Table 11: actors behind the RI discourse vary according to the press medium 
Speaker Financial press Broadsheet press 
Mainstream Investor 19% 8% 
Other* 11% 24% 
RI advocate 11% 16% 
RI Investor 24% 33% 
Service provider 35% 20% 
*academics, corporates, individuals, and international associations. 
3.5.3 Analysis of the type of disputes 
We began the analysis as we collected the data, grouping controversies by themes, 
identifying the orders of worth and keeping track of stakeholders. The final analysis focused 
on how the tests unfold and are resolved for each dispute. 
 
As mentioned earlier, each test unfolds either through a test of truth, a test of 
legitimacy or an existential test. After identifying the type of test, we determined whether it 
seemed to be resolved in the form of a temporary (local) arrangement or of a compromise. In 
other words is the compromise that would allow a contribution to the real economy reached? 
Since RI is somewhat ambiguous, it could accommodate several worlds as required by a 
compromise. But this supposes that the debate agrees on a general interest, a common good. If 
this is not possible, then all there can be is private arrangements, in the sense that they do not 
address a common good but rather the private interests of the parties involved. 
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3.8 Disputes and Resolutions for RI 
For each dispute identified in the data, we identify the type of justification used by the 
actors as a combination of orders of worth. For a specific dispute with a specific justification, 
we then look at the quality of the test and how is it resolved.  
 
3.6.1 First Level Results: Disputes and Justification 
We quantified the worlds of worth in the justification discourse of RI. We counted the 
occurrences of each stakeholder’s voice in the 234 articles in our dataset, identifying 1047 
passages corresponding to a stakeholder’s expression of a justification based on a given order 
of worth. The market, civic and industrial orders of worth clearly dominate the discourse (see 
Table 12), confirming the observations in previous research (Taupin, 2011) which identify the 
resolution of disputes as a market-civic-industrial compromise. 
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Table 12: Occurrences of worlds in the justification discourse, including multiple worlds in the discourse 
Column1 civic connectionnist domestic fame green industrial information inspirational market 
civic 201 4 19 6 9 12 11 5 40 
connectionnist 4 48 8 4 0 7 9 0 2 
domestic 19 8 113 3 8 4 7 1 16 
fame 6 4 3 78 3 3 4 1 11 
green 9 0 8 3 97 3 3 2 30 
industrial 12 7 4 3 3 157 15 4 17 
information  11 9 7 4 3 15 60 4 11 
inspirational 5 0 1 1 2 4 4 52 12 
market 40 2 16 11 30 17 11 12 241 
 19% 5% 11% 7% 9% 14% 8% 5% 23% 
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However, some variations appear depending on the type of press. A first noteworthy 
point is that the main orders of worth mobilized to justify responsible investment in the 
financial press is the civic logic rather than the market one. A plausible reason for this is that 
the market logic does not need to justify itself in the financial press: it is taken for granted and 
shared by all, within a specific arena of justification (here, the financial press). On the 
contrary, the market logic is the most called upon in the broadsheet and tabloid press, where it 
is not taken for granted and needs to be justified. In the broadsheet press, the domestic logic is 
part of the top three justifications, instead of the industrial logic.  
 
The discourse disputing RI, just like the discourse disputing conventional finance, 
promotes a specific vision of how the world should be - what is worthy and what is just. 
Investing is about making money. However, even when this discourse is strongly oriented, it 
still combines multiple logics in order to increase legitimacy. A second result to be 
highlighted is that most of the justification occurs within the three dominant logics of 
financial markets -- the market, industrial and civic orders of worth, as illustrated in the 
following quote.  
 
It’s just as well virtue is its own reward, for it seems vice is much better for the wallet [market 
world]. An upstart fund based on the principle of anti-ethics has just ended the quarter as one of 
the top ranking investment funds based on returns over the past 12 months [market world]. 
Driven by distaste at the new craze of “socially responsible” investing [inspirational world], 
Mutuals.com decided to look at all those things mother told you to steer clear of - guns, fags, 
booze and gambling [domestic world]. Fund manager Dan Ahrens admits the Vice Fund was 
established as a reaction to the do-gooders. ` `Investing should be about making money,'' he says, 
``not making a political or social statement.'' Months of research convinced him the idea was a 
flyer. [market world]. Dan Ahrens in The Daily Telegraph, 9 April 2005. 
 
It is particularly in the broadsheet press that justifications come from multiple worlds. 
Again, looking at the speakers in table 11 sheds light on this result: there is a broader variety 
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of speakers in the broadsheet press (with the “other category”, representing academics, 
individuals or international associations such as the United Nations). The broadsheet press 
also gives room to justification using the green, domestic and fame worlds of worth, each one 
relying on a competing vision of justice (Table 13). As a result, we might observe a higher 
quality of tests in the broadsheet press.  
 
Table 13: justification discourse in the financial and non-financial press 
 Financial press Broadsheet Tabloid 
Civic 125 59 17 
Market 113 61 67 
Industrial 107 25 25 
Domestic 63 39 11 
Fame 60 11 7 
Green 54 24 19 
Information 45 8 7 
Connectionnist 42 5 1 
Inspirational 32 17 3 
* Worlds representing more than 15% of the media’s discourse are highlighted in grey. 
 
Another possibly counter-intuitive result is that the green world of worth comes in the 
sixth position only, in the financial and broadsheet press, although RI has focused a lot on 
global warming issues in the past years. While the CO2 dispute is present in many articles, the 
sustainability and environmental protection arguments are anecdotal when justifying investing 
based on CO2 considerations. When CO2 emissions are mentioned, it is not in terms of global 
warming but in terms of risk and return, a market discourse and in terms of certificates, an 
industrial discourse. This is not the case in the tabloid press, where the green logic comes in 
fourth position. But as mentioned, we chose not to focus on this sample of data due to its 
nature and small size of the sample.  
 
We noted that RI justifies itself in different ways, as illustrated in table 12 Many of the 
disputes around RI are linked to a market logic, responding to critiques coming from the 
market world, domestic world or industrial world (the first three columns of table 12 in  
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appendix). The competing logics are only found in disputes that are much less important in 
the media discourse, with the exception of the environmental debate which we will focus on 
in the next section.  
 
The next level of analysis is to determine whether the content of the dispute is a test of 
truth (confirming the institutional order) or a test of legitimacy (the existential test not being 
quite applicable in media discourse, as it would require interviews).  
 
3.6.2 Second Level Results: Tests and Resolutions 
We now drill into some of the most common disputes emerging from the data, to 
identify how the disputes around RI are resolved. We limit our analysis here to three disputes 
among the 16 identified for the sake of conciseness. Our choice of disputes was based on their 
relevance in terms of frequency in the media discourse, and in terms of variety in the type of 
justification. For each of the three disputes, we look at the possible resolution of the conflict 
in terms of short-term arrangement or longer lasting compromise.  
 
When Environmental Sustainability becomes Carbon Finance: A Critique of the Civic World to the 
Industrial World 
As a first illustration of the resolution of a dispute, we take the dispute around 
environmental issues, one of the most common disputes in our data. We have shown in the 
previous section that the tests are mostly grounded in the areas of market, industrial and civic 
logics. One could imagine that the disputes on environmental issues are resolved through tests 
grounded in the green world of worth. 
 
The green world defends the principles of respecting and protecting nature, and of 
sustainability, yet it is barely present in the RI disputes linked to environmental concerns. The 
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dispute on environmental issues which is deployed both in the financial and non-financial 
press is in fact generally a critique from the civic world to the industrial world, and is largely 
resolved with a market and industrial world compromise. 
 
Mr Tickner says investors should be asking companies whether they have mapped any of their 
operations and supply chains in relation to areas where water is scarce (green), whether they 
have a water risk strategy in place (industrial world) . Dave Tickner, head of fresh water at WWF 
in Financial Times, 22 April 2011.  
 
Mr Simpson perhaps sums up the new mood among institutional investors: "If governments fail 
to regulate to avoid dangerous climate change then investors need to act to protect their 
wealth." (civic and market world) Paul Simpson, chief executive of the Carbon Disclosure Project 
in Financial Times, 22 April 2011.  
 
Looking further at the quality of dispute, we see that the dispute about environmental 
concerns in RI is a legitimacy test. It takes the context into account , such as the current mood 
and the current state of regulation and confronts the experienced reality with the socially 
constructed reality -- a real questioning can take place.  
 
A civic justification is brought in to resolve the market-industrial disagreement. This 
third logic allows a compromise between opposing logics, bringing together seemingly 
irreconcilable conceptions of the world, and of worthiness. But our data suggests that the 
resolution of the dispute between the civic world and industrial/market worlds is not that 
solid, and can be qualified as a fragile compromise. Sometimes the attempts to propose an 
acceptable resolution reconciling all logics seem too stretched to be genuine, which may lead 
to ironic discourse as illustrated below. And irony and sarcasm could be good indicators of 
the loss of common good. 
 
This tree-hugging nation loves its recycling and fair trade coffee (green +  civic), so it should seem 
natural that companies are trying to attract shareholders by branding themselves as "socially 
responsible'' (fame).  Peter Michaelis, manager of Norwich Union's UK ethical fund, explains that 
such marketing can pull in the investors (market). He says: "The younger generation is more 
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concerned about global issues like climate change, fair trade, child labour, employees' rights and 
human rights.'' (green + civic)  The Daily Telegraph, 13 March 2006. 
 
We conclude from this first dispute that there seems to be no main obstacle to drag the 
ESG criteria into the market world. This corresponds to the second possible vision for the RI 
discourse we had envisioned: it circumscribes conventional finance, by showing that the 
financial sphere must comply with other principles. But our data shows that ESG proponents 
rarely seize the opportunities offered by the possibility of framing responsible investment 
within other worlds. As a result, the ecological critique has been taken over by capitalism. 
The current public debate about global warming is not framed in terms of a green logic.  
Instead, the civic world is brought into the discourse for justification. In other words, the 
framing strategy revealed here consists of attempts to suspend the disagreement with the 
industrial and market worlds. This is done by proposing a perspective that would be 
acceptable to all, because it is located within the civic world, where “beings all belong to a 
collective that includes and transcends them” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 192).  
 
Maximizing Shareholder Value: Critique Circumscribed to the Market Logic  
Just like much of the academic research on RI focuses on financial return, much of the 
RI disputes in the public discourse are about financial return. This dispute is dealt with within 
a single logic, the market one.  
  
HCT Group, a transportation firm, also blends commercial [Market] and social aims [Civic]. It 
reinvests a third of its profits into social schemes such as training for unemployed people 
[Market, civic]. Dai Powell, HCT’s chief executive, attributes part of its success to the fact it does 
not have shareholders to satisfy [Market], which means it can accept lower margins on tenders 
[Market]. As well as bank loans and asset-backed financing, it has an equity-like loan whose 
interest rate is based on turnover: investors get paid more when HCT earns more [Market]. The 
Economist, 31 March 2012 
 
As in the above abstract, the discourse for the shareholder value dispute is anchored in 
a market logic: it is about profit, investors, return. In other words, RI uses the same language 
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and principles as conventional finance. RI is not subversive; it complies with the market 
logic’s vision of justice.  
 
But within the market logic, the objective of maximizing shareholder value is 
explicitly challenged. So far, maximizing shareholder value was accepted as a higher common 
principle, which means it was supposed to benefit the whole of society and was thereby more 
than the pursuit of individual interests. This is now contested, and an alternative objective of 
satisfying social aims is proposed. As a result, maximizing shareholder value becomes an 
arrangement rather than a compromise, meaning that it serves the interest of a minority, which 
reduces its legitimacy.  
 
Because the critique is circumscribed to the market logic, the validity of the test itself 
is not challenged, and the dominant values come out strengthened from the test. This situation 
falls in the first possible scenario we had envisioned for the results of justification in RI. We 
therefore conclude that RI disputes about shareholder value “purify” the market logic of 
finance, to use a term coined by Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]). Some of the most 
damaging financial products and practices can be halted, but the underlying principle and 
conventions are confirmed and reinforced. Daudigeos and Valiorgue suggest similar results 
for the evolution of corporate responsibility strategies (2010), which were absorbed by the 
corporate system as they matured. 
 
The Need for a Practical and Efficient Framework: Critique of the Industrial World to the Market 
World. 
The dispute on the appropriateness and completeness of financial tools (the need for 
company disclosure, ESG integration, and a framework to determine the materiality of issues) 
available for investment decisions refers to a larger number of worlds than most disputes. 
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Many logics are called upon to resolve this dispute. While the main critique comes from the 
industrial world, it is framed according to the principles of the market, industrial and civic 
worlds as well as the green world and the connectivity world. However, it does not seem that 
the presence of these other, new, worlds in the debate will result in shaking up the dominant 
compromise. 
 
Dark green funds apply negative screening procedures [industrial] and do not invest in companies 
in certain sectors that are deemed harmful, such as tobacco or armaments [market,  green]. Light 
green funds focus on the measures that companies are taking to be more sustainable, such as 
waste efficiency plans or even community outreach programmes [green,  civic]. However, light 
green funds are not necessarily "less ethical" than dark green ones. Fund managers of light green 
funds often use their clout as shareholders to encourage companies to take more sustainable 
measures - which are arguably just as beneficial for sustainability in general as investing directly 
in a wind turbine company [market + green]. Financial Times, 11 April 2009 
 
This is a test of truth, debating who is right or wrong, what is ethical or not, as 
illustrated above regarding the effective way to invest and manage funds. The discourse 
proposes hybrid practices and language, but does not discuss the underlying principles that it 
is built on, because these are not clear. There are multiple examples of such hybrid discourses 
and constructions when the common good is unclear or misunderstood. The discourse is 
focused on market and industrial worlds of worth, with a domestic and inspirational worth 
subordinated to them, which implies reconciling multiple principles. But the principle 
resulting from a possible arrangement is unclear, and not specific to RI: is it active fund 
management, or superior financial performance, or environmentally-friendly acts? It is 
unclear what RI stands for, and what it stands against.   
 
“We never use screening as a justification for poor performance,” she says. “I have to deliver in 
the same way that any other fund manager does. If I can't invest in oil, for example, then I will 
look for an alternative that I believe offers a good investment opportunity [market world] and 
meets our ethical criteria [domestic world]. If anything, investment teams running ethical and 
sustainable funds have to work harder because they can't rely on following the stocks that the 
mainstream funds do [industrial]. This is good for investors as it means the funds are being 
actively managed.” [industrial world + market] (…) Quinn is passionate about recycling 
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[inspirational, green world] and predicts legislation forcing us to recycle more will be introduced. 
'Britain is behind the times when it comes to educating people on their personal responsibility,' 
[domestic world] she says. Julie Quinn in The Mail on Sunday, 13 April 2008 
 
The justification using a plurality of orders of worth is characteristic of this dispute 
and makes RI potentially subversive, but the quality of the dispute is hindered by the absence 
of a clear common good. The following quote also introduces the value of networks into the 
debate. The common good might then become “avoiding legislating”. This is a possible basis 
of a new compromise between seemingly opposing worlds of worth, if it were more than a 
lonely quote among the sizeable dataset.   
  
[…] Analysts want data on non-financial matters, such as use of raw materials and energy 
consumption. [industrial] "There is a strong feeling across Europe that if we had a better 
understanding of this, much of the financial crisis could have been avoided," [industrial] Mr 
Hinkel says. Reflecting this trend, more than 800 investors have signed up to the UN's Principles 
for Responsible Investment, accounting for $2,200bn - 10 per cent of global capital markets. 
[fame] The goal is to nudge companies to provide environmental, social and corporate 
governance (ESG) data voluntarily, rather than legislating. [civic] Hans-Joerg Hinkel, strategic 
planning manager at Mitsubishi Electric, in Financial Times, 4 October 2010. 
 
There are more proposals for a vision of a common good, but they are anecdotal in our 
data at this stage. This last quote suggests a vision of the common good, which is to make RI 
obsolete by making extra-financial issues mainstream. Is this what RI stands for? To become 
the common good, this objective needs to be perceived as representing the interests of all, and 
not just of a portion of the RI community. Otherwise, any resolution of the conflict would be 
only a local arrangement, with a limited contribution to the real economy. 
 
The EAI has been one of the loudest voices calling for investors to pay more attention to long 
term and hidden risks. Set up four years ago to encourage brokers to produce more and better 
research on "extra-financial issues", the EAI declared at the outset its intention to make itself 
obsolete by bringing these extra-financial issues into the mainstream. Financial Times, 6 October 
2008. 
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We conclude that RI is neither completely compliant nor completely subversive in 
relation to the market logic when it justifies the need for a new, practical framework to take 
investment decisions. In some ways it challenges the underlying principle and conventions of 
mainstream finance. We also see that tools, objects such as models and frameworks, help to 
determine and influence what is worthy. The current search for RI models and tools might 
therefore play an important role in resolving the RI disputes resulting from its 
institutionalization.  
 
3.9 Implications and Conclusion 
In order to understand how tensions around different notions of common good are 
negotiated, we looked at the disputes and resolutions around RI, as reported in the financial 
and non-financial press. We collected data in three separate samples of 97 financial press 
articles, 112 broadsheet press and 24 tabloid articles. The articles span over the 2001-2012 
period, corresponding to the professionalization years of RI during which ESG became the 
key RI approach. Using Boltanski and Thévenot’s framework, we analyzed the justification 
discourse for a series of disputes on RI that emerged from the data. Three such disputes are 
about environmental concerns; inconclusive financial performance; and inappropriate 
investment methods and tools. We conclude from our data that (a) the RI proponents try to 
develop arguments from multiple worlds, a majority of these arguments coming from the 
market, industrial and civic worlds; (b) the green world is almost absent from justifications, 
even when the discussing ecological issues; (c) the quality of the tests is advanced, showing a 
maturity in the RI debate; and (d) a sometimes fragile compromise is reached to appease the 
RI disputes, but it would require RI models and tools to consolidate it.  
 
RI critiques and justifications combine multiple worlds in order to construct a valid 
and plausible discourse on RI, confirming the importance of using a framework that allows 
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studying multiple logics and grammars. This first conclusion based on our analysis means that 
currently the market, industrial and civic logics are perceived as the most legitimate ones in 
responsible investment since they are most used to justify RI. In addition, a variety of other 
logics are present in most justifications, namely the green, domestic and fame logics, which is 
where the quests of do-gooders and bottom-liners can meet. Stating that RI is hybrid may 
sound obvious. But it is important to say so because the discourse on RI is often Manichean: 
RI is presented as meaningless or presented as a way to save the world, neither of which is 
exact. This brings us back to the scenarios we hypothesized as the most likely -- that RI is 
neither completely compliant nor completely subversive in relation to the market logic and 
that there is no clear debate, no clear vision of the world and of justice. We had hypothesized 
that RI in the 21st century proposes hybrid practices and language, but does not discuss the 
underlying principles that it is built on, because these are not clear and because it is too 
dangerous for the future of RI. We conclude that most of the justification occurs within the 
three dominant logics of financial markets -- the market, industrial and civic orders of worth -
-, making it unlikely that RI will significantly challenge the dominant order by debating and 
discursively justifying competing visions of the world. By referring to the dominant worlds of 
worth, RI validates them and strengthens the existing compromise. This positions RI as the 
solution offered by financial markets to appease the critique, rather than as a critique of 
financial markets. But interestingly, although RI follows a market logic, it challenges it from 
the inside, by questioning the common good within that world. As a result, it purifies finance, 
bringing it back to its foundations. It is in this way that RI might be making a difference and 
contributing to society. This first conclusion on the slow legitimating and diffusion of RI 
raises new questions about practices that do not get legitimacy – are not valid and plausible -- 
but still are diffused. A variety of practices in the financial industry could possibly fit this 
description, and should be studied to understand the other side of the story.  
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Another finding of our study is the quasi-absence of the green world from the 
justification discourse of RI, compared to the frequency of ecological debates. Our coding 
process highlighted a problem within the ecological order, linked to commensuration and 
certification. The ecological aspects need to be measured and fit in models because they are 
justified by certification more than by discourse. Paradoxically, certification is part of the 
industrial logic. This results in a tension within the green logic, leading to the reinforcement 
of the industrial logic, not the green logic. The same trend characterizes ESG investing, the 
mainstreamed version of RI, where one could say that the commensuration and certification 
requirements transform the ecological product and ecological discourse.  
 
The quality of the tests in RI is advanced, showing a maturity in the RI debate. When 
it justifies itself with the need for a practical and efficient framework for investment practices, 
or when it calls for dutiful shareholders (in terms of active ownership and fiduciary duty), RI 
not only attempts to appease the disputes surrounding it, but it also becomes a legitimacy test 
for financial markets, because it challenges the reality of how markets currently function. In 
those disputes, RI critiques the market principle by confronting it with a domestic logic 
(responsibility) or a green logic (sustainability). If we consider that a valid critique is one that 
questions the underlying assumptions, the legitimacy test is the type of critique that will do so. 
There are examples in existing literature illustrating how this type of test is institutional work 
which may lead to a new institutional order. Our results show that RI’s justification efforts are 
another such situation of applying legitimacy tests.  
 
Lastly, our findings point to the role of tools and models in strengthening the 
compromises between multiple logics. We consider these compromises to be fragile, not only 
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because they are hybrid by definition but because they are not (yet) consolidated by 
recognized RI tools and models. The dispute on the need for a practical and efficient 
framework illustrated the absence of such tools. Should such RI tools be developed in the 
future, they would deserve scholarly attention as one of their consequences would be to 
stabilize the RI compromise between multiple logics.  
 
With all of the above, we have contributed to clarifying our expectations towards RI 
and shown that if we want to address shortcomings in finance, we should probably not rely on 
RI as it is defined and practiced in the 21st century, i.e. mainly including ESG factors in 
institutional investors-decision making process as a result of mainstreaming.  
 
A limit of this chapter lies in the discourse versus practice tension, which suggests 
further research. It would be naïve to believe that a media discourse leads to a practice. How 
professional and organizational processes in the newsroom (leading to media discourse) 
influence public processes remains an even more complex issue than the impact of public 
discourse on public opinion. There clearly is a discursive practice, but beyond that we would 
like to know if there are other, non-discursive practices. The link between media discourse, a 
discursive practice, and non-discursive practices of the audience (in terms of investment 
decisions) suffers from shortcomings inherent to our research approach, since we are basing 
ourselves on press articles without assessing how the discourse is translated in day-to-day 
processes. This is a common difficulty for all discourse analysis that must recognize that 
discourse does not forcibly correspond to practice. However, RI practices are documented, in 
practitioner reports for example, and do show an evolution similar to the discourse on these 
practices, such as the evolution from screening, to engagement, to ESG integration. For future 
studies using the Boltanski and Thévenot framework to understand RI, it would be important 
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to focus on the micro-level by meeting and observing the actors in their daily practice and 
attempts of justification. 
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4 A paradox perspective on responsible investment 
4.1 Chapter Summary 
After focusing on “justifying RI” in chapter 3, chapter 4 now focuses on “practicing 
RI”, the second collective belief identified in chapter 2. Looking at practice with a framework 
for ESG investing built by institutional investors, I show that the design of an RI valuation 
tool is not just a series of equilibriums, but rather a dynamic paradox process, made of 
constant arrangements between multiple dualities. 
This chapter examines the tensions embedded in the dynamics of responsible 
investment (RI) mainstreaming, and the arrangements through which individuals, a group or 
an institution cope with paradoxical tensions. In the previous chapters, I relied on convention 
theory to highlight the multiplicity of equilibriums which may lead to institutional 
maintenance or change. In this chapter, I analyze the tensions and coping mechanisms related 
to RI mainstreaming through the lens of paradox theory. This allows me to present RI 
valuation not only as a series of equilibriums, following the economics of convention 
approach, but also as a process.  
Through an ethnographic study of asset managers building a framework for 
responsible investment, we found that four paradoxes specific to RI (lack of convention; 
stability and transformation; time horizon; judgment and metrics) were subject to multiple 
arrangements but did not need to be resolved for the process to reach an outcome. The results 
suggest that the dynamics of paradoxes is a continuous circular process of constant shifting 
between both branches of each duality. We show that the typologies of paradoxes are a useful 
categorization tool, but we suggest that the untapped essence of paradox theory lies in its 
capacity to study the dynamics of a process. 
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4.3 Introduction 
 
Although responsible investment (RI) mainstreaming, i.e. the integration of 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues into mainstream finance (Kurtz, 2008), 
has been widely discussed and announced (Déjean and Le Theule, 2011, Louche, 2004, 
Penalva-Icher, 2012), very few studies have tried to theorize this phenomenon. The existing 
literature focuses on how to mainstream RI and on identifying impediments to mainstreaming 
(Juravle & Lewis, 2008). However it does not yet capture the tensions associated with the 
divergent goals of finance and sustainability that characterize RI mainstreaming. These 
tensions result from competing demands and create contradictory prescriptions for actions. 
With the mainstreaming of RI, a multitude of actors in this field attempt to provide guidelines 
and processes to set common rules about RI: stock exchanges and their regulators set rules for 
listed companies, rating agencies set norms for equity and debt issuers (Sinclair, 2000), 
consultants and analysts set norms for valuation methods (Lordon, 2000). Finance versus 
sustainability tensions in the RI field are reinforced by the mainstreaming of the field. To 
expand our understanding of RI mainstreaming in this changing context, we need to 
understand the tensions that shape it and the ways actors cope with them. This leads us to the 
two following questions: (1) What tensions are embedded in RI mainstreaming? And (2) 
through which arrangements do the individuals, the group or the institution cope with the 
paradoxical tensions? 
 
To address these questions, we carried out an ethnographic study of RI mainstreaming 
with a working group composed of experts in the field of responsible investing. For two years, 
investment professionals in conventional banks worked together to reach a consensus on a 
short-list of the most significant ESG factors and the appropriate metrics for these factors. 
This group, called Delphi, is an interorganizational group representing international and major 
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financial institutions. We consider the Delphi group to be representative of the RI mainstream 
organizational field, as they represent several institutions of the financial market. This 
distinguishes our study from existing empirical articles focusing on one organization or 
business unit. We consider this setting appropriate to our research purpose, because 
responsible investment practitioners often face ambiguity regarding both the objectives they 
set to reach and the tools they use to make responsible investment decisions. In addition to 
paradoxes inherent to RI, our research setting offers paradoxes linked to the process of 
consensus seeking in a collaborative environment and paradoxes inherent to the framework 
developed, which is a standardization exercise.  
 
First, we identify the variety of tensions that co-exist and persist over time and the 
multiple levels at which they occur in the field of RI: individual level, group level and 
institutional level. Among the many tensions in the Delphi process, we show that those 
specific to the activity of ESG standardization and commensuration are paradoxes between 
learning and performing, namely: convention; stability and transformation; time horizon; and 
judgment and metrics. Second, we identify the arrangements used to cope with the tensions in 
practice by the individuals and by the group. Framing the tension as a paradox, shifting, 
transcending and defending are the required ongoing responses in order to channel the 
paradox and its creative potential. Finally, we propose a spiral model for the dynamics of 
paradoxes, showing how paradoxes co-exist, feed-each other and can be channeled through or 
eliminated from a process.  
 
How paradoxes are dealt with critically impacts an organization’s success, or an 
institutions’ orientation, yet remains relatively unexamined. In that respect, addressing our 
research question is important to deepen understanding of a critical practice - managing 
 121 
 
paradoxical tensions - that underlies all activities associated with changing dominant views in 
a field. In our discussion section, we explore how our line of inquiry can not only inform 
research on RI mainstreaming, but also the growing literature on paradox theory by clarifying 
the nature of a paradox, shifting the focus on arrangements, and illustrating the potential of 
paradox theory as a theory of dynamic processes. 
4.4 Literature review 
4.3.1 ESG valuation as paradoxical 
The practice of ESG integration, an approach consisting in the integration of 
environmental, societal and governance criteria into investment decision-making, combines 
the efficiency, quantitative analysis, and resources of traditional fund management with the 
beliefs, values, and judgment of sustainability, such as a long-term focus, attention to 
stakeholders, and non-financial measures. This combination brings together “multiple and 
inconsistent goals, norms, and values, creating contradictory prescriptions for action”, a fertile 
ground for paradoxes according to Besharov & Smith (2013). The actors of ESG integration 
are analysts in conventional banks, who focus on financial consideration, but for who this 
combination of dimensions generates ethical dilemmas (Dees, 2012; Margolis & Walsh, 
2003). ESG is quite remote from the “anti-market” and “anti-corporate” visions that initially 
drove responsible investment. Today’s ESG integration is a very corporate focused view of RI 
where valuation involves quantification in the form of key performance indicators, ratings, 
and financial modeling. With this approach comes the quest for materiality (AccountAbility, 
2006) --which non-financial criteria have the most value, meaning influence most financial 
performance-- and commensuration (Déjean, Gond, & Leca, 2004) --how can the value of a 
non-financial criteria be measured.  
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This transformation of qualities into quantities is inherently paradoxical, because it is 
an attempt to reconcile metrics and judgment. Scholars have analyzed the obstacles to 
commensuration, as well as the conditions necessary for commensuration to succeed 
(Espeland & Stevens, 1998). But there is room for further research when it comes to the 
characteristics of the agreement to be reached (Huault & Rainelli, 2011). ESG 
commensuration projects are particularly paradoxical, because they try to reconcile financial 
and non-financial performance. Here, the arrangement for the financial world and 
sustainability paradox is ongoing and observable, and as such the Delphi group provides a 
laboratory for observing tension and arrangements at different levels, from the individual and 
group level, to the field level.  
4.3.2 Tensions in paradox theory 
Paradoxes refer to ''contradictory, yet interrelated elements—elements that seem 
logical in isolation, but absurd and irrational when appearing simultaneously" (Lewis, 2000: 
760), like judgment and metrics in a commensuration process, or like the economic rationale 
and the sustainability rationale in responsible investment. Scholars in social sciences agree 
that these tensions are inherent to organizations, and result from contradictory demand from 
divergent internal and external interest groups (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Individuals, groups or 
institutions may be tempted to frame contradictory elements as a dilemma, by addressing the 
elements separately in time or space to make them more manageable. But paradox theory 
argues that addressing the divergent goals, logics, values, norms, and identities 
simultaneously will lead to long term organizational success and sustainability (Smith, Gonin 
& Besharov, 2013).  
 
Collaborations are one setting where these multiple and inconsistent goals, norms, and 
values are embedded within the boundaries of one group, and therefore seems to be a good 
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place to study paradoxes. Indeed, one insight emerging from the existing research on 
interorganization collaborations (Domenico et al., 2009; Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006; 
Philips & Lawrence, 2002) evidences tensions within these organizations. These tensions 
enable participants to develop difficult-to-imitate organizational capabilities through the 
transmission or sharing of resources (Domenico et al., 2009). In the responsible investment 
organization field, collaborations are starting to emerge due to the institutionalization and 
ongoing structuration of the field (Louche, 2004), which is characterized by increased 
interaction among organizations in the field; the emergence of interorganization structures; 
the increase in information load; and the increased awareness among participants who are 
involved in common enterprises (DiMaggio & Powell,1983). These characteristics drove 
collaboration initiatives that group different actors from the field around a table – one of 
which is Delphi, the collaborative venture we chose as our setting for paradoxes. 
 
A few well-documented paradoxes are flexibility and efficiency (Gibson & 
Birkenshaw, 2004), exploration and exploitation (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Garud & 
Gheman, 2011; Raish, 2009; Smith, 2014); collaboration and control (Lusher & Lewis, 2008); 
and profit and social responsibility (Domenico et al. 2009, Smith et al., 2013). These 
paradoxes are experienced in various areas, including innovation, change, identity, corporate 
governance, communication and leadership (Smith, 2006) and at multiple levels as well for 
individuals, business units, companies and interorganization collaboration. Smith & Lewis 
(2011) propose to organize these tensions into four categories, as performing, organizing, 
belonging and learning paradoxes. However, there remains a gap in literature regarding the 
nature and management of strategic paradoxes (Lewis, 2014).  
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An analysis of the existing literature on paradox theory reveals first that most 
contributions come in the form of conceptual papers. Garud, Gheman & Kumaraswamy 
(2011), Jay (2013) and Luscher & Lewis (2008) are three exceptions, with action research 
methodologies conducted respectively at 3M, Cambridge Energy Alliance, and Lego. 
Moreover, studies that take a longitudinal perspective on paradoxes, with ethnographic field 
study or action research methods, are scarce and called for (Raisch, 2009).  
 
Second, studies in paradox research have addressed many different levels in separate 
studies. The middle management and the business unit level are addressed by Luscher and 
Lewis (2008) and Smith (2014). The organization level is studied by hybridity scholars 
(Borys & Jamison, 1989; Jay 2013) as well as identity scholars (Pratt and Foreman, 2000). 
And paradoxes at the interorganization level are illustrated in literature on collaboration, with 
examples of interorganizational collaboration by Jarzabkowski and Fenton (2006) and Philips 
and Lawrence (2002). But so far none of these studies have investigated paradoxes at the field 
level, a level which includes organizations that constitute a recognized area of institutional 
life and are subject to similar competition, reputational and regulatory pressures (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983: 148). Studying the field level offers an opportunity to study how paradoxes 
shape a field, in our case responsible investment mainstreaming.   
 
Thirdly, the tensions specific to RI mainstreaming have not yet been analyzed using 
the paradox framework. A tension between social performance and financial performance has 
been documented in various settings such as social entrepreneurship (Smith, Besharov, 
Wessels & Chertok, 2012), corporate social enterprise collaboration (Domenico et al.; 2009) 
and corporate social performance (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). But RI mainstreaming is 
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paradoxical through multiple dualities of co-existing tensions, which gain to be investigated 
systematically using the paradox framework.  
4.3.3 Arrangements mechanisms in paradox theory 
Before coping with a paradox, it needs to be identified. Different mechanisms have 
been discussed in literature as indicators of the existence of a paradox, among which are 
external interventions, drawings, open discussion forums and humor (Lewis, 2006). Humor is 
a subtle mechanism to point out incongruencies, incoherencies and paradoxes in manager’s 
daily lives by joking about them (Hatch & Ehrlich, 1993). Identifying a paradox may already 
be a challenge, because it means confronting a tension. But managing complexity, even when 
it is desired or constructed, can be even more challenging.  
 
Arrangements appear in the earlier studies of paradox theory, which do not limit 
themselves to identifying tensions, but also discuss the importance of dealing with paradoxes. 
Indeed, while most teams and organizations have a tendency to avoid tensions, as they find 
paradoxes difficult to accept and manage (Pool & van de Ven, 1989), some recognize the 
potential of complexity and even strive for it. But resolving the tensions is neither easy nor 
always desirable (Goodpaster & Holloran, 2008) as shows the ongoing debate between 
acceptance and resolution of paradoxes (Smith & Lewis, 2011). The authors suggest “working 
through” the paradox instead of resolving it (Luscher & Lewis, 2008), “preserving” the 
paradox rather than resolving it (Goodpastor, 2008; Lado, 2006) or in other words “accepting” 
the paradox (Lewis, 2006; Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). While previous studies of institutional 
logics suggested that choosing between one logic and another is the desirable course (Pache & 
Santos, 2010), paradox theory defends an inclusive approach rather than “either/or” stances. 
Pratt and Foreman (2000) illustrate the problematic consequences of deletion as one way of 
managing multiple identities within individuals and organizations. For Andriopoulos et al. 
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(2009), “managing paradox does not imply resolution or eliminating the paradox, but tapping 
into its energizing potential”, which would require preserving the paradox. Hence, a paradox 
framework shifts the notion of "managing" from modern definitions based on planning and 
control to coping—its original meaning (Lewis, 2006). We will adopt the notion of 
arrangement to capture this idea, as suggested by Garud et al. (2011).5 This requires mindsets 
and approaches that embrace complexity resulting from multiple identities, goals and logics 
(Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009).  
 
Four types of arrangements emerge from existing research. A first type of arrangement 
serves to identify the paradox, to recognize existence of a contradiction, a first step in the 
dynamics of paradoxes. This arrangement consists in embracing an ‘either/and’ view of the 
contradiction, in which the opposites both continue to exist and can be united in an 
arrangement. The alternative view is to resolve, and thus reject, the paradox by fully 
separating the opposites and choosing one branch of the duality over the other.   
 
A second arrangement consists in simplifying the situation. This can be done by 
compartmentalizing - making a separate but equal segregation of the different logics (Pratt & 
Foreman, 2003). Segregation can be achieved either by spatial or temporal separation, as 
observed by Pool and Van de Ven (1989). In both cases, the difficulty of achieving a clear 
separation of contrary assumptions, theories, or processes remains to be solved and leads to 
either/or positioning within one of the levels or time frames. These strategies are similar to 
framing tensions as dilemmas and either/or options and ultimately choosing one alternative 
within one context (Smith, 2014), losing the rich potential of a paradox.  
 
                                               
5
 and not in the sense of Cloutier and Langley (2007) as one type of short-lived coping mechanism. 
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A third arrangement consists in shifting from one strategy to the other. Multiple 
studies recommend switching between differentiating - recognizing the uniqueness of each 
alternative - and integrating - bringing the alternatives together to address them 
simultaneously and seek synergies between them (Andriopoulos, 2009; Raish, 2009; Smith, 
Besharov, Wessel and Chertok, 2012; Smith, 2014). Switching between adaptability and 
alignment (Gibson & Birkenshaw, 2004) characterizes successful ambidextrous 
environments. Switching between organizing and strategizing (Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 
2006), diversity and shared understanding, trust environment and conflict-friendly 
environment (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003), aggregation and integration (Pratt & Foreman, 
2000) are all possible examples of how to cope with a paradox over time. Recent studies have 
focused on how this shifting occurs over time (Raisch et al, 2009; Smith & Lewis, 2011; 
Smith, 2014).   
Finally, a fourth type of arrangement involves innovation (Philips & Lawrence, 2002); 
developing new, creative alternatives which Lewis (2006) refers to as transcendence. It 
requires a complex, paradoxical way of thinking, viewing tensions as complementary and 
interwoven. All of these arrangements are identified in literature, as illustrated in table 15. 
Table 15: Arrangements explored in paradox literature.  
Year Authors Arrangements   
  Identification 
accept or reject 
simplifying shifting transcending 
1989 Poole & Van de Ven  Accept the paradox 
and use it 
constructively 
Clarify levels of 
analysis 
Temporally separate 
the two levels 
 
1991 Oliver  Defiance Avoidance;  
manipulation 
 Compromise 
1993 Hatch & Ehrlich,  Humor    
2000 Pratt & Foreman  Deletion Compartmentalize Aggregating - Integrating 
2002 Philips & Lawrence   Reproduction  Innovation 
2003 Sundaramurthy & 
Lewis  
External interventions  Fostering virtuous circle (trust and 
conflict; diversity and shared 
understanding) 
2004 Gibson & Birkinshaw    Alignment  
and adaptability 
2006 Jarzabkowski & 
Fenton  
  Strategizing  
and organizing 
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2006 Lado  Preserve rather than 
resolve 
   
2006 Lewis  Confrontation;  
Acceptance 
  Transcendence 
2007 Denis & Langley     Conventions as 
compromises 
2008 Goodpastor  Preserve rather than 
resolve 
   
2008 Luscher & Lewis  Working through 
paradox instead of 
resolving 
   
2009 Andriopoulos    Differentiating - 
Integrating 
 
2009 Domenico et al.     Synthesis 
2009 Raisch    Differentiating - 
Integrating 
 
2012 Smith & Besharov  Accepting  Differentiating - 
Integrating 
 
2013 Smith    Many sorts of shifts 
identified in literature 
 
2014 Smith    Differentiating - integrating 
 
These different arrangements can be consolidated with discourse related mechanisms. 
Van de Ven (1989) notes the use of new terms to resolve a paradox. Garud and Gheman 
(2011) discuss the helpful role of narratives that legitimize transcendence by innovation. Jay 
(2013) adds linguistic hooks as a useful mechanism to identify and cope with paradoxes. And 
Philips and Lawrence (2002) focus on the translation of rules and resources as a way of 
legitimizing an arrangement. Besides these tools, there is still much unknown about 
arrangement strategies for paradoxes, with a need for further research.  
 
This study seeks to expand and build on existing studies that have identified 
arrangements, to further our understanding of the nature of paradoxes and arrangements.  
4.5 Method 
4.4.1 Research setting 
To investigate the role of paradoxes in the commensuration of RI, we followed a 
working group of conventional asset managers and asset owners who came together in 2012 
with the objective to create a framework of key performance indicators (KPIs) for ESG. This 
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working group was called ‘Delphi’. The group served as a laboratory, as participants were put 
outside their ‘natural’ environment to work together on a project. In the following section, we 
drill down into our research setting by presenting responsible investment mainstreaming, and 
more specifically the activity of valuing responsible investment. We then provide some 
background on the Delphi group.  
 
Our study is based on qualitative data analysis, following a tradition which focuses on 
the means by which organization members go about constructing and understanding their 
experience (Creswell, 1998). This approach seemed the most appropriate to examine a 
moving picture of a process (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2012) such as the dynamics of 
paradoxes.  
Research laboratory: the Delphi project 
With the rise of ESG requests from the investment community comes the need to 
develop tools and techniques to value non-financial performance. This is what led the Delphi 
project to develop a framework of KPIs for ESG: a short-list of the most significant ESG 
factors and the appropriate metrics for these factors.  
 
Delphi is an investor-lead initiative grouping recognized experts in the field of 
responsible investing -- asset managers and asset owners -- all working in large international 
banks. It is a collaborative venture with 45-50 different participants, all bound to operate 
under strict confidentiality rules. The project is organized in three workstreams, with a leader 
for each. The Asset Manager workstream is led by the head of a big bank’s global 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) investments business. The Asset Owner 
workstream is led by the Head of Governance of a large pension fund and the Metrics 
workstream is led by the Managing Director of the European Federation of Financial 
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Analysts. To coordinate communication between these three groups there is a project 
manager, our lead informant, whose responsibilities include project management at the Global 
Advisor branch of an international bank.  
For Delphi’s working process, our lead informant and his partners deliberately 
searched for complexity, as a validation of their legitimacy. This process evolved over time as 
it soon was considered to be an inefficient way of working. A Technical Group composed of 
10 people was set up to address conflicting demands of consensus and efficiency.  Participants 
to the Technical Group came from the three workstreams and needed to commit to thorough 
reading of the framework, a bi-weekly 90-120 min meeting (by conference call), and 
responding to 3-4 short surveys. This allowed to speed up the process of determining the 
material ESG factors. Figure 8 presents an overview of the project with its workstreams and 
stakeholders.  
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Figure 8 : An overview of the Delphi Group6 
Initial « Straw-man » hypothesis drawn from VNFP Laboratory (including corporate and 
initial asset owner input) – tested by G30 group
Asset
Managers
Asset
Owners
Metrics
Technical Group
Representatives from 3 work-streams
establish framework:
Value Levers, Value Drivers, Factors, 
KPIs (generics and sector specific)
Work Streams
Dialogue with panel of 
investment
consultants
Consultation with IIRC, 
SASB 
Academic review (R. 
Eccles, M. Krzus
Survey of Asset
Owners (large 
sample)
Recommended Framework for ESG investment criteria, relative 
importance and metrics to be included in VNFP Collaborative Venture 
report
 
 
The project was launched in June 2012 and was scheduled to be completed by June 
30th 2013. However, it took longer than expected. In October 2014, the framework was 
finally presented publicly, and the “socialization phase” (presenting the framework to the 
public through conference calls) was still ongoing in December 2014. The data presented here 
spans the 2 first years of the project, and stops at the launch of the framework, that is October 
2014. 
 
Getting people engaged in the Delphi process and gathering their opinion was a 
constant challenge, due to the voluntary basis of participation. Participants came and went, 
with varying levels of engagement over time. Work was divided by sector, with one or two 
                                               
6
 VNPF = valuing non-financial performance. 
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people in charge of identifying KPIs per sector, after which all the contributions needed to be 
brought together. “So what is the next step?” was a recurrent critical question.  
While the framework developed by Delphi, with its indicators for ESG, is an 
interesting object to study for ESG scholars, we rather focused our research on the process of 
generating indicators and the debates Delphi has had on each of the issues it encountered. We 
see this process as the real contribution, not only to ESG but also to a better understanding of 
arrangements when faced with paradoxical tensions. As one participant stated: “The 
spreadsheet is useful, but the discussions it makes us have with analysts are brilliant. This is 
the big change, the better conversations we are having.”  
My role in this group was observation. The conference call format of most meetings 
was favorable to this role. I seldom participated in the discussion, and was invisible most of 
the time. I was of course visible during the on-site meeting, but intervened as little as possible. 
Despite this, it is clear that I was one among many coping mechanisms for the group. Having 
a scholar observe their process added legitimacy.  
 
4.4.2 Data collection  
The study relied on unique access to multiple data sources: archival material, 
participant observation, formal semi-structured interviews, informal talks and multiple 
artifacts. 
 
Over 18 months, the author of this thesis followed Delphi’s Technical Group. When 
she joined the project, it had already been running for 6 months but she was granted access to 
the archival material in the form of email exchanges and minutes of previous meetings. The 
ethnographic observation consisted in 22 Technical Group meetings and 7 asset manager 
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workstream meetings, which typically took place by conference call every two weeks and, on 
two occasions, in-person meetings of the whole group.  
 
While challenging for the group, the conference calls had the advantage of making her 
presence discreet and non-intrusive so that participants spoke freely. During the in-person 
meetings, participants would frequently peer at her work and ask about her abundant notes 
and “analysis” of their interventions, not entirely comfortable at the idea of being under 
scrutiny. They invoked “Chattam House Rules” before speaking their minds. In addition to 
observation, 15 interviews were conducted. First came two exploratory interviews with the 
lead informant, who facilitated the initial contacts for meeting attendance and appointments 
for interviews, and who was one of the initial sources of information for this study. Then a 
first round of 9 interviews was held at with active members of Delphi at the beginning of the 
project, in winter 2012. A second round of 4 interviews was conducted later in the project, in 
winter 2013, with participants who were available at that time for a 1-hour interview. The 
objective was to capture the evolution in the process and individual perceptions of the 
process. Data validity was gained through the repeated interviews over  time, rather than 
through the number of people interviewed. Indeed, the number of people to be interviewed 
was limited by the size of the Technical Group. Artifacts such as the various versions of the 
document, which were to become the framework, or such as reports and definitions produced 
by others but referred to in the Delphi process were used to support the analysis by clarifying 
the concepts discussed.  
Table 16 : Data sources and use 
Data source Type of data Use in the analysis 
Archival data Project related documents from previous 
workstreams: Documents drafted to launch 
the project, minutes of meetings from 
workstreams, email conversations prior to 
my arrival in the project. 
 
Familiarize with organizational context. 
Situate the tensions identified in the 
context of the project 
Support, integrate and triangulate 
evidence from observations and 
interviews. 
Observations  Field notes from meeting attendance: 1 half-
day meeting with company representatives, 
Map the tensions resulting from the 
process and the resolutions adopted by 
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1 two-day meeting with investors interested 
in the project, and 26 conference call 
meeting.  
(203 pages, times new roman 12, double-
spaced) 
Framework in its different versions as it was 
built and evolved. 
Informal conversations with project 
participants ranging from brief email 
exchanges to longer talks during conference 
breaks or dinners. 
participants over time. Validate 
interpretation from phone 
conversations. 
Triangulate interpretations emerging 
from conference calls and interviews. 
Familiarize with the project and 
participants, build trust, discuss 
insights from the observations, clarify 
uncertainties regarding project related 
events and motivations.  
Interviews Preliminary interview with project leader to 
understand the project and its context. (2) 
First round interviews (8).  
Second round interview (5). 
Pictures: visual inspired by business model 
canvas filled in at intervals. (8)  
(178 pages, times new roman 12, double-
spaced) 
Familiarize with the project and its 
context. 
Investigate perceived process 
Investigate tensions in the process as 
perceived by participants.  
Validate interpretation 
External data Articles, models, standards referred to during 
the workstreams 
(27 items including power point presentations 
and external reports) 
Support the reconstruction of concepts 
built into the framework. 
Intranet Web discussions 
Data shared via web platforms 
Map the tensions and arrangements 
throughout the process. 
 
4.4.3 Data analysis 
The initial stages of analysis focused on the meeting material, both archival and 
ongoing, to derive a narrative of main events on a time line (see Appendix 2), such as changes 
in the process with the creation of a Technical Group or the use of a communication platform, 
the arrival of new members or departure of members in the group, or the introduction of new 
factors in the framework. The narrative was used to make sense of the overall development of 
the framework, and as such served both as a data organization device and as a validation tool 
(Langley, 1999). The rest of the data analysis followed a cyclical process, with the first 
analysis beginning as the interviews went along, and consisting in a three level content 
analysis (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2012). 
Step 1: tracing types of paradoxes  
In line with prior empirical studies adopting an institutional perspective on 
standardization (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Slager, Gond & Moon, 2012), we used a process of 
‘constant comparison’ between theory and data. The first order constructs were derived from 
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our data and rephrased as questions to highlight the tensions, without determining yet if they 
were paradoxical of not.  
 
We then plotted the questions on the paradox framework proposed by Smith and 
Lewis (2011). By doing this we noticed that there was a multitude of tensions in Delphi, 
linked to different aspects of the project: in terms of the knowledge needed, the identity of the 
participants, the process to follow and the outcome to be reached. Many tensions in the Delphi 
process, specific to the activity of ESG standardization and commensuration, were paradoxes 
between learning and performing. Another group of tensions, specific to collaborative 
ventures, were paradoxes of belonging or paradoxes between belonging and organizing, 
already documented in literature as flexibility and control paradoxes. Other tensions, between 
learning and belonging or learning and organizing, had in common the difficulty of not 
sharing a common reference framework.  
 
We induced from the mapping of tensions seven constructs that captured a 
homogenous cluster of tensions in relation to paradoxes in the Delphi process. We then 
compared these constructs to prior literature, to distinguish new constructs from documented 
ones. Table 17 summarizes this process, showing how the second order constructs were built 
out of the coded tensions from the first order constructs. It also provides illustrative quotes for 
each of the first order constructs we identified. 
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Table 17 : Paradoxes encountered at Delphi, related to the Delphi process, to SRI integration and to the framework. 
Second order code First order code Illustrative quote 
Time horizon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stability and 
transformation 
 
How can I reconcile economic 
rationale and sustainability 
rationale?7 
If you try to monetize things in dollars, you understate the real 
value of things like employee engagement. Putting a dollar on 
things does not reflect the importance of an ESG aspect. If we 
try to squeeze ESG into the existing valuation process you 
underestimate it. We should not want to put a dollar on 
everything. 
How can I reconcile performance 
and exposure indicators? 
I would not feel very comfortable with claiming to be forward 
looking and predictive and ending up with presenting policies 
and targets, especially when talking about ESG targets you 
can typically find in reports. That would cost us credibility.  
Even if you look back and take performance measures it does 
not mean they cannot be looked at as a forward looking 
manner. This is true for financial metrics as well. 
How can we give a static picture of 
something dynamic? 
Let’s not lose sight that we are not putting this foreward as a 
model. It’s the collective wisdom of us. We can take some 
editorial freedom and liberties because it’s not a full blown 
model. This gives us an outlet for the tension between what’s 
available and actionable now and what we’d like to see. 
We’ve acknowledged this tension regularly and maybe we just 
need to be clear on the final output, what it is and why it’s in 
there. This doesn’t move us much closer to any decision… 
[laugh]. 
How can we agree on indicators in 
a fragmented SRI sector? 
New Business and new products… is this limited to eco 
products? Having a large quantity of new products is not a 
                                               
7
 Including various declinations such as  
How can I reconcile brand value and sustainability rationale? 
How can I reconcile economic rational and corporate governance? 
How can I reconcile economic rational and climate change? 
How can I reconcile supply chain management and sustainability rationale? 
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measure of a good business, is it? Plus, are there metrics for 
this? Is it good or bad to have a short product life cycle? 
How can we combine granularity 
with parsimony? 
That’s just not the way the City works, even if it’s more 
accurate: they use 10 sectors, broken down into 2 or 3 
subsectors and that’s all. It may be more accurate to work like 
this, and build a sum of the parts, but it’s not as useful because 
that’s not how the City works.  
Judgment and metrics How can we value SRI when the 
reporting is incomplete? 
Delphi has had some points of tension during the process : 
thinking about the metrics that bring the factors to life; do we 
limit ourselves only to what is available or to what we would 
like to have?  
How much judgment can we apply 
if we are lacking objective 
measures? 
 
We treat financial data as if it were weather data, when in fact 
it is physically constructed data.  
How can our model be legitimate 
if it is grounded in opinions? 
What we are doing here is standard setting. It requires a good 
methodology, and we’re getting there. But it also requires 
commensuration and judgment. If you have an opinion that 
something is important, that adds to the quality of the model. 
Your expertise stands in for the lack of justification. 
Performing  How can we aim for materiality if 
we can't define it? 
There is a natural allure about having generic factors because 
they are the ones that rise to the fore because they will be seen 
as the cover material that arise in all industry. It may seem 
material but in practice they may not be that material. That is 
the dilemma I am struggling with.  
Belonging Who do I represent if I'm not an 
ordinary investor speaking for his 
company? 
This convergence between sustainability and mainstream has 
happened on the sell side, there are quite a lot of sell side 
people involved in the technical expert group, or I don’t know 
how we call ourselves anymore, [...], I think the others call us 
the engineers because we try to work out the details of this 
thing. These people are in the same kind of role as we are 
here, having two hats on. On the buy-side and asset owner 
side it’s a bit more separated. It’s called the dedicated RI 
analyst but they still have to be equipped to understand when 
you talk internally to your portfolio manager or to the other 
analysts on the buy-side.  
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 How do we collaborate if we are 
competitors? 
It’s an internal/external collaborative venture and it will be 
open source. I think the real power in this is the participation 
and the collaboration between those who are typically 
competitors and we normally act on a contractually driven 
provider-client basis. 
Flexibility and control How can we combine efficiency 
and consensus? 
[The creation of a technical group] TG is thought to 
significantly speed up the process of arriving at a shared and 
consensual view on material ESG factors across all 
workstreams, so that controversial aspects or issues which 
require more deliberation within or across the workstreams 
can be given enough space in workstream meetings. 
 How can we have both 
commitment and voluntary work? 
It feels weird, we have almost all of the class that did their 
homework this time. Actually doing real work ! [laughs] 
 How can we foster empowerment 
without losing direction? 
Something that’s come up is the governance set up behind 
that. Everyone one starts offs enthusiastic but where does the 
decision making process really lie? Where is the ownership of 
the output, the recognition of the work we put in? 
 How can we be complete and keep 
the framework manageable? 
You could probably identify certain patterns, clusters of 
factors. That could take us a step forward from wherever we 
are at the moment which is at best one aggregate coefficient of 
ESG. That’s the complexity of what we are trying to do. 
Conventions  How can we get the users 
involved, when they don't have the 
knowledge? 
 [The asset owners] know roughly what they want. They know 
there is value in the long term. They know there is value in 
ESG. And they want the [asset] manager they appoint having 
that knowledge and track record. They want to see how you 
manage that risk. But when you ask them what isyour model, 
they haven’t got one. [...] I said do you have a model that you 
apply to  you investments? He said no, we are hoping to get 
that from the Delphi project! 
 How can we understand each other 
if we come from different worlds? 
[We need] a definition of value and value drivers that makes 
the output more accessible, more understandable to someone 
who thinks more in terms of financials. 
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Step 2: tracing arrangements adopted throughout the process  
Our second formal stage of data analysis focuses on strategies to cope with tensions. 
In a preliminary stage, we engaged in open coding of interviews, searching for relevant text 
segments that referred to or suggested how and why arrangements were used to address the 
tensions. We initially labeled these arrangements with “in vivo” terms used by the informants. 
 
Following multiple re-readings of the data and discussions between co-authors, we 
gradually combined in-vivo codes into first order categories. At the end of this stage, we 
compared our codes with existing literature, searching for similarities. Finally, a last coding 
was performed to aggregate dimensions of arrangements and to reduce the number of themes 
for arrangements into broader and more theoretically relevant categories, as illustrated in table 
18. 
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Table 18: Mechanisms adopted by Delphi to cope with paradoxes 
Second order 
construct 
First order 
construct 
First order construct 
definition and conceptual 
sources 
Resolution 
type in 
literature 
Level Illustrative quote from Delphi 
FRAMING 
THE 
PARADOX 
Acceptance Acknowledging tensions  and 
appreciating their existence. 
(Poole & Van de Ven, 1989) 
Acceptance Individual 
Group 
 
They [the UN PRI] ask us to engage, with proxy voting 
etc. but so far engagement was not integrated in the 
research. So engagement will more and more influence the 
evaluation of the brand. I’m speaking about adding 
complexity, although I don’t want to add more complexity 
than needed. In the future we will have more integration of 
engagement with analysis.  
Confrontation Discussing the tensions to 
socially construct a more 
accommodating understanding 
or practice. (Lewis, 2006) 
Identification Individual 
 
I understand your point of view but it doesn’t make sense. 
Then many other issues should be out. I don’t agree.  
 
Spontaneous 
humor 
Pointing out paradoxes in 
manager’s daily lives by 
joking about them (Hatch & 
Ehrlich, 1993) 
Identification Individual 
Group 
 
Sorry! Forgot to say we agreed we wanted this to be a life 
transforming experience hothousing with some of the best 
brains in the industry 24/7 until October 5. For our US 
friends, that's ENJOY! 
Defining, setting 
rules of the game 
Constructing a rule system 
that confers membership and 
status (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006) 
Simplifying Individual 
Group 
Institution 
 
I think it works because we defined the terms, we defined 
the objectives from the start which were very oriented on 
materiality, on the drivers. After that, it's just finance. It's 
not an exact science... nothing perfect or systematic. 
Use of 
metaphors, 
analogies, etc 
Using figures of speech to 
assert similarities or 
dissimilarities between two 
domains (Entzion & Ferraro, 
2010) 
Tools Individual 
Group 
 
But how detailed does it have to be. Should it be just a list 
of ingredients or should we also include some recipes?  
 
If you include the supermetrics we have the form of a 
diamond. Without the supermetrics we have a triangle: a 
few factors, a larger number of indicators and a larger 
number of metrics. We have to decide if we want 
supermetrics in there, that’s how I see it.  
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SHIFTING Keeping things 
loose 
n/a Shifting  Individual 
Group 
Institution 
 
My personal belief, and I think what would be the belief of 
the asset manager work stream at least, is that the 
framework will be for time zero based on information at 
time zero. And it is hopefully going to be flexible enough 
so that it can capture or be adjusted easily for longer term 
issues.  
 
 Imitation. 
copying what 
others have done 
Imitating existing practices or 
templates in order to 
legitimize new practices or 
organizational forms 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) 
Shifting  Individual 
Group 
Institution 
 
Typically, an excellent way of ensuring the future 
connectivity of a standard in the process of definition is to 
reference and endorse other standards. 
 
 Shift of logics to 
values 
n/a Shifting  Individual 
 
We all have biases, more or less strong ones, more or less 
convictions and engagement. And there comes a time 
where we want to share this, to make things change, you 
see. It doesn't have to happen in our industry, because it 
doesn't have that engagement and conviction dimension. 
These are not values that we share there. So to me, we find 
each other here based on those values. And that's what we 
need, it's good and it just happens naturally.  
OR 
The spreadsheet is useful, but the discussions it makes us 
have with analysts are brilliant. This is the big change, the 
better conversations we are having.  
 Parking ideas  Separate in space (Poole & 
Van de Ven, 1989) 
Simplifying or 
shifting 
Individual 
Group 
We’ll take this off line and come up with suggestions for 
the next meeting. 
 Delaying Separate in time by switching 
from one form of the paradox 
to another depending on which 
one holds at what time. (Poole 
& Van de Ven, 1989) 
Simplifying or 
shifting 
Individual 
Group 
It’s not the first time that you raise this issue. It’s not that it’s 
being ignored but it’s being mashed and re-mashed. We could 
take it back to the group or to a subgroup and then take it for 
consultation to the arbitrarily supreme court which is on the 
17th March when we all meet together.  
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TRANSCENDI
NG 
Synthesis Fully integrating existing 
identities for a most highly 
synergistic response (Poole & 
Van de Ven, 1989) 
Transcending Group 
Institution 
 
Without pretending that it is the answer to everything, it will 
start creating a consensus and a convergence in the thinking, in 
the production of the tool and additional convergence for the 
people that weren’t involved  in production but can see the 
relevance of the tool. They get a clear understanding of what are 
the critical issues and how you go about measuring them. I 
mean the mainstream industry, not the ESG industry. It has to 
emerge from people who have been thinking about this stuff for 
long enough, trying and experimenting and playing around with 
it and are now coming together and can say based on our 
experience here is what we think is relevant. 
OR 
No need for more data, no need for more stories, it’s about a 
new process to invest capital. Our industry doesn’t want to 
know how to link the metrics of ESG to P&L. What they want 
is a different model, of how to think about investing capital. Not 
just looking at how much capital a company makes, but also 
looking how a company makes capital. This is what 
sustainability is about. It’s not always called ESG data, but 
that’s what it’s about. And Delphi is a framework for investing 
capital in a more long term way.  
 
DEFENDING 
THE 
PARADOX 
Educating Providing standard adopters 
with the knowledge to comply 
with the standard (Brunsson & 
Jacobsson, 2000) 
tools Individual 
Group 
I think we will have to do a certain amount of education, 
through press and through various other means of 
communication. So that’s the “theoretically” bit.  If we do 
that, there is no reason why they should not benefit from [the 
framework].  
 Creating an audit 
trail 
n/a tools Group I’ll pull something up in an email. This about process quality. 
I spend too much time with standard setters. They have a 
black box and they don’t remember weeks after how they 
reached a decision.  
 Use of 
technology to 
create new 
communication 
platform 
n/a tools Group  
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Step 3: building a theoretical framework for tensions and arrangements. 
Finally, drawing on the content of interviews and ethnographic notes, we associated 
the seven types of tensions linked to RI mainstreaming with the four arrangements identified 
in Delphi. The resulting data structure, inspired by past research adopting similar analytical 
approaches (e.g. Corley & Gioia, 2004; Stigliani & Ravasi 2012), is illustrated in Figure 9.
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Figure 9 : Data structure 
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There is no one-to-one correspondence between arrangements and paradoxes. Instead, 
paradoxes cumulate over time, in multiple dualities of co-existing tensions, creating an edge 
of chaos. And the more the process evolves for the group and the individuals, the larger the 
variety of arrangements gets, with more creative mechanisms to capture both extremes of a 
duality. This situation is much richer than a half-way point between two extremes, as a 
compromise would be, which we now show in our findings.  
4.6 Findings 
 
The process of managing paradoxes is not smooth, linear or planned. As one 
participant stated:  
“No, you can’t give up [laughs]. You have to have a plan. We had a plan but it’s been one that's 
kind of moving forward and back. Perhaps now we need to go back and get some key things that 
need to be done by a certain date.”  
 
Arrangements at Delphi rested on the willingness to frame tensions as paradoxes again 
and again, and the flexibility to shift from one approach to the other over time. We found 
multiple examples of each arrangement for the paradoxes encountered by Delphi. We explore 
the tensions by building a paradox typology and by describing the arrangements they were 
subject to, and the dynamics between them, in the next parts of this section.  
4.5.1 Paradox typology 
By mapping the Delphi paradoxes in the different categories identified by Smith and 
Lewis (2011), we tested and confirmed the categorization power of their paradox framework.  
 
All tensions encountered fitted in the framework, which is built on tensions as 
dualities between two elements. In contrast, an expected level of complexity suggested by 
Smith and Lewis (2011) did not emerge: our data did not require us to expand the framework 
to more complex trialectics or pluralistic tensions. Indeed, despite the multiplicity of 
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competing demands, the Delphi participants addressed the tensions as multiple dualities. 
Perhaps multiple dualities is a level of complexity which the mind can still grasp, unlike 
trialectics. Or perhaps the plurality is found on the level of arrangements, rather than tensions. 
This finding strengthens the diamond shaped paradox framework put forth by Smith and 
Lewis (2011).   
 
Not all paradox categories were represented in our data, due to the specificities of our 
case study. There is no “belonging vs. performing” tension in our data, i.e. paradoxes between 
identity and goals. This makes sense as Delphi was a very homogenous group, not a multi-
stakeholder initiative. It seemed quite clear to participants that they rightfully belonged in the 
group, for the purpose of sharing their expertise on ESG commensuration.  
 
Finally, we did not meet the need to either transform or create new categories in 
addition to the four dimensions of learning, belonging, organizing and performing at the level 
of the classificatory framework. These categories are sufficiently comprehensive and mutually 
exclusive to describe the field we were studying (Gerring, 1999). In addition, they have 
enough depth to bundle multiple tensions, including the paradoxes for which we had to coin 
new names.  
 
In addition to the paradoxes of belonging, performing, and flexibility and control that 
have already been amply discussed in previous research, we identified new types of paradoxes 
inherent to RI integration, namely: convention; stability and transformation; time horizon; and 
judgment and metrics. The construct of convention captures the difficulty of working together 
without common references, be it in terms of knowledge, tools, or terminology. The construct 
of stability and transformation relates to tensions between formalizing things firmly to be 
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efficient and facilitate decision, and remaining open to change imposed by the environment. 
Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008) present organizations that manage to combine this stability 
with dynamism and change in their structure. The time-horizon construct refers to tensions of 
change that emerge from divergent time horizons, classified as “learning tensions” by Smith 
(2013), but to which are added tensions resulting from a double bottom line measure of 
performance, depending on financial and social goals (Smith and Lewis, 2011). Finally, 
judgment and metrics captures the tensions related to measuring the non-financial dimensions 
of ESG and defining metrics for the factors.  
4.5.2 Arrangements by framing, shifting, transcending and defending 
Our data shows that a same tension can be viewed as a paradox or as a dilemma, 
depending on the approach taken by the group. Faced with a choice, Delphi sometimes chose 
to address it as a dilemma to simplify things. On the other hand, the group chose to tackle 
some issues as paradoxes, recognizing the value that this approach would bring to the output. 
We called this arrangement the framing, as in the quote below where the group recognizes a 
paradox and chooses to keep it. 
Delphi 1:  Is there such a thing as a qualitative metric?  
All:  [Laughs] 
Delphi 2:. I actually tried that, a factor without a metric, in London, but we don’t want to go back 
to that argument.  
Delphi 3:  We don’t, but that doesn’t mean it will go away.  
 
Throughout its process, Delphi shifted from one process to another, from one logic to 
another, from one knowledge form to another. The group often expressed the importance of 
keeping things loose and flexible.  
« When I go back and look at the mission statement, we’re actually still pretty much in line with 
that. There are slight variations in it, but it started out with the right objectives. Or maybe they 
were so loosely defined that it could fit anything [laugh]. » 
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In practice, this meant that the usual project management procedures were not 
followed, but were adapted to fit the group dynamics. The group structure was also flexible 
and was adapted to the needs, shifting from three working groups to a collective technical 
group when communication proved difficult. Flexibility was seen as a value that allowed the 
group to function. Flexibility was also required to acknowledge that the related parties did not 
all share the same conventions. When it appeared that the contribution of asset owners could 
not be as expected because of their different frame of reference, the validation process of the 
framework was changed.  
« It doesn’t make sense to keep pushing for these asset owners, but [we need to] keep them for 
the next step. I’m comfortable with the people working in this group: leading industry experts. 
The next step is a road show where we need asset owners. […] Go there and show them, rather 
than involve them. We are like brain surgeons talking to a patient who doesn’t want all the 
information » 
 
Transcending means introducing new concepts or new perspectives, allowing an 
arrangement that satisfies both sides of the paradox. This type of arrangement was much rarer 
in Delphi, suggesting that when it comes to RI mainstreaming, there is not much creation of 
novelty . RI mainstreaming is not a new paradigm for finance, but rather a shifting between 
different approaches to reconcile opposing objectives. For example, there is a convention that 
ESG is worthwhile, but there is no convention of how it is worthwhile, or how much. Rather 
than address that paradox, Delphi want to create a convention on how to do RI, by providing a 
tool, the framework.   
« Without pretending that it is the answer to everything, it will start creating a consensus and a 
convergence in the thinking, in the production of the tool and additional convergence for the 
people that weren’t involved in production but can see the relevance of the tool. » 
 
Reaching an arrangement for a paradox is not something done once and for all, 
according to our data. It must be accompanied by mechanisms defending the arrangement, to 
make it acceptable. As a result, Delphi wrote documents to clarify the approach, keep traces, 
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communicate and convince. The group used academic references to justify their approaches. 
And as a participant-observation researcher documenting the process, the author was also an 
arrangement mechanism for the group. 
4.5.3 Dynamics of paradoxes  
We see the dynamics of paradox as a circular process. The arrangements in our data 
consist in moving back and forth between both branches of each duality, keeping the paradox 
present and unchanged, despite applying a variety of framing, switching and defending 
arrangements. For Delphi, this was the case for discussion on how to reconcile economic 
rationale with climate change, corporate governance or value chain rationale. Neither were 
these discussions ever resolved, nor did Delphi ever create a new rationale to reconcile these 
opposing logics. For this reason, we prefer a circular model to a spiral model that would 
wrongly suggest a constant evolution towards an outcome.  
 
Some paradoxes are eliminated, either because they don’t fit with the other paradoxes 
in the process, or because they are not productive. Such examples are identity tensions. They 
are revealed mostly when the group meets other parties like asset owners, or company 
representatives, to present the framework and the working process, as well as in individual 
interviews. This paradox distinguishes itself from others because it is felt at the individual 
level. Perhaps because of the different level it occurs on, this paradox does not take up much 
space in the Delphi process, although the same arrangements are applied to it as for other 
paradoxes: humor, renaming things, copying what others did, keeping things loose, creating 
an audit trail.. It is as if the paradox of identity at Delphi did not participate in the dynamics of 
the other paradoxes, and could be put aside more easily, even if it is not resolved. The group 
thus eliminated the paradox after a while (scenario 2). 
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Other paradoxes move on to another level, a higher circular loop, when arrangements 
allow them to transcend the existing situation. The arrangements do not resolve the paradox 
(so the next loop in our model is not thinner than the first one), but allow a maturing of the 
discourse, evidenced in our data by the evolution of discussions around these paradoxes.  
 
More and more paradoxes appear during the process, some of them feeding each other. 
As a result, the next level loop in our proposed model gets larger with this accumulation of 
paradoxes. One reason is that paradoxes co-exist, but they don’t all appear at the same time. 
This is due to the nature of the group discussions, and to the evolution of the project. These 
multiple dualities increase over time, some of them getting rejected from the process (with or 
without resolution), while new ones appear. In our case, the result was an increase in 
paradoxes over time. For example, flexibility and control tensions appeared mostly at the 
beginning of the process, when the working method needed to be designed or redesigned in a 
way that was efficient yet allows the individuals to identify with the group and contribute 
their most distinctive personal strengths. These tensions between the individual and the 
aggregate are categorized as a paradox of belonging and organizing in the Smith and Lewis 
2011 framework. No clear-cut arrangement emerged from the data for these paradoxes. 
Humor is regularly used to recognize the tension, but no resolution is attained within the 
group. The flexibility and control tensions become less present in the discourse once they are 
outsourced to special task groups or to individuals, but they never quite disappear. Along the 
process, the time horizon paradox appears in addition to the existing paradoxes. It becomes 
more present at the end of the process, when Delphi digs deeper into the model in search for 
specific metrics for each value driver. 
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Another reason that paradoxes co-exist is that some of them are exacerbated, or 
provoked by others. This is the case of the judgment versus metrics paradox, which is strongly 
present from the first to the last day in our data. This paradox underlies the whole project, and 
appears  with other paradoxes, sometimes of a very different nature (efficiency and 
consensus; voluntary commitment). The question of opinions, and what value these have in a 
metric environment, is so key to the project that is revived by discussions on other paradoxes.  
Figure 10: Building a theoretical framework for the dynamics of paradox  
 
 
It is important to note that the paradox dynamics is not a series of equilibriums but a 
continuum, illustrated by interactive loops. While many theoretical frameworks consider a 
series of equilibriums, our data shows no such pattern. Rather, the group experiences a 
constant flow of paradoxes coming, going and co-existing. An analogy for this process could 
be a conversation, which also flows, and which one participant highlighted as an unintended 
but valuable consequence:  
“The spreadsheet is useful, but the discussions it makes us have with analysts are brilliant. This 
is the big change, the better conversations we are having.” 
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Indeed, the process created dialogue, which stimulated learning for the group and for 
the individuals. While the process did not lead to radical change – the financial logic was not 
overturned, which was not the objective –, it did lead to a framework which departs from a 
pure financial logic. Indeed, the framework is hard to use with typical financial resources like 
Bloomberg, as the author discovered when she tested it.  
 
While Delphi members were not working on this project full time, work on it did 
occur between meetings. Part of the paradox management must have occurred outside of the 
meetings, unaccounted for in our data. These arrangements took place at the subgroup level, 
with informal discussion between participants, or one-on-one phone calls, as well as at the 
individual level, with individuals’ thought processes maturing between two meetings. 
Although invisible in our data, these other processes must be accounted for here as they 
influenced the paradox dynamics. Literature on conflict resolution may shed light on the 
processes outside the group that influence paradox dynamics (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; 
Rao, Morril and Zald, 2000). At this stage, we can note that resolving a paradox requires work 
at the individual level and outside of the group. 
4.5.4 Paradox resolution 
An unanticipated result emerged from the data on paradox resolution: practically 
nothing is resolved at the end of the process. After two years, most of the paradoxes are more 
present than ever, despite the variety of arrangements adopted and the seeming willingness of 
the group to move forward. Despite this, Delphi did end up with a framework. This suggests 
that the paradoxes were necessary to the process. The group needed most of the paradoxes to 
work with, in order to build its framework.  
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One exception is the question “How do we collaborate if we are competitors”, a 
paradox of identity and organization. This paradox was resolved early in the process by 
framing the group functioning with agreements and covenants, i.e. defining the rules of the 
game. Had this identity /organization tension not been resolved, the group might not have 
been able to work together at all. So while some paradoxes are necessary and sources of 
creativity, other paradoxes are paralyzing and need to be dealt with. In other words, while not 
all paradoxes should be resolved, not all paradoxes should be maintained. This is a reminder 
not to ignore the dark side of paradoxes, and the burden that these paradoxical tensions (such 
as the emotions resulting from the paradox) may be for some individuals. 
 
Do the paradoxes live on when the group dissolves? Tensions of belonging and 
organizing will disappear when the working group dissolves, since they result from the 
collaborative venture of seeking a consensus among competitors. However, the tensions 
linked to learning and to performing are embedded in the document produced by Delphi. The 
Delphi framework is constructed on the paradoxes of judgment versus metrics, time horizon, 
stability and transformation. Using the model we developed, we understand that what happens 
to the paradoxes when the group dissolves will depend on the arrangements adopted by the 
users of the Delphi framework. They may choose to frame the tensions in the framework as 
either/or, and dismiss its paradoxical nature. Or they may choose to use the framework in an 
“and…also” approach and dynamically embrace the paradoxes in the framework by 
constantly choosing to frame the paradoxes and shift from one branch to the other of the 
dualities.    
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4.8 Discussion and conclusion  
 
In this article we identified the tensions embedded in RI mainstreaming and analyzed 
the framing, shifting, transcending and defending arrangements used to cope with the 
paradoxical tensions. 
4.6.1 Implication for theory and practice 
This study contributes to paradox theory by highlighting the continuous circular aspect 
of paradox dynamics. A first contribution is to Responsible Investment literature. We show 
that ESG abounds with paradoxes, which we expected. The paradoxes specific to RI are lack 
of convention; stability and transformation; time horizon; and judgment and metrics. What 
was less expected is that a mainstreaming exercise could take place without resolving these 
paradoxes. We discovered indeed that paradoxes may not need to be resolved for 
mainstreaming to occur. These are an argument to shift away from the debate on the financial 
contribution of RI, in order to focus on the nature and management of ESG’s tensions. Our 
results show that no single arrangement (no one way of framing, of shifting, of transcending, 
of defending) dominates and no single map tells you how to deal with paradoxes. A recurrent 
discussion at Delphi about creating a framework but not a standard is one illustration of this 
striving to “keep things loose”.  
 
A second contribution is to paradox theory. Our study offers a step forward in defining 
what is – and what is not- a paradox. We showed that while tensions are inherent in 
organizational systems, they are constructed as paradoxes by the actors involved with them. A 
duality of “contradictory, yet interrelated elements” (Smith, 2006) is not a paradox if it is not 
acknowledged and treated as such by those subject to it. The logic in which the tension is 
approached (either/or, and/or, either/and) determines the nature of the tension. This means 
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that to answer the question “is this a paradox” we need to look at the logic behind the 
practices observed. In our case, dualities that were treated with a logic of dilemma, were 
therefore no longer considered as paradoxes for the purpose of our study.  
4.6.2 Limitation and future research  
The context of this study raises questions about the model’s generalizability. The 
limited size of the group did not allow for a large number of interviews. More importantly, the 
interactions that must have happened outside of the meetings were not observed, which does 
not mean they were not influential. In addition, we would have liked to observe more 
occurrences of transcendence in order to better understand this arrangement. Transcendence is 
only partial and precarious, in our results. It is not “managing” a paradox as prior research 
suggests; it is rather an umbrella approach keeping the paradox open.  
Our results show the importance of flexibility, which allows flowing with the cadences 
of institutional life and bringing forth first one and then the other side of the paradox at the 
right time and the right place. This leads us to new questions such as “how do you identify the 
right time and place to switch from one branch of the duality to the other”; or “what is the link 
from processes to outcomes”? 
4.6.3 Conclusion 
Most studies from a paradox perspective focus on outcomes. We show that paradox 
theory is in fact also a theory about processes. The focus on typologies of paradoxes was a 
necessary first stage, but we suggest that the untapped essence of paradox theory lies in the 
dynamics of a paradoxical process.  
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4.10 Appendix  
Appendix 1: Profile of investors interviewed on the Delphi process.  
Name  Workstream Company Function Background Previous expericence Country 
Laura  Aarnio Steerco State Street Global Advisors VP, ESG Investment Analyst Economics Newton Investment 
Management, PIRC 
US, FI 
Cecile Churet Steerco, Asset 
managers, Metrics 
 RobecoSAM Sustainability Investing Client Specialist HSBC , World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development 
CH 
Ralph Frank Steerco; Metrics  DVFA Managing Director   DE 
Frank  Curtiss  Steerco  RAILPEN Investments Head of Corporate Governance Asset Owner  UK 
 Mark  Hooker Steerco State Street Global Advisors Senior Managing Director, Advanced  
Research Center 
Assistant Professor in Money and 
Banking, Federal Reserve Board 
USA 
Andrew Howard Asset managers Goldman Sachs Equity Analyst Business Administration, 
Economics 
McKinsey UK 
 Alistair  Lowe Steerco  State Street Global Advisors Chief Investment Officer and Business 
Leader 
Economics and 
Computer Science 
NatWest USA 
Christopher  
McKnett 
Steerco, Asset 
managers 
State Street Global Advisors Managing Director & Head of ESG Business Administration KLD USA 
Nazzaro Paolo  Steerco Telecom Italia Head of Business Compliance Business Administration, 
Accounting 
Blue IT 
Michael Polya Steerco State Street Global Advisors 
Ltd 
Director Client-Facing Support EMEA Business Administration  UK 
Pascale Sagnier Asset managers AXA Investment Managers Head of ESG country research and impact Investing  FR 
Stéphane Voisin Metrics  KeplerChevreux Head Sustainability Research & 
Responsible Investment 
Business, Finance NatWest, Barclays, BNP Paribas, 
JPMorgan 
FR 
Daniela Carosio Asset managers Etica SGR Head of Research, Advocacy and 
Engagement  
Economics, Finance S&P, Italian Stock Exchange  IT 
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Neil Brown Asset managers Alliance Trust SRI investment manager Economics, Development PIRC UK 
 
Appendix 2: Delphi time line 
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5 Responsible investing: what factors matter most for market risk? 
5.1 Chapter Summary 
Following up on the previous chapters, we now take a closer look at the content of a 
tool constructed to practice RI, adopting a big bank and institutional investor perspective. In 
the previous chapters, it appeared that there is a demand for RI investing, regardless of the 
inconclusive ESG and financial return debate. I suggested that there is an understudied aspect 
of RI, in terms of values and beliefs underlying RI. Another understudied aspect of RI is the 
financial risk side. Indeed, while the link between environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) factors and financial return has been abundantly demonstrated in literature, though not 
in a satisfactory way, the link between ESG and risk is still unknown. 
In this chapter, I focus on this link between ESG factors and risk, and question what 
the Delphi framework, a tool for RI mainstreaming, can tell us about it. I adopt an exploratory 
approach, with the Delphi framework and Bloomberg data as my starting point, and combine 
it with a critical review of literature. The data confirms that there is a link between ESG 
factors and risk, although there is no information regarding causality and no predictive power 
in the models. An industry approach is most appropriate, and disaggregating ESG metrics 
makes sense. In addition, my analysis shows the limits of a quantitative approach. This leads 
me to a proposition for a new theoretical perspective on ESG, as an antidote to theoretical 
stagnation in ESG-performance research. 
5.2 Introduction 
While the link between ESG factors and financial return has been abundantly 
demonstrated in literature -- though with conflicting evidence -- the link between ESG factors 
and market risk is still unknown. The focus on return (or cost of capital) rather than risk (or 
market price volatility) is understandable as historically, ESG value has been studied from a 
corporate perspective. In addition, most studies adopting a shareholder perspective also have a 
 162 
 
neo-classical perspective, meaning they focus only on systematic risk, measured by Beta. In 
this research, however, we consider markets to be inefficient, information to be incomplete, 
and risk as not fully diversified. This is why we choose to rely on standard deviation, or better 
still, downward deviation, as a measure of financial risk to complete existing research. We 
investigate how ESG factors are linked to market risk, which we measure by the downside 
deviation of a company’s share price on the market. We argue that investors and stakeholder 
perspectives are also relevant. So this study contributes to the discussion between 
sustainability and financial performance with an investor focus and an empirical drive. To do 
so, we analyze data constructed by and used by institutional investors. 
A group of institutional investors has gathered together over the course of two years to 
build a framework of environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors that matter for 
sustainable investment. Their initiative contributes to the debate highlighted above because 
“what matters” is, among other things, which ESG factors reduce market risk affecting a 
company’s share price. The Delphi group (see Appendix for a description of the Delphi 
project), as these investors named themselves in reference to the consensus-based process 
they wished to follow, adopted a dialectic process consisting of knowledge sharing and 
discussions over time, to determine which factors belonged in the framework -- which factors 
were most “material”. The materiality of a factor reflects the discussions and judgment of the 
members of the Delphi group on the merits of each factor in terms of strategic and operational 
impact for a company, but above all in terms of financial performance, rather than ESG 
performance. More specifically, financial performance is understood by the group as a 
company’s market return, but also very importantly in terms of risk: strategic risk, operational 
risk and last but not least, financial market risk, measured by the volatility of share price.  
The key findings of our study relate to ESG data availability and quality, which 
remain poor; to the relevance and limits of a framework such as the one built by Delphi, 
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which resides in the role such a tool plays in shaping a practice and a field; and to the 
relevance of measuring financial performance through historical volatility.  
5.3 Literature review 
A voluminous though inconclusive debate has been going on in literature on the link 
between financial performance and ESG factors (Margolis, 2009), with more than 200 
academic articles adopting different angles to search for this link (e.g., Derwall, Guenster, 
Bauer, & Koedijk, 2005; Bauer, Derwall, & Otten, 2007), including several meta-analyses 
(Allouche & Laroche, 2005; Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003; Wu,2006). Some studies 
adopt accounting measures to value sustainability, while others adopt market-based measures 
to value sustainability. Some focus on CSP (corporate social performance), while others focus 
on institutional investors’ sustainable or unsustainable funds. Some samples include all 
companies, while other samples are limited to sustainable companies, identified for example 
based on the composition of a sustainability index such as the FTSE4Good or the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index Stoxx. Although this literature is often regarded as one field of research, 
it has been addressed from a variety of perspectives that provide very different insights. For 
the purpose of this study, we focus on the literature that looks at the link between ESG factors 
and financial performance from a market perspective: i.e. how do financial markets value a 
company’s reporting and performance on ESG factors.  
5.3.1 The ESG and financial return relationship for company shares 
A categorization of literature on the link between social and financial performance in 
the past 10 years can be done according to several dimensions. A first categorization serves to 
distinguish studies adopting a shareholder perspective (such as Bauer et al., 2005; Derwal et 
al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 2008) from studies with a stakeholder perspective (such as 
Barnett & Solomon, 2006; Capelle Blancart & Monjon, 2012; Cox, 2007; Edmans, 2011). 
The former was the most common approach in earlier studies, and explains the many studies 
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trying to make “the business case for socially responsible investment”. This perspective, 
based on the shareholder maximization principle, makes an attempt to demonstrate that 
investing according to ESG criteria brings higher financial returns. It is only recently that 
some authors started to depart from this first perspective. Stakeholder perspective studies on 
the link between ESG factors and financial performance recognize that a firm’s economic 
activities may have positive or negative externalities that affect the welfare of third parties. 
These studies view ESG as creating value for stakeholders and as a proxy for good 
management. The better a firm manages its relationships with its stakeholders, the better its 
financial performance over time (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1999). As an 
illustration, Barnett et al. (2006) explain that “a firm with a favourable work environment can 
decrease its hiring costs and increase its employee retention rate, decrease community 
opposition and legal costs when opening a new factory, and more easily lobby for tax breaks 
from local governments” (p. 1105).   
A second categorization serves to distinguish studies that are theory-driven from those 
that are data-driven. The earlier studies on ESG performance and financial performance are 
mostly theory driven (Bauer et al., 2005; Derwal et al., 2005; Renneboog at al., 2008). These 
authors use data to test theories -- for example the market efficiency hypotheses that suppose 
share prices reflect all available information and adapt to new information. So if ESG has any 
value, it should be reflected in the share price. Or traditional portfolio theory, which predicts 
that any screen increases idiosyncratic risk8 by restricting diversification. As a result, ESG 
investments using exclusionary screens should lead to lower returns in theory. In the same 
                                               
8
 As Oikonomou et al. (2012) note, under traditional portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1991), the total risk 
that a security bears can be divided into systematic risk arising from broad factors that affect the entire 
universe of securities and idiosyncratic risk which arises from industry/firm-specific factors. Through 
diversification, portfolios bearing no idiosyncratic risk can be constructed so that the investor is only 
compensated for the market risk of his investments. That means research adopting a neo-classical 
perspective should focus only on systematic risk, measured by Beta. In this research, however, we 
consider markets to be inefficient and risk as not fully diversified. This is why we can rely on standard 
deviation, or better still, downward deviation, as a measure of financial risk. 
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vein, authors following Freidman’s (1970) neo-classical arguments will expect a negative link 
between ESG performance and financial performance, and a positive link between ESG 
performance and idiosyncratic risk (more sustainability leads to more volatility). They see 
ESG investments as a misappropriation of company resources, reducing shareholder value, as 
illustrated by Brammer, Brooks and Pavelin’s (2006) results. Furthermore, there is little need 
for studies focusing on risk in this perspective, because of the automatic risk-return trade-off.  
The more recent studies, on the other hand, tend to be data driven, perhaps in reaction 
to the inability of theory driven studies to confirm their hypotheses with the available data 
(Hoepner & Ferguson, 2010; Kempf & Osthoff, 2008). These empirical approaches allow for 
more nuance. They do not presuppose a link between sustainability and financial 
performance, but look for patterns in the historical data, which is now becoming available, 
and look at different dimensions separately. As a result, Bouslah, Kryzanowski and M’Zali 
(2013) for example observe that the direction of causation between firm risk and sustainability 
performance depends on the ESG dimension examined. Similarly, Hoepner and Ferguson 
(2010)’s results give different relationships for financial performance and ESG performance 
per industry. These approaches leave room for market inefficiencies and justify a specific 
focus on market risk (both systematic and idiosyncratic) in addition to market return.  
The ESG and market risk relationship 
Recent research calls for more attention to financial risk (accounting based or market 
based). Several scholars argue that it is an aspect to be taken into account specifically when 
assessing the link between sustainability and financial performance in a more comprehensive 
manner (Kempf & Osthoff, 2008; Salama, Andersen & Toms, 2011; Oikonomou, Brooks, 
Pavelin, 2012; Wagner, 2010). Neo-classical theory driven studies predict a risk-return trade-
off: high risks [low-risk] are associated with high [low] expected returns. In theory, if RI has 
superior expected return, it is to compensate for higher volatility. If RI reduces risk, it leads to 
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lower expected returns. However, the results do not always confirm theoretical expectations. 
When Bauer et al. (2005) look at idiosyncratic risk (measured by the residuals volatility of the 
CAPM), they find no relationship with ESG performance. And Renneboog et al. (2008), 
conclude that they “cannot unequivocally demonstrate” (p. 1732) a link between ESG 
performance and financial return (and therefore risk) with their meta-analysis. 
The rationale for using market risk as a dependent variable is pluralistic, and varies 
with the theoretical perspective on market efficiency, agency, or stakeholder versus 
shareholder perspective, among others, which authors rarely position themselves on explicitly. 
When they do take market risk into account, most studies adopt financial return as a 
dependent variable, with mitigated results. There is no regression-based study that 
simultaneously uses stock-market based return measures and measures of financial risk as 
dependent variables. A few studies focus exclusively on financial risk as a dependent variable 
(Oikonomou et al., 2012), while others use a multivariate regression error term as a measure 
of financial risk (Bouslah et al., 2013).  
What is still missing from research on ESG and market risk?  
The idea of studying ESG performance and market risk is not exactly new. In 1978, 
Spicer already adopted this perspective by studying the link between ESG (looking at 
different aspects of pollution) and idiosyncratic risk (as measured by total market risk) as well 
as systematic risk (beta). After him, several authors adopted this approach, mostly using 
subjective measures of ESG constructed by third parties: Aupperle et al. look at 5-year total 
risk and long-term beta in 2005, using a subjective index for ESG. Fortune's community and 
employee responsibility (CER) indicator is used by Salama et al. (2009) to compare and  
investigate systematic risk. In these studies, there is a generalized use of second hand, 
composite ESG measures, leading to the empirical and conceptual limits discussed in the next 
section. 
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Furthermore, few studies acknowledge the current context of ESG reporting, 
characterized by demand differences for different types of shares and by incomplete 
information, which can lead to discrepancies in prices. Galema et al. (2008) argue that 
investors do not include securities in their portfolio for which they lack such information as 
expected return, variance, and covariance with other securities. If shares with good ESG 
performance are in excess demand compared to “sin stocks”, they will be overpriced and 
therefore give a lower return. But this does not automatically lead to higher risk, as suggested 
by Merton (1987), who shows that in the presence of this type of incomplete information, firm 
size, firm-specific return variance and the fraction of investors that know about a security all 
impact on risk-adjusted returns. Thus, in the context of RI, the increased (or decreased) risk of 
a firm acting in a socially responsible manner could increase (or decrease) its expected return. 
This requires an explicit focus on systematic and idiosyncratic risk to explain the link with 
ESG performance. 
5.3.2 Disaggregating KPIs for ESG  
One of the limits encountered when studying the link between ESG and market risk 
(but also more generally financial performance) is the multiplicity of factors used in different 
studies. In practice, this results in numerous lists and matrices of sustainability indicators that 
raise at least two problems: whether to favor disaggregation or integration between indicators 
(Morse, McNamara, Moses & Okwoli, 2001), and how to integrate the conceptually different 
ESG factors in a legitimate way.  
Some studies note the importance of distinguishing the impact of the different ESG 
dimensions, but few do so empirically (Bouslah, Kryzanowski & M’Zali, 2013). Edmans 
(2011) shows superior long term share returns measured by four-factor alpha, for investments 
using an employee relations screen. However, this result is based on the “100 Best Companies 
to Work for in America” as its ESG metric, a measure subject to criticism like any study 
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relying on third-party surveys, which add a level of interpretation. Apart from this study, it is 
not clear whether any ESG factor influences financial performance more than any other 
(Capelle-Blanchard & Monjon, 2014).  
The aggregation over different dimensions that have confounding effects is pointed 
out as one of the reasons why the empirical literature yields few significant relations between 
RI and expected returns. First, aggregation may hide the effect of dimensions which are not 
that important or relevant. Bouslah et al. (2013) show that not all ESG dimensions are 
relevant for firm risk, and that the relationship will be positive or negative depending on the 
ESG dimension. For example, it is possible that positive news on environmental friendly 
production is positively related to expected returns, whereas news pertaining to good 
employee relations is negatively related (see Scholtens and Zhou, 2008). Second, the strengths 
and weaknesses in the KLD model, which most academic studies use, are different 
conceptually and should not be combined. Finally, these studies make investors dependent on 
the agencies that conceived the ratings, with all the shortcomings that have been discussed in 
literature (Entine, 2009) in terms of conflicts of interest, legitimacy and rating methodology. 
Indeed, the composite (or aggregate) measure of ESG adds a level of interpretation by third 
parties other than the company and the investor (Galema, Platinga & Scholtens, 2008).  
Summarizing the literature review 
In summary, the empirical literature on RI does not conclude that sustainability is 
significantly priced by the capital markets. A number of prior studies have attempted to 
quantify the empirical relationship between ESG and risk. These are summarized in Orlitzky 
& Benjamin’s (2001) meta-analysis, which finds an overall negative correlation. A review of 
prior research highlights the need for data driven research on the link between ESG 
performance and financial risk, on departing from a shareholder perspective, and on 
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distinguishing individual ESG dimensions. In addition, there is a need to acknowledge the 
incomplete information characterizing ESG reporting.  
The objective of this study is to explore the relationship between ESG factors and 
financial risk. To do so, we use the Delphi framework which allows us to have a data driven 
approach and a stakeholder perspective.  The framework will also help us to establish the 
level of ESG reporting available to institutional investors.  
5.4 Methodology 
We do not rely on social performance rating like previous studies do, since our 
departure point is the Delphi framework. Being built by investment practitioners, the Delphi 
framework can be regarded as covering the most relevant ESG factors considered for 
practitioners. The fact that this framework has not yet been explored by academics to our 
knowledge, is not a concern in terms of validity, but rather an opportunity to explore it 
ourselves and discuss the Delphi motivations which led to this framework. We are exploring a 
framework and database, which can be assimilated to grounded methods.  
5.4.1 Data sample and selection 
To conduct the research developed in the previous section at the company level, we 
use panel data for a set of US firms. The set of firms is derived from the Standard & Poor's 
500 index composition from 2007 to 2013.  This sample of large US companies varies from 
year to year, with the inclusion or exclusion of companies. 565 distinct company names 
compose the sample at some point in time. 341 companies have observations for all 7 years 
and 61 companies have data for the last 6 years. If we consider the time bracket 2008-2013 
we could work with a constant company sub-sample of 402 companies. However, this leads to 
a survivorship bias, as only the performance of companies that were most resistant and that 
lasted throughout these years would be considered. We first work with this unbalanced data 
and consider it to be panel data, applying panel regression models to control for the repetition 
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of companies from one year to another in the sample. This approach is recommended by 
Wagner (2010) to account for unobserved heterogeneity, since panel estimation techniques 
largely capture its effects. When performing industry specific analysis, we exclude the 
telecom industry due to its small sample size in the S&P 500 (from n=8 in 2013 to n=5 in 
2013). Following the poor results of the co-integration analysis with the panel data, with 
persistent volatility which gets worse when the analysis is performed per industry, we then 
test other relationships in the data by performing ordinary least square regressions per 
industry and per year, by filling in missing data (see Appendix), and by checking for non-
linear relationships.   
We restricted the sample to the United States for two reasons. One was that this 
automatically controls for the market effect, the biggest common factor in share returns, and 
secondly ESG standards and the market perception of the importance of these factors differ 
widely across countries. 
The final sample is an unbalanced panel of 3244 firm-year observations for the period 
2007-2013 for all S&P companies covered by Bloomberg’s ESG data. Companies are 
organized in 10 industries using the first digit of their ICB sector code. 
 
We use the list of factors identified in Delphi’s framework after following the 
construction of this framework by the group for two years. During our observation, we 
noticed how Delphi’s participants deliberately searched for complexity and consensus instead 
of quantitative tests, as a validation of their legitimacy. The group’s belief throughout the 
process was that markets do not value ESG properly in share prices, and that testing for a link 
between ESG performance and financial return would not be a favorable approach for their 
framework. Legitimacy therefore had to come from elsewhere than quantitative backtesting of 
metrics. The group followed a circular process to develop the framework, constantly going 
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back and forth between different positions. Delphi’s process took 2 years to reach a consensus 
on a framework of KPIs for ESG. And the current version of the framework is not meant to be 
definitive: it is meant to evolve, along with the evolution of ESG investing. The materiality of 
each factor had to be discussed and reviewed until each member of the group was comfortable 
to put their name on the framework (see Appendix for a description of the Delphi initiative). 
This process created dialogue, which stimulated learning for the group and for the expert 
individuals. The process led to combining judgment and metrics, leading to a framework 
which departs from a pure financial logic. The result is a framework organized around 3 
“value levers”. These are not the usual E(nvironment), S(ocial), G(overnance) but rather 
Growth, Returns on Capital, and Governance & Risk Management, which are meant to be 
much closer to mainstream asset managers’ categorizations when thinking about the value of 
their investments. These 3 value levers are broken down in 11 “value drivers”, 29 “key ESG 
factors”, and finally 98 “metrics” at the time of our analysis. Not all factors apply to all 
sectors. In our study, we use the suggested metric as independent variables when available, or 
the most similar available metric. So our analysis focuses on the lowest level (the “metrics”), 
to operationalize the factors, thus matching the Delphi approach. This is rare in ESG reporting 
literature. Studies are most often conducted at the more global level, which is usually defined 
as E, S and/or G, due to the way sustainability ratings are constructed (Barnett & Solomon, 
2012).  
Figure 11: Structure of the Delphi Framework (the full framework is currently confidential) 
Value lever 1 Value driver 1 ESG Factor 1  
ESG factor 2 
Metric 1 
Metric 2 
Metric 3 
Metric 4 
Metric 5 
 
 
. 
. 
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Value driver 2 ESG Factor 3  
ESG factor 4 
ESG Factor 5 
Value driver 3  
Value lever 2 Value driver 4  
…  
Value lever 3 …  
Value driver 10  
Value driver 11 ESG factor 29 
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In addition to being large enough for subsamples, the database must be a recent one, 
because the Delphi project is recent and ESG factors evolve. We therefore obtain the ESG 
metrics to populate these factors from Bloomberg’s database, with the purpose of using the 
same tools an asset manager would turn to. The data-set available from Bloomberg has annual 
data files from 2007 through 2013 for 62 metrics of the 98 metrics proposed by Delphi, 
distributed across all 29 ESG factors. The aspirational nature and qualitative nature of some of 
the Delphi metrics explains their lack of availability in a conventional financial database at 
this stage. Although the data has its limits in terms of completeness, it has the advantage of 
being self-reported data and of being recent. The Bloomberg ESG data is available since 
2007, which gives a time horizon of 7 years.  
5.4.2 Measuring market risk 
As one financial analyst in Delphi stated: “We need to understand what drives profit 
but also what risk was taken to reach this profit. We are very good at highlighting returns but 
very poor at highlighting risks. This is where Delphi can help, with its value drivers. This 
framework needs to tell you more about the risk profile of a company.” (Delphi meeting, 18 
March 2014). We therefore now clarify what risk we are studying, and how. 
In this research, we measure total market risk of a firm by the annualized standard 
deviation from average daily share return. It is helpful at this stage to define the average daily 
return of a share:  
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with		1    	
				 , the change in price. (1)  
(2)    ln  			, log returns which can be interpreted as continuously compounding 
and have additive properties  
Rt denotes the simple return at time t and rt denotes the continuously compounded 
return at time t. ̅ is the mean share return for T historical observations over a year.  
We use two financial risk measures, both constructed based on market price volatility.  
We use the yearly standard deviation of return as a first financial risk measure, 
calculated for year Y as:  
(3)  
Then, we adopt a downside-risk approach using the yearly semideviation, or semi-
variance, of return. Semi-variance only considers downside risk (returns below ̅) and is 
defined by :  
(4)  
 
With N = total number of observations in a given year Y. 
In other words, with this measure, financial risk is no longer symmetric, and we are 
not concerned with time periods in which rt ≥ ̅ (a share’s return exceeds its average daily 
return). This approach is closer to investors’ preoccupations. Further discussion of downside 
risk can be found in Sortino and Forsey (1996). 
In addition to the theoretical rationale we developed earlier for studying financial risk 
as a dependent variable, there is a methodological justification. By focusing on risk, we align 
ourselves with the perspective of the Delphi group that created the framework, adding 
coherence between method and data. The group considered its framework for ESG investing 
 174 
 
as having both an opportunity-based value (or value creation, reflected in return) as well as 
value destruction or risk‐based value (reflected in risk). To quote one of the Delphi members: 
“[With the framework] we are adding value. With excess return or lower risk or perhaps 
another form of measurement for adding value. Beyond that there is not much agreement.” 
(Asset manager interview, 6 November 2013). The question was raised which was the best 
approach for judging value drivers, to which the group responded that both approaches were 
in the scope of the framework and could be reflected at the Factor or Metric level. In fact, the 
term risk was used loosely by the group to cover governance risk, operational risk, water risk, 
reputation risk, market risk,… with a lack of clarity characteristic of research so far. But in 
their discussions, the Delphi members were adamant not to focus on return, as they believed it 
would not reflect the value added by using their framework. Moreover, the group suspected 
that most of these risk were not reflected in a company’s share price. As a result, a group 
member stated:  “We focus less on growth and more on downside risk. If ESG is a tail risk 
then we would focus on that in our modeling” (Asset manager call, 31 October 2012). 
The next part presents the empirical results. It summarizes and analyzes the 
observations made during our exploration. We calculate correlations between metrics and 
risk, then run regressions, looking to confirm which ESG metrics are linked to risk and 
whether they have any predictive power. With the OLS (ordinary least squared) regression 
analysis performed after having verified the poor results of panel regressions, we look at 
“without-study” variation, i.e. variations across subjects, in line with our research question. 
We do not look at “within-study” variation, i.e. variations across years as a fixed effects panel 
regression would do, because there is no significant variation in the year-to-year ESG 
performance of a company. 
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5.6 Findings 
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 19 reports the sample distribution by year for the whole sample of 3244 yearly 
observations based on S&P500 membership, grouped in 10 industry subsamples based on the 
ICB industry codes9.  
Table 19 Sample size, per year and per sector  
Number of companies Year     N
Industry 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Oil & Gas 27 35 37 30 36 38 36 239 
Basic 
Materials 
23 24 26 22 24 24 24 167 
Industrials 59 68 68 62 70 71 70 468 
Consumer 
Goods 
56 59 61 56 53 60 53 398 
Health Care 41 48 45 44 44 46 44 312 
Consumer 
Services 
59 64 67 61 67 71 67 456 
Telecommuni
cations 
8 8 7 7 5 5 5 45 
Utilities 25 29 31 28 31 32 32 208 
Financials 76 85 84 81 81 84 82 573 
Technology 54 61 61 57 45 55 45 378 
Total yearly 
observations 
428 481 487 448 456 486 458 3244 
 
                                               
9
 “The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is a definitive system categorizing over 70,000 
companies and 75,000 securities worldwide, enabling the comparison of companies across four levels 
of classification and national boundaries. The ICB system is supported by the ICB Database, an 
unrivalled data source for global sector analysis, which is maintained by FTSE International Limited.” 
Retrieved from http://www.icbenchmark.com/ on 31 March 2015. 
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Table 20 shows the level of reporting per year, for each independent variable (see 
Appendix for a description of each variable). Full reporting is only available for financial 
data, not for ESG data. While this gap between financial and non-financial data was to be 
expected, we also note that it is not reducing over time for US companies despite calls for 
better and more standardized reporting. Most of the data available based on Delphi’s 
categorization is “Governance & Risk Management” data, rather than “Growth” data or 
“Operational & Value Chain Risk” data. If we use the usual ESG classification, we note that 
social data is the least reported, followed by environmental data and corporate governance 
data. Only 7 of the ESG metrics are reported by more than half of the companies, as well in 
2007 as in 2013. In fact, while reporting did improve by an average 6% per year between 
2007 and 2011 in terms of data points available, the availability of ESG information for S&P  
500 companies in Bloomberg dropped after 2011 (the CDP reporting data was not available at 
the time of our data collection). In our study, we did not consider any of the metrics for which 
less than 15% of the data was available for all years (grey area in table 20). We took into 
account metrics with at least 15% of data points reported overall, in years and industries 
where reporting was sufficiently high, because a stricter threshold would have resulted in 
ignoring most of the metrics.  
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Table 20: Level of reporting evolving over time 
 
 
Variable Missing Total Percent Missing 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
COMPANY 0,00 3,244 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
(mean) DAILY_RETURN 0,00 3,244 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
(sd) DAILY_RETURN 0,00 3,244 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
CF_FREE_CASH_FLOW 311,00 3,244 9,59 19,86 17,05 13,96 10,94 1,10 4,12 0,44
CEO_DUALITY 339,00 3,244 10,45 21,73 16,01 12,94 10,49 1,54 3,70 7,42
HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY 451,00 3,244 13,90 21,50 16,42 13,14 10,71 1,54 5,97 28,82
ENVIRON_SUPPLY_MGT 451,00 3,244 13,90 21,73 16,22 13,14 10,71 1,75 5,76 28,82
CLIMATE_CHG_PRODS 455,00 3,244 14,03 21,73 16,22 13,55 10,94 1,75 5,76 29,04
#_OF_NON_EXECUTIVE_DIR_ON_BRD1,244 3,244 38,35 93,22 84,82 66,74 11,38 1,75 3,70 7,64
IS_RD_EXPEND 1,548 3,244 47,72 56,31 54,05 53,18 49,33 40,35 41,56 39,52
RD_EXPENDITURES_PER_CASH_FLOW1,550 3,244 47,78 56,54 54,05 53,18 49,33 40,35 41,77 39,52
CDP_REGULATORY_RISK_EXP 2,048 3,244 63,13 93,69 56,55 50,92 53,79 46,93 44,03 100,00
CDP_PHYSICAL_RISK_EXP 2,048 3,244 63,13 93,69 56,55 50,92 53,79 46,93 44,03 100,00
CDP_OTHER_RISK_EXP 2,052 3,244 63,26 93,69 57,17 51,13 53,79 46,93 44,03 100,00
TOTAL_GHG_EMISSIONS 2,113 3,244 65,14 66,82 63,41 67,15 62,28 58,55 64,20 73,58
BEST_SALES 2,269 3,244 69,94 100,00 100,00 98,15 75,00 92,11 25,10 0,87
ENERGY_INTENSITY_PER_SALES 2,441 3,244 75,25 81,07 80,25 76,39 70,98 67,76 71,60 78,82
WATER_INTENSITY_PER_SALES 2,548 3,244 78,55 83,88 82,74 80,08 74,78 73,68 74,28 80,57
WASTE_GENERATED_PER_SALES 2,599 3,244 80,12 86,45 83,99 80,08 77,23 74,34 76,13 82,97
PCT_WOMEN_EMPLOYEES 2,619 3,244 80,73 87,62 84,20 81,72 78,57 75,00 76,54 81,88
WASTE_RECYCLED 2,679 3,244 82,58 88,32 87,53 83,37 80,58 76,97 77,78 83,84
BEST_CAPEX 2,692 3,244 82,98 100,00 100,00 98,56 83,26 96,93 67,49 34,93
HAZARDOUS_WASTE 2,730 3,244 84,16 86,45 86,07 84,19 82,59 80,48 81,89 87,55
LOST_TIME_INCIDENT_RATE 2,738 3,244 84,40 87,85 87,11 85,01 82,59 80,92 81,48 86,03
ENVIRON_FINES_AMT 2,765 3,244 85,23 87,15 86,07 85,83 84,60 82,24 83,54 87,34
PCT_WOMEN_MGT 2,775 3,244 85,54 89,95 87,32 86,24 83,26 82,89 82,10 87,34
FATALITIES_TOTAL 2,803 3,244 86,41 88,32 88,57 85,63 82,59 82,89 86,01 90,83
POLITICAL_DONATIONS 2,875 3,244 88,63 89,95 89,19 87,89 86,16 86,18 88,27 92,79
FATALITIES_EMPLOYEES 2,880 3,244 88,78 90,42 89,60 88,30 86,83 85,96 87,86 92,58
NOX_EMISSIONS 2,884 3,244 88,90 88,79 89,40 89,73 89,06 86,40 87,65 91,27
WASTE_SENT_TO_LANDFILLS 2,914 3,244 89,83 95,79 94,80 91,58 87,05 85,53 85,39 88,86
PCT_MINORITY_EMPLOYEES 2,921 3,244 90,04 92,52 90,85 90,55 88,84 87,72 87,45 92,58
NUMBER_SPILLS 2,922 3,244 90,07 93,69 93,14 91,17 88,17 86,62 87,24 90,61
VOC_EMISSIONS 2,957 3,244 91,15 90,89 91,06 90,76 91,29 89,04 91,36 93,67
FATALITIES_CONTRACTORS 2,976 3,244 91,74 92,76 92,31 91,17 89,96 91,01 90,74 94,32
PCT_MINORITY_MGT 3,013 3,244 92,88 93,69 93,14 92,81 91,96 92,11 91,36 95,20
NET_REV 3,015 3,244 92,94 93,22 93,14 93,22 92,63 92,76 93,00 92,58
EMPLOYEE_TURNOVER_PCT 3,015 3,244 92,94 95,09 93,76 93,43 92,19 90,13 91,56 94,54
INVESTMENTS_IN_SUSTAINABILITY 3,049 3,244 93,99 94,63 94,18 93,22 93,30 93,42 93,83 95,41
SUSTAIN_INV_TO_CAPEX 3,053 3,244 94,11 94,63 94,39 93,43 93,53 93,42 94,03 95,41
SO2_EMISSIONS 3,063 3,244 94,42 93,93 94,59 94,46 94,20 93,86 93,83 96,07
CO2_INTENSITY 3,076 3,244 94,82 96,03 95,63 94,87 93,53 93,64 94,24 95,85
ENVIRONMENTAL_ACCTG_COST 3,093 3,244 95,35 96,26 96,05 95,48 95,31 93,64 94,44 96,29
PCT_WATER_RECYCLED 3,125 3,244 96,33 98,83 98,34 97,33 95,76 94,30 94,24 95,63
LOST_TIME_ACCIDENTS 3,127 3,244 96,39 96,50 96,26 96,51 95,98 95,83 95,88 97,82
LOST_TIME_PER_EMPLOYEE 3,127 3,244 96,39 96,50 96,26 96,51 95,98 95,83 95,88 97,82
TRAINING_SPEND_PER_EMPLOYEE 3,135 3,244 96,64 98,36 98,13 96,71 95,76 95,18 95,68 96,72
EMPLOYEE_TRAINING_COST 3,135 3,244 96,64 98,36 98,13 96,71 95,76 95,18 95,68 96,72
WATER_PER_UNIT_OF_PROD 3,144 3,244 96,92 98,13 98,13 97,13 95,76 95,83 96,30 97,16
ARD_PATENTS_TRADEMRK_COPYRIGHT3,172 3,244 97,78 97,20 97,51 97,74 97,99 98,03 98,15 97,82
PERCENT_OF_DISCLOSURE 3,173 3,244 97,81 97,90 97,51 96,51 97,54 97,59 98,97 98,69
BS_ASSET_DURATION 3,188 3,244 98,27 98,13 98,34 98,15 98,21 98,25 98,56 98,25
SUPPLIERS_AUDITED 3,207 3,244 98,86 99,53 99,58 99,59 98,88 98,03 98,35 98,03
PCT_RECYCLED_MATERIALS 3,213 3,244 99,04 99,30 99,38 98,77 99,11 98,46 98,97 99,34
SRI_AUM 3,218 3,244 99,20 99,77 99,58 98,97 98,88 98,90 99,18 99,13
SRI_PCT_TOTAL_AUM 3,220 3,244 99,26 99,77 99,79 99,18 98,88 98,90 99,18 99,13
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Table 21 reports the descriptive statistics of the risk measures and of the Delphi 
metrics as explanatory variables, as well as some financial metrics for the whole sample. It 
shows that the mean (median) annualized total risk ((sd) DAILY_RETURN)) is 0.0327 
(0.0233). The mean (median) downside risk (AVG_DOWNSIDE_DEVIATION) is 0.0015 
(0.0066). Panel B of Table 21 shows a mix of binary and numerical values for the ESG 
metrics called for in the Delphi framework. The metrics illustrate 9 different ESG factors, 
with each factor represented by one (Research & Development) to 13 metrics (Resource 
efficiency). As expected, each industry subsample based on ICB categories has different risk 
profiles, different key ESG metrics, and different financial characteristics (the descriptive 
statistics for each subsample or per year are not reported for brevity’s sake but are available 
upon request). Specifically, 2007 risk measures are high in all industries, confirming high 
volatility and downside deviation during the crisis. After 2007, risk measures drop until 2013, 
when total risk increases overall although downside deviation only peaked in the consumer 
goods industry. Furthermore, the risk profile of industrials is characterized by a slower 
decrease of volatility after 2007, and an increase in downside risk in 2013, although to a lesser 
extent than in consumer goods.  
Overall, the mean (median) values of binary ESG metrics linked to reporting are 
greater than 50% (equal to 1) suggesting that the typical firm-year observation is characterized 
by good reporting practices on disclosure issues such as health and safety risks or climate 
change regulatory or physical risks. On the other hand, the mean (median) values of binary 
ESG metrics linked to performance are smaller than 50% (equal to 0) suggesting limited 
results when it comes to practicing ESG metrics, through recent efforts in environmental 
supply management or developing or launching climate change products for example. 
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Table 21: Descriptive statistics of factors in the framework for which data is available in Bloomberg 
 
variable mean median sd min max skewness     kurtosis N
Panel A: financial measures
(mean) DAILY_RETURN 0.0013 0.0004 0.0197 -0.0127 0.8950 20.14 619.24 3244
(sd) DAILY_RETURN 0.0327 0.0233 0.0693 0.0043 1.8367 19.05 505.73 3244
AVG_DOWNSIDE_DEVIATION 0.0015 0.0066 0.0066 0.0000 0.3351 40.64 2041.72 3244
Panel B: Delphi Factors
Access to resources
ENVIRON_SUPPLY_MGT 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.77 1.60 2833
EMPLOYEE_TURNOVER_PCT 11.57 10.00 7.00 2.80 55.00 2.26 11.30 230
Human capital management
TRAINING_SPEND_PER_EMPLOYEE 1199.16 993.19 901.83 0.00 3756.88 1.28 3.96 109
EMPLOYEE_TRAINING_COST 161.61 23.00 220.94 0.00 1000.00 1.68 5.57 109
Innovation
SUSTAIN_INV_TO_CAPEX 0.21 0.05 0.72 0.00 5.70 6.38 45.75 192
ARD_PATENTS_TRADEMRK_COPYRIGHT4273.62 556.50 9222.87 95.31 34233.00 2.61 8.12 74
IS_RD_EXPEND 711.12 178.99 1491.05 0.00 11381.00 3.69 18.30 1726
Licence to operate
POLITICAL_DONATIONS 0.55 0.16 1.27 0.00 12.85 6.12 50.46 371
CDP_REGULATORY_RISK_EXP 0.78 1.00 0.42 0.00 2.00 -1.32 2.86 1213
Resources efficiency
CO2_INTENSITY 1.86 0.37 12.00 0.03 112.05 8.90 80.91 169
WATER_INTENSITY_PER_SALES 56916.73 380.60 506470.94 0.00 10993321.00 16.41 325.00 700
NOX_EMISSIONS 28.27 6.12 48.68 0.00 241.00 2.28 7.86 362
SO2_EMISSIONS 74.02 10.45 147.57 0.00 1017.00 3.55 17.93 182
VOC_EMISSIONS 17.16 0.53 53.93 0.00 310.00 3.65 15.32 289
ENERGY_INTENSITY_PER_SALES 851.68 124.85 3262.80 2.31 50934.14 9.30 109.40 807
WASTE_GENERATED_PER_SALES 1058.07 3.33 9092.47 0.00 124993.02 9.95 109.83 648
HAZARDOUS_WASTE 43.20 2.04 174.56 0.00 2000.00 7.46 68.94 516
WASTE_SENT_TO_LANDFILLS 94.36 11.76 509.46 0.00 8886.04 15.55 266.59 335
WASTE_RECYCLED 202.71 23.61 664.75 0.00 6601.42 6.55 53.80 569
WATER_PER_UNIT_OF_PROD 7088.99 152.00 15377.24 0.00 52900.00 2.06 5.45 101
PCT_WATER_RECYCLED 30.74 20.71 34.98 0.00 252.00 2.69 14.97 120
TOTAL_GHG_EMISSIONS 5817.15 862.91 15710.08 4.45 150000.00 6.02 47.68 1139
PCT_RECYCLED_MATERIALS 32.15 17.90 34.54 0.00 95.00 0.77 1.98 31
Operational & Value Chain Risk
LOST_TIME_ACCIDENTS 42264.64 13940.00 65092.99 0.00 280512.00 1.96 6.04 118
LOST_TIME_INCIDENT_RATE 0.50 0.31 0.63 0.00 4.20 3.27 16.13 512
LOST_TIME_PER_EMPLOYEE 1142.41 291.74 2525.49 0.00 14025.60 3.70 16.30 118
CDP_PHYSICAL_RISK_EXP 0.74 1.00 0.45 0.00 2.00 -0.91 2.27 1213
CDP_OTHER_RISK_EXP 0.68 1.00 0.47 0.00 2.00 -0.68 1.72 1209
SUPPLIERS_AUDITED 185.49 70.00 234.62 0.00 917.00 1.41 4.10 37
ENVIRON_FINES_AMT 1.23 0.01 9.25 0.00 119.00 10.20 111.49 482
FATALITIES_CONTRACTORS 1.11 0.00 2.23 0.00 14.00 3.13 14.48 270
HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY 0.59 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 -0.36 1.13 2833
NUMBER_SPILLS 108.50 14.00 248.44 0.00 2080.00 4.39 27.33 325
Research & development
RD_EXPENDITURES_PER_CASH_FLOW 0.39 0.16 2.86 -9.40 113.25 35.80 1402.84 1724
Product quality
FATALITIES_EMPLOYEES 0.97 0.00 1.88 0.00 16.00 3.57 20.64 368
FATALITIES_TOTAL 1.88 1.00 3.42 0.00 35.00 4.14 29.16 444
SRI_AUM 59921.69 16300.00 92323.42 0.00 285000.00 1.56 4.00 26
SRI_PCT_TOTAL_AUM 3.90 2.51 5.19 0.08 19.74 1.77 5.34 24
CLIMATE_CHG_PRODS 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00 6.59 44.40 2829
Availability of COGO kpis
CEO_DUALITY 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 -0.41 1.17 2946
PCT_WOMEN_MGT 26.11 24.80 11.36 1.00 71.00 0.54 2.95 472
PCT_WOMEN_EMPLOYEES 35.19 31.00 15.78 5.00 80.00 0.51 2.68 628
PCT_MINORITY_MGT 18.95 16.26 10.04 0.50 55.00 0.94 3.64 234
PCT_MINORITY_EMPLOYEES 30.96 31.05 11.54 5.20 72.00 0.15 2.55 324
CF_FREE_CASH_FLOW 1918.47 675.01 7548.81 -110560.00 127491.00 5.55 121.94 2979
ARDR_DIRECTORS_REMUNERATION 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
_OF_NON_EXECUTIVE_DIR_ON_BRD 9.63 10.00 2.33 4.00 31.00 1.67 15.61 2040
Panel C: independent variables
BEST_CAPEX -342.29 -110.00 837.83 -9850.00 0.00 -7.15 67.38 564
BEST_SALES 5608.39 2555.50 9778.75 134.50 121826.00 6.01 58.40 990
BS_ASSET_DURATION 4.58 4.50 1.65 0.00 7.87 0.04 3.17 57
NET_REV 17778.78 6716.61 26184.21 30.98 119643.00 2.14 6.52 230
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5.5.2 Exploration of the data 
Table 22 reports the factors that are most correlated to the downside risk measures. 
Four metrics have significant correlations, while most of the other results are statistically 
insignificant. We report only the most correlated metrics due to the large size of the full 
correlation table (empty cells are non-significant). The pairwise correlation matrix, all years 
combined, shows that four metrics have a high enough valjue (though less or equal to 20%) 
and significant correlation to financial risk measures. The result is similar for both financial 
risk measures, but stronger for the semideviation risk measure. We therefore focus on the 
downside risk measure. The fact that both conventional and downside risk measures lead to 
similar conclusions, although both risk measures are not significantly correlated, adds 
convergent validity to the analysis. The four significant metrics are the existence of a health 
and safety policy10 (binary variable; negative correlation), of environmental supply 
management11 (binary variable; positive correlation), the number of non-executive 
directors on board12 (numerical variable; negative correlation) and CDP regulatory risk 
exposure13 (binary variable, negative correlation). The four metrics have enough observations 
to be considered in a model. The result is the same if we look at data for year 2013 only, the 
year with most companies reporting and with high market volatility. Half of the significant 
metrics are disclosure metrics (health and safety, environmental policy), confirming Crifo, 
                                               
10
 Indicates whether the company has recognized its health and safety risks and responsibilities and is 
making any effort to improve the management of employee health and/or employee safety. "0" 
indicates that the company has not explicitly disclosed any such efforts in its most recent Annual or 
Company Responsibility reports. 
11
 Indicates whether the company has implemented any initiatives to reduce the environmental 
footprint of its supply chain. Environmental footprint reductions could be achieved by reducing waste, 
by reducing resource use, by reducing environmental emissions, by insisting on the introduction of 
environmental management systems etc. in the supply chain. "0" indicates that the company has not 
explicitly disclosed any such efforts in its most recent Annual or Company Responsibility reports. 
12
 Number of non-executive Directors on the company's board, as reported by the company. 
13
 Further information explaining why the company does or does not believe to be exposed to climate 
change regulatory risk. The response is directly from the company's response to the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) questionnaire 
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Forget & Teyssier’s (2015) observation that “soft” information such as good environmental 
ESG policies matter when it comes to investment decisions. 
Table 22: Correlation matrix between metrics and downside deviation risk measure, reported for significant 
values. 
  
Note: *p <.10; **p < .05; *** p< .01 
But the significant correlation between the metrics and the risk measures are also 
industry dependent, as illustrated in Table 23. We compare data availability for each factor 
per sector in the Appendix, to make sure the data availability has not biased our results. In the 
oil and gas industry, two factors are significant among the four significant factors for the full 
sample: a higher number of non-executive directors is negatively correlated to a higher market 
risk and the existence of a health and safety policy is negatively correlated to a higher market 
risk (we focus here on significant correlations with large enough samples). In industrial 
companies, only one factor is significant among the four significant factors for the full 
sample, although data was available on all of those factors: acknowledging that the company 
is exposed to climate change physical risk reduces the financial risk. In the consumer goods 
industry, managing the environmental supply is negatively correlated to downside market 
risk, as with the full sample. But having women on board (negatively correlated to downside 
market risk) and lost time incidents (positively correlated to downside market risk) are also 
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0.1768 0.0147 0 0 p-value
2000 2000 1889 1889 2000 nb observations
-0.0201 -0.0786*** 0.2012*** 0.0740** 0.0656* 1
0.4877 0.0065 0 0.0106 0.0549
1196 1196 1192 1192 856 1196
SD_DAILY_RETU
RN
AVG_DOWNSIDE
_DEVIATION
HEALTH_SAFETY
_POLICY
ENVIRON_SUPPL
Y_MGT
#_OF_NON_EXE
CUTIVE_DIR_ON
_BRD
CDP_REGULATO
RY_RISK_EXP
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significant factors. About 75% of data points are missing for the two latter factors, which 
shows a lack of reporting on significant factors in the industry. In the health care industry, 
the number of non-executive directors on board is negatively correlated to market risk, while 
high water intensity is positively correlated. These factors came out as significant only in the 
health care industry, where it is reported more than in most industries (58% data points 
missing, compared to an average of 70% across all industries). The market risk in consumer 
services companies is correlated with the highest number of metrics (8), although it is the 
industry with the least reporting (80% data points missing, compared to an average 73.25% 
across all industries): the number of non-executive directors on board, the percentage of 
women on board, the existence of a health and safety policy, the existence of environmental 
supply management, developing climate change products, NOX emissions and energy 
intensity are all negatively correlated with market risk, while the number of minorities on 
board is positively correlated with risk. The large proportion of missing data encourages us to 
disregard this strange result (94.37% missing data for this factor in consumer goods, 
compared to an average 89.45% missing data points for this factor across all industries). In 
utilities companies, the existence of a health and safety policy is negatively correlated with 
market risk, while NOX emissions (46% of missing data points in utilities, most reported in 
this industry with the average 81.90% missing data points across industries) and energy 
intensity (93.75% of missing data points in utilities, least reported with an average 69.50% 
missing data points across industries) are positively correlated with market risk. In financials 
and in technology companies, the existence of a health and safety policy and the existence of 
environmental supply management matter and are negatively correlated with market risk. 
Furthermore, the number of women on board is positively correlated with risk in the financial 
industry. The large number of missing data encourages us to disregard this result (90.48% 
missing data for this factor in financials, compared to an average 79.83% missing data points 
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for this factor across all industries). These two industries have the lowest levels of reporting, 
after consumer services. While other factors may be significant here, the low levels of 
reporting do not allow us to identify them. So far we can note that in both industries it is the 
soft, reporting KPIs that are the most correlated with financial risk; these soft KPIs are also 
the most available ones.  
The basic materials industry does not have any metrics correlated to risk measures, 
despite having the best level of reporting (65.14% average missing data, compared to a 
73.25% sample average). Finally the telecommunications industry is too small a sample. 
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Table 23: Correlation matrix between metrics and downside deviation risk measure, per industry. 
 
 
 
corr p value N corr p value N corr p value N corr p value N corr p value N
-0.4111** 0.0103 38 non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
-0.1914** 0.0186 151 non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant  -0.2142*** 0.0032 187
-0.2834*** 0 213 -0.0549*** 0.0023 147 non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
-0.2804** 0.0123 79 non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
0.2318* 0.0747 60 non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant -0.2319* 0.077 86 non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant -0.2295*** 0.0052 147 -0.0889* 0.0657 430 -0.1180*** 0.0002 327 non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant -0.1579** 0.03 189 non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant -0.2162*** 0 85 non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant 0.3170***                                                     0.0018 95 non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant -0.1032* 0.0556 345 non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant  0.2956** 0.0028 100
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significantENERGY INTENSITY
WATER INTENSITY
PCT MINORITY
CEO DUALITY
NOX EMISSIONS
CLIMATE_CHG_PRODS
INDUSTRY 3 : consumer goods.
PCT WOMEN
LOST TIME
ENV SUPPLY MNGT
CDP_PHYSICAL_RISK_EXP
 INDUSTRY 2 : industials 
BEST CAPEX
TOTAL GHG EMISSION
# OF NEDS ON BOARD
CDP regula
HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY
HAZARDOUS WASTE
INDUSTRY 0: Oil & Gas INDUSTRY 1 : basic materials. INDUSTRY 4 : health care
corr p value N corr p value N corr p value N corr p value N
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
-0.155*** 0.0009 299 -0.1549* 0.0784 130 non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
-0.1256** 0.0454 391 -0.2333***                     0.0012 191  -0.1937*** 0 506 -0.2671*** 0 279
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
-0.1118** 0.027 391 -0.133* 0.0673 190  -0.1541*** 0.0005 506 -0.1686***  0.0048 279
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
-0.3278***                                                    0.0082 64 non significant non significant non significant 0.2353** 0.0407 76 non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
-0.332** 0.0124 56 non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
0.3879* * 0.0257 33 non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
 -0.1335***                          0.0082 391 non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant  0.2538** 0.0158 90 non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
non significant non significant non significant  0.6033***                     0.003 22 non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant non significant
NOX EMISSIONS
ENERGY INTENSITY
LOST TIME
CEO DUALITY
WATER INTENSITY
PCT MINORITY
TOTAL GHG EMISSION
ENV SUPPLY MNGT
CDP Physi
PCT WOMEN
CLIMATE CHANGE
HAZARDOUS WASTE
# OF NEDS ON BOARD
HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY
CDP regula
BEST CAPEX
INDUSTRY 5 : Consumer Services INDUSTRY 7 : utilities. INDUSTRY 8 : financials INDUSTRY 9 : technology 
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The signs of these correlations with ESG metrics suggest that ESG compliance or 
good ESG performance reduces risk, similar to prior literature showing superior financial 
performance for ESG investments (with the exception of our results for minorities and women 
on boards, but with too small a sample). They also confirm the Delphi group’s intuition 
regarding soft (exposure or compliance) metrics. One of Delphi’s concerns was how to 
reconcile exposure metrics (what are the risks that companies are exposed to?) with 
performance metrics (how are companies managing this risk?) and whether exposure metrics 
belonged in a framework at all. The consensus in the Delphi group was to mix both types of 
metrics. The data shows that exposure metrics do matter for total and downside financial risk, 
and that they should be taken into account.  
We performed fixed effect panel regressions in the hope of identifying within panel 
variation, with poor results not only for the full sample (Table 24), but also for industry 
samples (Table 25).  
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Table 24: Fixed effect panel regression analysis between ESG metrics and downside risk measures compared to total market risk, full sample.  
Number of obs      =       867 
Number of groups   =       334 
 
R-sq:   within  = 0.0338                      Obs per group: min =         1 
 between = 0.0029                                         avg =       2.6 
 overall = 0.0106                                         max =         5 
 
F(4,529)           =      4.63 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4310                        Prob > F           =    0.0011 
 
 
 
 
Table 25: Panel regression analysis between ESG metrics and downside risk measures compared to total market risk, full sample.  
 
Note: *p <.10; **p < .05; *** p< .01. Entries of the last row are adjusted R-squared values for each regression. 
Variable
Standard 
Coefficient
t 
Standard 
Coefficient
t
Standard 
Coefficient
t
Standard 
Coefficient
t
Standard 
Coefficient
t
Standard 
Coefficient
t
Standard 
Coefficient
t
Standard 
Coefficient
t
Standard 
Coefficient
t
-0,0000182 -0,41 0,0001949 3,15** -0,0000758 -2,06** -0,0001456 -3,15*** 0 0,07 0,0001867 0,41 -0,000017 -1,23 0,0000399 0,31 0,0004714 1,53
0,0000927 0,23 0,0008814 0,3 -0,0002124 -1,76* -0,0000995 -0,57 -0,0001097 -0,65 0,0000874 0,06 -0,00001029 -1,37 -0,0006811 -1,75* 0,0007761 0,59
-0,0003851 -0,84 0,0005403 -0,09 -0,0000575 -0,62 0,0000319 0,19 -0,0001714 -1,86* -0,0002243 -0,21 0 (omitted) -0,0005499 -1,41 -0,0006406 -0,49
0 0,0003114 -1.77* -0,0001217 -1,15 -0,0002774 -1,60 -0,0002693 -0,92* -0,0012343 -0,81 0,0000619 1,06 -0,0004901 -1,04 -0,0044213 -3,34***
0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
F F(3,42)            =      2.00
Nb of observations 70
Nb of groups 25
R²-squared within 0,1252
R²-squared between 0,0025
R²-squared overall 0,0557
 F(3,32)            =      0.32
0,0668 0,00360,12110,02590,02210,1631
0,1753
18 17 53 42 33 43 59 41
0,0295 0,0133
0,0289 0,3098 0,1612 0,1631 0,1593 0,0225 0,0809
0,0485 0,010,0497 0,2426 0,077 0,0222 0,1166 0,0185
 F(4,63)            =      3.35
53 60 132 112 81 93 151 108
 F(4,75)            =      3.60** F(  1,    49) =   13.34***   F(4,44)            =      2.08* F(4,46)            =      0.26  F(4,88)            =      1.94
CDP_REGULATORY_RISK
_EXP
ENVIRON_SUPPLY_MGT
CDP_PHYSICAL_RISK_EXP
 F(4,39)            =      4.38*
Consumer Services Utilities Financials Technology
# OF NEDS ON BOARD
HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY 
Dependent variable: 
downside risk
Oil & Gas Basic materials Industials Consumer goods Health care
Downside Deviation Coef. Std. Err. t     P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY -.0002126 .000236 -0.90    0.368 -.0006762 .0002509 
ENVIRON_SUPPLY_MGT -.0008156 .0002361 -3.46    0.001 -.0012793 -.0003519 
CDP_REGULATORY_RISK_EXP -.0002007 .0002106 -0.95    0.341 -.0006143 .000213 
#_OF_NON_EXECUTIVE_DIR_ON_BRD .0000646 .0000575 1.12    0.262 -.0000483 .0001775 
_cons .0006219 .0006267 0.99    0.322 -.0006093 .001853 
sigma_u .00076395      
sigma_e .00126887      
rho .26605018 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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We analyze the relationship further with a series of OLS (ordinary least square) 
regressions on the full data confirming the absence of parsimonious, easily described mean 
relationship between ESG and financial risk measures. A first regression with the four 
financial risk-correlated factors and semideviation shows that all variables correlated to 
financial risk have explanatory power. The link between the metrics and risk is established, 
but the predictive power of these metrics is limited: high R-squared suggests that the 
estimation of future risk is inaccurate. In addition, the residuals deviated substantially from 
normality, although they did not display volatility. The same analysis with our total market 
risk measure, on the other hand, leads to no significant model. ESG is not linked to volatility, 
it is linked to downside volatility. This confirms the interest of using the downside deviation 
as a risk measure. This result is an incentive for managers to report ESG, as it implies that 
good ESG reporting (exposure and performance) limits bad surprises in terms of share price.  
The same OLS regressions performed for the logged semideviations with the four risk-
correlated factors confirms the explanatory power of all variables, but still leads to high R-
squared. While those residuals were normally distributed, they displayed heteroscedasticity. 
Further analysis shows that the volatility of residuals is not due to extreme occurrences in a 
specific year (such as linked to the 2007 crisis) or due to a few companies with extreme 
behavior. However, all of these regressions ignores the panel nature of our data. We therefore 
perform next OLS regressions per year. 
Table 26 displays the OLS regression analyses for specific year samples. The model 
generally predicts a negative relationship between good ESG metrics and market risk 
measured by downside deviation. Looking beyond the sign of the relationship, the coefficients 
are very small, albeit significant. Still, the large majority of metrics did not reach a level of 
significance to be included in any of the industry models, thus providing no quantitative 
support for their inclusion in the framework.  
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We note particularly unsatisfactory results in the financial industry. In this sector, it is 
harder to assess what the investor community is sensitive to in terms of sustainability.  There 
may be a conflict of interest issue in this sector, as institutional investors are themselves part 
of the financial industry. It may also be that material sustainability metrics are different than 
the ones we had access to through the Bloomberg database.  Indeed, focusing on a metrics 
such as lost time due to incidents in financial institutions, just because it is available, would 
not add credibility to sustainable investment. However, the metrics identified by Delphi as 
material in the financial sector, such as employee training and qualification, customer 
retention, or regulatory compliance, were not available.  
Overall, there appears to be a slightly negative but insignificant relationship between 
the various ESG metrics and downside financial risk. In our industry regressions, not a single 
slope coefficient between any of the risk measures and any of the metrics has a t-statistic with 
an absolute value greater than 1.6449 (the approximate critical value at the 10% level of 
significance for a two-tailed test) (Oikonomou et al. 2012). The results confirm that the 
materiality of ESG metrics is industry dependent, as the standard coefficients of metrics are 
different in each industries. Given the coefficients close to zero and the low t-stats, it seems 
reasonable not to draw further conclusions based on these models.   
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Table 26: OLS Regression analysis between ESG metrics and downside risk measures compared to total market risk, full sample per year, completed for missing data.  
 
 
 
Variable
Standard 
Coefficient
t 
Standard 
Coefficient
t
Standard 
Coefficient
t
Standard 
Coefficient
t
Standard 
Coefficient
t
Standard 
Coefficient
t
Standard 
Coefficient
t
Standard 
Coefficient
t
-0,0002504 -0,66 -0,0000166 -0,42 0,0000543 1,9** 0 9,96*** -0,0010403 6,34*** -0,0000234 -2,39** -0,0000447 -2,30** 0,0000399 0,31
-0,0007864 -0,37 -0,0006512 -3,05*** -0,0004223 -2,83*** -0,0000381 -1,46 -0,0001394 -1,70* -0,0000509 -0,95 0,0001183 1,05 -0,0006811 -1,75*
-0,0012514 -0,57 0,0002175 0,98 0,0000449 0,3 -0,0000238 -0,79 0,0000105 0,11* 0,0000282 0,5 0 0,05 -0,0005499 -1,41
0,0038252 1,39 -0,0008251 -3,22*** -0,0002549 -1,58 -0,0000425 -1,61 -0,0001134 -1,44 -0,0000178 -0,38 -0,0001108 -1,24 -0,0004901 -1,04
F 
Nb of observations
adjusted R²
F(  4,   453) =    1.91
458
0,0079
486 151
-0,0032 0,0637 0,041 0,0324 0,221 0,0165 59
 F(  4,   443) =    3.71*** F(  4,   451) =    3.57 F(  4,   481) =    2.02  F(4,88)            =      1.94
428 481 487 448 456
CDP_REGULATORY_RISK
_EXP
ENVIRON_SUPPLY_MGT
F(  4,   423) =    0.66 F(  4,   476) =    9.17***  F(  4,   482) =    5.15***
2012 2013 2014
# OF NEDS ON BOARD
HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY 
Dependent variable: 
downside risk
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
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5.5.3 In summary 
Our data show that there is little improvement in the availability of data points over time. 
There is a problem with the data available -- in terms of number of years and in terms of 
normality of residuals -- limiting the possibilities of econometric analysis. Throughout our 
exploration, we showed that data availability is an important issue: if we look at the financial 
sector, the material KPIs have been identified in the Delphi framework, but there is no 
information available in Bloomberg for these KPIs. The right data is not available. Either 
Bloomberg is not copying the right data, or companies are not reporting it.  
Risk measures and ESG metrics are linked, as demonstrated by their correlations. Most of 
the individual metrics that matter are negatively but insignificantly associated with total market 
firm risk, and with downside risk. This is a confirmation that good ESG matters to limit bad 
surprises in terms of downside volatility: a company’s share will less often perform far below its 
average market return. We can distinguish ESG exposure metrics from ESG performance 
metrics. At this stage, exposure metrics seem to matter most, perhaps because they are simpler to 
collect and imply less interpretation in terms of calculation by companies and third parties. 
The material ESG metrics are industry dependent. While the reporting of some metrics is 
also industry dependent, there is no direct link between materiality and reporting. For example, 
the percentage of employee turnover is material for industrials and consumer goods, although 
there is less reporting in this metric than in other industries, where it is not material. As another 
example, the R&D expenditure is material for industrials but not for consumer goods, despite the 
above average reporting on this metric in both industries.  
We identified market volatility conditions as a possible moderator in the ESG-financial 
risk link. When the market is volatile, like in 2007 and 2013, it is important to perform well on 
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ESG metrics, for a limited financial volatility of a company’s annualized returns. When market 
volatility is low, as in 2008 to 2012, good ESG indicators make little difference on a company’s 
market risk.  
Finally, while we have evidence of the link between ESG-financial risk, our models have 
no predictive power. 
5.7 Discussion and limits 
This study contributes to an ongoing research stream on the link between sustainability 
and financial performance. We investigate this link using ESG factors to assess the sustainability 
of a firm; and using the volatility of share prices to assess the financial risk of an investment in 
company shares. Our results raise questions and highlight limits in terms of data availability, 
relevance of a framework for ESG investing, and measures of financial risk using downside 
deviation, which we discuss below.  
5.6.1 Data availability and quality 
This study highlights that we need more data and better quality data for this type of 
econometric analysis. This is in line with ESG accounting research, where much of the literature 
concerns the incompleteness of ESG reporting (Adams, 2004). This was also a conclusion of an 
ESG-risk study in 2011 (Salama et al., 2011), where the authors noted they were constrained by 
the limited amount of data yet available, despite their large UK dataset across all industries. Four 
years later, this conclusion has not changed for our sample of large US companies.  
Because the data reported does not currently correspond to ou.r needs, we would advise 
further research to use different metrics. Indeed, further econometric analysis on this data would 
have to disregard the underlying hypothesis of models in terms of normality of residuals, which is 
unorthodox. One path for further research could be to consider alternatives to econometric 
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analysis. Another path for further research, well aligned with the perspective of this data driven 
research, is to consider other metrics for the factors identified by Delphi. One striking example is 
the financial sector, for which no metric was available in the Bloomberg database, although 
Delphi did identify important risk factors specific to this sector. A next step would be to gather 
the missing data elsewhere.  
We looked at each metric in isolation, but it would be interesting to look at results for 
aggregate metrics. The framework is meant to help focus on the most material metrics, but with a 
global view on the firm. The intention is not to work with a given composite measure, which has 
been criticized in previous studies, but rather to build clusters of metrics based on our analysis of 
the data. It is likely that results would be more pronounced for clusters of metrics (Oikonomou et 
al., 2012). To quote a Delphi participant:  
"I am concerned by the idea that we can use these metrics as replacement for financial 
metrics. They are an additive, not a replacement for financial metrics. We want the story of how 
energy efficiency relates to Siemens’ profitability, we don’t want another metric of CO2 emission. 
"  
We highlighted the distinction between firm risk and exposure KPIs versus relation 
between firm risk and performance KPIs. This distinction is important as it cover two different 
data reporting and data collection realities. Exposure KPIs will de facto have better reporting 
levels because of Bloomberg’s data collection process: if a company indicates that it recognizes 
its health and safety risks and responsibilities, for example, the analyst collecting data will 
indicate "1". However, if the analyst finds no such information, he will add "0" in the database to 
indicate that the company has not explicitly disclosed any such efforts in its most recent Annual 
or Company Responsibility reports. The analyst either finds or does not find the information; in 
both cases the database can be populated. In other words, whether this field is populated or not 
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does not depend on an action of the company, but of the Bloomberg analyst. On the contrary, a 
performance KPI will remain blank if the company has not disclosed anything for the metric. The 
level of reporting of performance metrics therefore holds additional information regarding actions 
taken by the company in terms of reporting. This distinction between reporting and performance 
metrics needs to be considered when reflecting on the results. Indeed, more exposure metrics than 
performance metrics are significant. This may be due to the data collection process, rather than to 
the metrics themselves.  
5.6.2 Relevance and limits of a framework for ESG investment 
Concluding that not many Delphi factors matter does not mean that Delphi’s initiative 
does not matter. On the contrary, Delphi’s framework can play an important role in the 
mainstreaming of ESG investing despite our weak econometric results. This role is linked to the 
role of tools in defining an emerging field, which is not captured in our study.  
Our findings suggest that the unsatisfying data should not hinder the practice of ESG 
investing, because a link is observed. This approach is supported by a Delphi participant, who 
stated:  
"No need for more data, no need for more stories, it’s about a new process to invest 
capital. Our industry doesn’t want to know how to link the metrics of ESG to P&L. What they 
want is a different model, of how to think about investing capital. Not just looking at how much 
capital a company makes, but also looking how a company makes capital. This is what 
sustainability is about. It’s not always called ESG data, but that’s what it’s about. And Delphi is 
a framework for investing capital in a more long term way."  
Beyond this discussion, the true relevance of a framework like Delphi’s is its role in 
shaping the growing field of ESG investing. Institutionalization requires a certain level of 
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standardization. A framework can provide this if it is considered as legitimate, for example 
because it emerged from a consensus between reputable institutional investors. As a result, we 
recommend a complementary research approach that considers beliefs, justifications, tensions,… 
all dimensions that played an important role in the Delphi process, beyond the final result of a list 
of metrics in a framework. These approaches would allow to take into account the other 
dimensions of value: those that are not included in a price constructed by financial markets, or in 
a metric constructed by financial service providers. 
5.6.3 Measuring performance with historical volatility 
Regarding the link between ESG factors and financial risk or return, our results are not 
very different from the many existing studies. What is interesting is that we reached similar 
results using a different approach: through a market risk lens, measured by (downside) volatility 
of share returns. The rationale for this approach was that we did not want to presuppose a direct 
relationship between risk and return. The need for a better understanding of the risk side of the 
story is raised by a Delphi participant in the following words:  
“We have to stop understating the issue. Changing the WACC is not the solution. Neither is changing 
the Beta; this is not a way to include ESG because it’s arbitrary. Risk is just too misunderstood. We 
need to clarify what risk we are talking about and what uncertainty of what could happen in what 
time frame.” (Delphi meeting, 18 March 2014).  
To improve our understanding of risk and sustainability, further research could consider 
other models of volatility. These other models could put more focus on the long term, to 
correspond to ESG investment’s time horizon. A long term variance could be one such measure.  
5.8 Conclusion  
We study whether the Delphi framework does what its conceivers expect it to do: reduce 
market risk for ESG investments, which we measure with the volatility of share return. The asset 
managers who devised the framework debated the value of judgment versus metrics, and cast 
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doubts on the market's ability to translate ESG factors into market value and on the usefulness of 
econometric tools to capture ESG value. We explored their framework with a quantitative 
approach, to determine what information can come out of such an approach.  We analyzed the 
financial risk of a company in relation to its environmental, social and governance metrics which 
the Delphi group deemed material after two years of discussions.  We used the annualized 
standard deviation from average daily share return and the downside deviation as our two 
financial risk measures. Our sample consists of US equity funds which we analyze for the time 
period from 2007 to 2013. Our exploration leads us to the following findings:   
(i) The quantity and quality of ESG data currently available is insufficient, making ESG 
data availability a significant issue for studying the link between sustainability and financial 
performance. Data availability is industry dependent, with the financial industry and consumer 
services industry displaying the poorest transparency. While ESG compliance data is increasingly 
available in some industries, ESG performance measures are lacking everywhere. For regulators, 
this result implies that there is still is a need to improve ESG disclosure by companies.  
 
(ii) ESG metrics matter for market risk, particularly when measured by semi-deviation, 
but without any predictive power on the magnitude of future risk's reduction. This has managerial 
implications, as it means that reporting good ESG limits bad surprises. It also has implications for 
further research, which may want to consider downside deviation as a useful measure of 
volatility. 
(iii) The materiality of ESG metrics varies from one industry to another. This justifies the 
industry approach adopted in the Delphi framework. Furthermore, the ESG metrics are 
constructed and need to evolve with ESG practice. Many of the metrics currently available are 
not material, although they may be reported. This means that it is advisable for regulation not to 
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impose a standard list of ESG metrics to be disclosed, in which the material KPIs for investors 
would be lost. It would be better to consider at what level and at what cost disclosure should be 
imposed. We would suggest that the appropriate level of granularity is not the detailed metric 
level but rather the more general ESG factor level. It also has implications for managers and trade 
unions who are interested in stability and standardization.  
(iv) ESG exposure metrics matter, and not only ESG performance metrics, when it comes 
to reducing financial risk. The fact that more exposure metrics than performance metrics are 
significant may result from the data collection process, which leads to higher levels of data 
availability for exposure metrics. However, the current limits on data reporting do not preclude a 
link between ESG exposure metrics and downside deviation.    
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5.10 Appendix 
Additional figures 
Average yearly percent of missing data, per industry.  
 
Note:  Grey rows are significant factors for the full sample, all industries and years combined.  
  Boxes indicate significant factors in the industry, all year combined.  
  
Percent Missing Oil & Gas Basic 
materials
Industials Consumer 
goods
Health 
care
Consumer 
Services
Telecomm
unications
Utilities Financials Technology Average % 
Missing
Average % Missing 73.60 65.14 73.01 72.93 72.90 80.96 69.18 70.89 79.42 74.51 73.25
CEO_DUALITY 0.00 4.17 0 6.67 2.17 2.82 0.00 0.00 3.57 12.73 3.21
ENVIRON_SUPPLY_MGT 0.00 4.17 2.82 11.67 4.35 5.63 0.00 0.00 4.76 14.55 4.80
CLIMATE_CHG_PRODS 0.00 4.17 2.82 11.67 4.35 5.63 0.00 0.00 4.76 14.55 4.80
HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY 2.63 4.17 2.82 11.67 4.35 5.63 0.00 0.00 4.76 14.55 5.06
IS_RD_EXPEND 36.84 29.17 18.31 18.33 17.39 49.30 20.00 81.25 92.86 16.36 37.98
RD_EXPENDITURES_PER_CASH_FLOW 36.84 29.17 18.31 18.33 19.57 49.30 20.00 81.25 92.86 16.36 38.20
#_OF_NON_EXECUTIVE_DIR_ON_BRD 37.60 33.93 37.13 39.70 40.82 35.00 55.56 37.50 38.61 45.26 40.11
CDP_OTHER_RISK_EXP 60.53 29.17 30.99 48.33 36.96 64.79 20.00 31.25 34.52 54.55 41.11
CDP_PHYSICAL_RISK_EXP 60.53 29.17 30.99 48.33 36.96 64.79 20.00 31.25 34.52 54.55 41.11
CDP_REGULATORY_RISK_EXP 60.53 29.17 30.99 48.33 36.96 64.79 20.00 31.25 34.52 54.55 41.11
TOTAL_GHG_EMISSIONS 73.68 29.17 57.75 65.00 63.04 76.06 60.00 62.50 73.81 52.73 61.37
ENERGY_INTENSITY_PER_SALES 76.32 45.83 67.61 66.67 60.87 85.92 60.00 93.75 76.19 61.82 69.50
WATER_INTENSITY_PER_SALES 81.58 50 71.83 66.67 58.70 90.14 60.00 75.00 84.52 69.09 70.75
PCT_WOMEN_EMPLOYEES 81.58 58.33 77.46 78.33 76.09 80.28 60.00 56.25 85.71 72.73 72.68
WASTE_GENERATED_PER_SALES 89.47 54.17 69.01 71.67 63.04 94.37 80.00 71.88 86.90 63.64 74.42
WASTE_RECYCLED 92.11 58.33 76.06 76.67 65.22 91.55 80.00 62.50 82.14 74.55 75.91
LOST_TIME_INCIDENT_RATE 63.16 62.5 70.42 73.33 73.91 98.59 80.00 71.88 97.62 90.91 78.23
PCT_WOMEN_MGT 84.21 66.67 80.28 76.67 84.78 88.73 80.00 65.63 90.48 81.82 79.93
HAZARDOUS_WASTE 84.21 62.5 78.87 83.33 71.74 94.37 100.00 53.13 97.62 74.55 80.03
ENVIRON_FINES_AMT 86.84 62.5 80.28 75.00 78.26 95.77 80.00 68.75 96.43 81.82 80.57
NOX_EMISSIONS 81.58 50 95.77 93.33 89.13 98.59 80.00 46.88 96.43 87.27 81.90
FATALITIES_TOTAL 71.05 62.5 87.32 78.33 86.96 97.18 100.00 68.75 96.43 90.91 83.94
FATALITIES_EMPLOYEES 68.42 70.83 88.73 80.00 86.96 95.77 80.00 78.13 97.62 98.18 84.46
WASTE_SENT_TO_LANDFILLS 97.37 58.33 81.69 76.67 86.96 98.59 100.00 84.38 90.48 76.36 85.08
NUMBER_SPILLS 68.42 66.67 85.92 85.00 84.78 97.18 100.00 78.13 98.81 89.09 85.40
POLITICAL_DONATIONS 84.21 70.83 88.73 88.33 86.96 92.96 80.00 87.50 91.67 89.09 86.03
PCT_MINORITY_EMPLOYEES 86.84 100 90.14 81.67 86.96 87.32 80.00 62.50 92.86 92.73 86.10
VOC_EMISSIONS 81.58 62.5 94.37 95.00 84.78 100.00 80.00 87.50 97.62 90.91 87.43
EMPLOYEE_TURNOVER_PCT 89.47 79.17 91.55 93.33 89.13 98.59 80.00 84.38 94.05 90.91 89.06
FATALITIES_CONTRACTORS 68.42 79.17 94.37 85.00 89.13 98.59 100.00 81.25 97.62 98.18 89.17
PCT_MINORITY_MGT 89.47 95.83 91.55 86.67 91.30 94.37 80.00 71.88 95.24 98.18 89.45
SO2_EMISSIONS 97.37 83.33 97.18 96.67 95.65 100.00 80.00 50.00 98.81 98.18 89.72
CO2_INTENSITY 92.11 95.83 92.96 93.33 91.30 97.18 60.00 96.88 96.43 94.55 91.06
SUSTAIN_INV_TO_CAPEX 86.84 79.17 94.37 91.67 95.65 98.59 80.00 90.63 98.81 96.36 91.21
EMPLOYEE_TRAINING_COST 94.74 95.83 95.77 95.00 97.83 98.59 60.00 96.88 97.62 90.91 92.32
TRAINING_SPEND_PER_EMPLOYEE 94.74 95.83 95.77 95.00 97.83 98.59 60.00 96.88 97.62 90.91 92.32
REG_ENVIRO~T 84.21 75 94.37 96.67 95.65 100.00 100.00 90.63 97.62 96.36 93.05
PCT_WATER_RECYCLED 84.21 79.17 95.77 95.00 91.30 98.59 100.00 100.00 98.81 90.91 93.38
LOST_TIME_ACCIDENTS 94.74 95.83 92.96 98.33 95.65 100.00 80.00 90.63 98.81 92.73 93.97
LOST_TIME_PER_EMPLOYEE 94.74 95.83 92.96 98.33 95.65 100.00 80.00 90.63 98.81 92.73 93.97
WATER_PER_UNIT_OF_PROD 100.00 87.5 100 83.33 97.83 100.00 100.00 93.75 98.81 98.18 95.94
SUPPLIERS_AUDITED 97.37 100 100 96.67 95.65 98.59 100.00 96.88 100.00 98.18 98.33
ARD_PATENTS_TRADEMRK_COPYRIGHT 100.00 100 100 93.33 97.83 94.37 100.00 100.00 100.00 100 98.55
PCT_RECYCLED_MATERIALS 100.00 91.67 100 96.67 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 98.18 98.65
PERCENT_OF~E 100.00 100 100 96.67 97.83 98.59 100.00 100.00 98.81 100 99.19
SRI_AUM 100.00 100 100 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 95.24 100 99.52
SRI_PCT_TOTAL_AUM 100.00 100 100 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 95.24 100 99.52
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Step-wise regression in Technology industry for 2012 data, performed on raw data. 
 
Step-wise regression in Technology industry for 2012 data, with missing values filled in with 
company’s last performance, leads to no significant improvement of model. 
 
Step-wise regression in Technology industry for 2012 data, with missing values filled in with 
company’s last performance and with industry average if not available, leads to no significant 
improvement of model. 
 
.  
                                                                                           
                    _cons     .0002159   .0000282     7.66   0.000     .0001598    .0002721
  RESS_ENVIRON_SUPPLY_MGT     .0000166   .0000451     0.37   0.714    -.0000732    .0001064
OVCR_HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY     .0000292   .0000417     0.70   0.486    -.0000538    .0001121
                                                                                           
   AVG_DOWNSIDE_DEVIATION        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                           
       Total    2.4960e-06    79  3.1595e-08           Root MSE      =  .00018
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0154
    Residual    2.4702e-06    77  3.2081e-08           R-squared     =  0.0103
       Model    2.5737e-08     2  1.2869e-08           Prob > F      =  0.6710
                                                       F(  2,    77) =    0.40
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      80
                                                                                           
                    _cons     .0002279    .000029     7.87   0.000     .0001702    .0002855
  RESS_ENVIRON_SUPPLY_MGT     .0000105   .0000469     0.22   0.823    -.0000828    .0001038
OVCR_HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY     .0000199   .0000432     0.46   0.647    -.0000661    .0001059
                                                                                           
   AVG_DOWNSIDE_DEVIATION        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                           
       Total    2.7193e-06    80  3.3991e-08           Root MSE      =  .00019
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0213
    Residual    2.7077e-06    78  3.4714e-08           R-squared     =  0.0043
       Model    1.1637e-08     2  5.8183e-09           Prob > F      =  0.8460
                                                       F(  2,    78) =    0.17
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      81
                                                                                           
                    _cons     .0002318   .0000285     8.14   0.000     .0001751    .0002884
  RESS_ENVIRON_SUPPLY_MGT     .0000105   .0000465     0.23   0.822     -.000082     .000103
OVCR_HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY     .0000199   .0000429     0.46   0.644    -.0000654    .0001052
                                                                                           
   AVG_DOWNSIDE_DEVIATION        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                           
       Total    2.7817e-06    83  3.3515e-08           Root MSE      =  .00018
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0204
    Residual    2.7701e-06    81  3.4198e-08           R-squared     =  0.0042
       Model    1.1637e-08     2  5.8183e-09           Prob > F      =  0.8439
                                                       F(  2,    81) =    0.17
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      84
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Description of Delphi project  
The world of reporting indicators is not standardized. This is a problem in the context of 
the European Commission’s 4.7 accounting directive on transparency. For the reporting directive 
to be effective, companies would need a standardized framework of indicators to report on, and 
metrics to measure these. It is in this context that Delphi’s initiative appeared, encouraged by 
EABIS’s first research on the topic of non-financial metrics. This does not mean that Delphi has 
an exclusively European focus, as evidenced by its members that represent US institutional 
investors as well as European ones.  
A second context is that of responsible investment’s mainstreaming, which has not 
progressed much since its announcement, but which could make a jump ahead in the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis, if such a crisis can lead to change. The Delphi participants note this 
favorable context, along with a move away from “quarterly capitalism” towards a stakeholder 
perspective. They consider this the time right to provide pointers to investors in terms of good 
processes and risk management practices, as EFFAS did previously with a first framework, but 
guard themselves from promising to identify excess return (ESG factors as “alpha generators”). 
These are the two origins of the project, one stemming from a company focus, following 
up on the EABIS “Valuing non-financial performance” initiative; the other having an institutional 
investor perspective, building upon the EFFAS “KPIs for ESG”.   
In the documents that described Delphi when the project was launched, it is written:  
 “Project Delphi seeks convergence around the materiality and impact of ESG factors on 
investment and asset allocation decisions. There has been a great deal of research carried out into 
the financial impact of ESG factors, which has produced a large number of ESG factors that are 
deemed to be “material”. Project Delphi intends to bring these strands of research together to 
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produce a short-list of the most important factors which impact investment value and how to 
measure them.” 
 Throughout the two years that I followed Delphi’s process, the initiative evolved. 
Each of its members also came with different perceptions of the group’s goal, which I 
documented during interviews, using an adapted version of Osterwald’s 2008 business model 
canvas as a data collection tool. Some of the Delphi participants referred to the Delphi framework 
metaphorically as a “roadmap”, others as a “list of ingredients”, others still as a “list of recipes”. I 
summarize the Delphi initiative, in its many dimensions, below and in figure 12.  
Delphi’s objective 
A key aspect for all members from the start is that the framework must derive from a 
consensus. This consensus resulting from members’ representations of ESG is what would give 
the framework its strength and legitimacy. So the main, declared objective is to seek consensus 
between the Delphi parties on a short-list of the most significant ESG factors per industry, and 
the appropriate metrics for these factors. Delphi seeks to bring together the strands of research 
carried out by the various participants and to converge on a framework which all parties agree 
would be most likely to capture the value residing in ESG factors --  to help them understand 
ESG.   
In addition to this main objective, some parallel objectives are pursued by each member, 
depending on their affiliation and approach to ESG investing. Some members want to enhance 
their own understanding of the impact of the most important ESG factors, by learning from the 
group. Some hope the Delphi framework will provide grounds for the creation of collective 
investment vehicles and/or the integration into investment decision making that would be 
approved by many asset owners. This would simplify the current ESG offer where each asset 
owner requires their own investment vehicle to be constructed based on their own (often unsure) 
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criteria. Delphi members who regularly meet with companies hope the framework will provide a 
common ground for discussion with companies around investor benchmarks, for companies to be 
able to assess the financial impact of their ESG activities. This reporting is the raw material that 
many of the Delphi participants use in their day-to-day job. Their work is affected by the quality 
of reporting, and could benefit from reporting on metrics which are agreed to be material. A final 
objective is to promote a common language for dialogue between companies and investment 
professionals, recognizing that both parties need information from each other, which makes this 
experience a case of mainstreaming responsible investing in action.  
Delphi’s resources 
The main resource, according to Delphi’s participants, was the intellectual capital brought 
by the group members. More specifically, it is the knowledge and content that these practitioners 
brought together that was most valued, in order to conceive the tool from an operational view 
point. As there were no financial or time resources allocated to the project, it was a constant 
challenge to gather these people together for discussions. 
In addition, as a collaborative initiative, Delphi had to resort to collaborative tools: 
meetings, conference calls, online chat rooms, etc.  
Activities required  
The activities performed over time by the Delphi group are characterized by their 
circularity: this was not a linear process, despite the sequential presentation below. It was in fact 
a process of constant back and forth between opposite perspectives on each issue.  
The variety of tasks Delphi undertook included structuring the information, with a 
structure inspired by existing frameworks, and adapted to the needs of the group. A “metrics 
team” provided a first framework of “value drivers”, “factors” and “metrics” by industry, based 
on participants’ individual expertise, probably with a strong EFFAS influence. The asset 
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managers work stream then provided a second framework of value drivers and factors, inspired 
by a McKinsey framework. 
Determining parameters that fit in the structure, and giving boundaries by excluding 
items were additional steps that led to the creation of a framework. In parallel, the group 
produced a taxonomy which facilitated common language, and defined concepts that were used 
to build the framework, such as the concept of ESG, or materiality. These definitions were 
written down and approved by the group, building up documentation for the project. Once the 
structure was in place, the group had to determine the materiality of each factor, per sector, 
drilling down into the framework with a top down approach, from the more general factors to the 
specific metrics. This also required reducing the number of factors and clustering factors 
together, parsimony being a key word for the group throughout the process. Project 
management was a key and challenging task throughout the process. Delphi was first organized 
in three workstreams: the metrics group, the asset managers, and the asset owners, plus a steering 
committee overseeing the project. After a while, a Technical Group was set up to speed up the 
process. It was supposed to consist of individual members of the three workstreams having some 
technical expertise in either standard-setting or ESG valuation. But as a result, only the asset 
managers were represented in this group.  
Finally the group activities required seeking validation internally, for example by 
developing a narrative to justify each metric, or externally by presenting the framework to 
colleagues and potential partners.  
Delphi’s beneficiaries 
Unlike other multi-stakeholder initiatives, Delphi is an initiative by investors and for 
investors. The asset owners should theoretically be the first beneficiaries as providers of capital, 
because they would be able to produce a set of guidelines which would help them structure their 
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ESG investments, along with the asset managers, who would have a common reference to 
communicate with clients and companies. A second type of beneficiary is companies, because 
they could use the framework to justify their ESG activities, and to report on a standardized set of 
metrics. Furthermore, the ESG industry as a whole can also be considered as a beneficiary of the 
Delphi project. Indeed, although not explicitly stated by the group, the Delphi framework is a tool 
that contributes to legitimizing the field of ESG investing. 
 
Delphi’s partners 
The sponsors of the project are, on the one hand State Street and on the other hand, CSR 
Europe and EABIS who initiated the “Valuing Non-Financial Performance” project. The latter 
are Delphi’s loose connection to the European Commission. When thinking about partnership, 
Delphi wanted to focus on institutions that were interested in a collaborative approach. For 
example, Delphi did not want organizations that had a vested interest in a particular ESG 
framework, such as consultants or service providers that had developed their own framework or 
index, to be part of the initiative. 
As mentioned earlier, Delphi is not a multi-stakeholder initiative. Companies are not part 
of the initiative, but should be partners at a later stage as they were supposed to develop their own 
framework in parallel. Many members of the financial system are not represented in Delphi, 
although they may be considered as partners eventually. Data providers for example are not 
represented, but may come into the picture later on in the process.  
External communication by Delphi 
While communication with the outside word was not Delphi’s preoccupation in the earlier 
phases of the project, external communication became a pressing issue in the last months and has 
not been resolved at the time of this study. A first level of communication is among institutions 
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represented in the Delphi group, which are referred to as “family”, and to selected beneficiaries, 
referred to as “friends”, before a broader socialization phase. At this stage, there is a consensus 
that the project needs a communication strategy, telling each type of investor how the Delphi 
framework could be useful to them. But there is no consensus beyond that, on what type of 
communication strategy would be desirable, or who should be in charge of it. 
 208 
 
Figure 12: The Delphi initiative, adapted from the business model canvas (Osterwal, 2008)
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Description of Bloomberg data use to populate Delphi metrics. 
Bloomberg Field Mnemonic Bloomberg Definition 
ENVIRON_SUPPLY_MGT 
Indicates whether the company has implemented any initiatives to reduce 
the environmental footprint of its supply chain. Environmental footprint 
reductions could be achieved by reducing waste, by reducing resource use, 
by reducing environmental emissions, by insisting on the introduction of 
environmental management systems etc. in the supply chain. "N" indicates 
that the company has not explicitly disclosed any such efforts in its most 
recent Annual or Company Responsibility reports. Field is part of the 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
EMPLOYEE_TURNOVER_PCT 
Number of employees that left the company within the past year expressed 
as a percentage of the average total number of employees.  High employee 
turnover may indicate that employees are unsatisfied with their work at the 
company or their compensation, or that conditions at the company are 
unsafe or unhealthy. Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance 
(ESG) group of fields.  
PCT_WOMEN_MGT 
Percentage of women employed in management positions at the company. 
Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
PCT_WOMEN_EMPLOYEES 
Number of women employed at the company expressed as a percentage of 
the total number of company employees. Field is part of the Environmental, 
Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.    Japan:       Data may be 
provided by CanPan.  
PCT_MINORITY_MGT 
Number of minorities employed in management positions at the company 
expressed as a percentage of the total group number of employees in 
management positions. Minorities should be expressed as such by the 
company. Field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
group of fields.  
PCT_MINORITY_EMPLOYEES 
Number of minorities employed at the company expressed as a percentage 
of the total group number of employees. Minorities should be expressed as 
such by the company. Field is part of the Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
#_OF_NON_EXECUTIVE_DIR_ON_BRD 
Number of non-executive Directors on the company's board, as reported by 
the company. 
CEO_DUALITY 
Indicates whether the company's Chief Executive Officer is also Chairman of 
the Board, as reported by the company. "N" indicates the two roles are 
separate. Field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
group of fields.  
EMPLOYEE_TRAINING_COST 
Amount the company spent on employee training during the reporting 
period. Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of 
fields.  
TRAINING_SPEND_PER_EMPLOYEE 
Training spending per capita calculated as dollars spent on training per 
company employee.  To compare companies around the world, this ratio 
should be converted to a common currency.  Ratio is calculated based on 
data items disclosed in company filings.  Calculated as:        Employee 
Training Cost / Number of Employees        Where:       Employee Training 
Cost is ES094, EMPLOYEE_TRAINING_COST       Number of Employees is 
ES043, NUMBER_EMPLOYEES_CSR        This field is part of the 
Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
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SUSTAIN_INV_TO_CAPEX 
Amount of money spent by the company on environmental and social 
projects as a multiple of capital expenditures for the reporting period. Ratio is 
calculated based on data items disclosed in company filings. Calculated as:        
Investments in Sustainability / Capital Expenditures         Where:    
Investments in Sustainability is ES056, 
INVESTMENTS_IN_SUSTAINABILITY    Capital Expenditures is CF017, 
CF_CAP_EXPEND_PRPTY_ADD        This field is part of the 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
POLITICAL_DONATIONS 
Amount of corporate donations to political groups, parties, or individuals,  in 
millions. Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of 
fields.  
CDP_REGULATORY_RISK_EXP CDP_PHYSICAL_RISK_EXP 
NUMBER_SPILLS 
Actual number of spills of hazardous materials by the company in the period. 
Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
ENVIRON_FINES_AMT 
Total amount of environmental fines paid by the company in the period, in 
millions. Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of 
fields.  
LOST_TIME_ACCIDENTS 
Total number of hours out of work by employees who suffered accidents. 
Accident days are converted to hours (A day equals 8 hours).  Field part of 
Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
FATALITIES_CONTRACTORS 
Number of contractors who have died on a company site or on a company 
facility or as a result of a company's operations. Field part of Environmental, 
Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY 
Indicates whether the company has recognized its health and safety risks 
and responsibilities and is making any effort to improve the management of 
employee health and/or employee safety. "N" indicates that the company 
has not explicitly disclosed any such efforts in its most recent Annual or 
Company Responsibility reports. Field is part of the Environmental, Social 
and Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
LOST_TIME_INCIDENT_RATE 
Total number of incidents resulting in lost time from work, per 200,000 hours 
worked. Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of 
fields.  
CDP_PHYSICAL_RISK_EXP 
Indicates if the company considers itself exposed to climate change physical 
risk. The response is directly from the company's response to the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) questionnaire.  
CDP_OTHER_RISK_EXP 
Indicates if the company considers itself exposed to any other risk 
associated with climate change. The response is directly from the company's 
response to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) questionnaire.  
LOST_TIME_PER_EMPLOYEE 
Number of employee hours out of work due to accidents, per thousand 
employees. Ratio is calculated based on data items disclosed in company 
filings. Calculated as:        Lost Time from Accidents / Number of Employees         
Where:    Lost Time from Accidents is ES051, LOST_TIME_ACCIDENTS    
Number of Employees is ES043, NUMBER_EMPLOYEES_CSR        This 
field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of 
fields.  
CLIMATE_CHG_PRODS 
Indicates whether the company has developed and/or launched products 
during the current period only which address future impacts of climate 
change and/or which mitigate customers' contributions to climate change by 
reduced Green House Gas (GHG) emissions. The products may or may not 
be new to the market. Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance 
(ESG) group of fields.  
FATALITIES_EMPLOYEES 
Number of employees who have died on a company site or on a company 
facility or as a result of a company's operations. Field part of Environmental, 
Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
FATALITIES_TOTAL 
Total number of employees and contractors who have died on a company 
site, at a company facility, or as a result of a company's operations. Field 
part of Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
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RD_EXPENDITURES_PER_CASH_FLOW 
Research and development (R&D) expenses divided by cash flow from 
operations. Calculated as:        R&D Expenses / Cash Flow from Operations        
Where:       R&D Expenditures is IS072, IS_RD_EXPEND       Cash from 
Operations is CF015, CF_CASH_FROM_OPER  
CO2_INTENSITY 
Tonnes of carbon dioxide emitted by the company per megawatt-hour of 
energy consumed. Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) 
group of fields.  
TOTAL_GHG_EMISSIONS 
Total Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions of the company, in thousands of 
metric tons. Greenhouse Gases are defined as those gases which contribute 
to the trapping of heat in the Earth's atmosphere and they include Carbon 
Dioxide (CO2), Methane, and Nitrous Oxide. Total GHG Emissions as 
defined in this field, equals the total of company Scope 1 and Scope 2 
emissions. It does not include Scope 3 emissions. Definition of Scope 3 
emissions remains subject to much interpretation and therefore there is 
significant variability in company reported data - this could cause undue 
variation in company Total GHG emissions figure. Emissions reported as 
CO2 only will NOT be captured in this field. Emissions reported as generic 
GHG emissions or CO2 equivalents (CO2e) will be captured in this field. 
Field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of 
fields.          Japan:     Data may be provided by CanPan.  
NOX_EMISSIONS 
Total amount of nitrogen oxide (NOx) emitted by the company, in thousands 
of metric tons. Field is part of the Environmental, Social or Governance 
(ESG) group of fields.    Japan:       Data may be provided by CanPan.         
For index tickers, total amount of NOx emitted by a power plant (in metric 
tons).  
SO2_EMISSIONS 
Total amount of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emitted by the company, in thousands 
of metric tons. Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) 
group of fields.  
VOC_EMISSIONS 
Total amount of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) emitted by the 
company, in thousands of metric tons. Field part of Environmental, Social or 
Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
PCT_WATER_RECYCLED 
Percentage of water usage from recycled sources. Field is part of the 
Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.    Japan:       
Data may be provided by CanPan.  
HAZARDOUS_WASTE 
Amount of hazardous waste the company discards, in thousands of metric 
tons. Field is part of the Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group 
of fields.    Japan:       Data may be provided by CanPan.  
WASTE_RECYCLED 
Total amount of waste the company recycles, in thousands of metric tons. 
Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
PCT_RECYCLED_MATERIALS 
Percentage of raw materials used from recycled sources. Field part of 
Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
WATER_PER_UNIT_OF_PROD 
Water consumed by the company per unit of production.  The unit of 
production depends on the company's activity.  For oil companies, this field 
reflects water consumption per barrel of oil, etc.  In liters. Field part of 
Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
WASTE_SENT_TO_LANDFILLS 
Amount of company waste sent to landfills, in thousands of metric tons.  This 
field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of 
fields.  
ENERGY_INTENSITY_PER_SALES 
Energy intensity calculated as megawatt hours of energy consumed per 
million of sales revenue in the company's reporting currency.  To compare 
companies around the world, this ratio should be converted to a common 
currency.  Ratio is calculated based on data items disclosed in company 
filings.  Calculated as:        Energy Consumption / Sales        Where:       
Energy Consumption is ES014, ENERGY_CONSUMPTION       Sales is 
IS010, SALES_REV_TURN        Field part of Environmental, Social or 
Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
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WATER_INTENSITY_PER_SALES 
Water intensity calculated as cubic meters of water consumed per million of 
sales revenue in the company's reporting currency.  To compare companies 
around the world, this ratio should be converted to a common currency.  
Ratio is calculated based on data items disclosed in company filings.  
Calculated as:        Water Consumption / Sales        Where:       Water 
Consumption is ES016, WATER_CONSUMPTION       Sales is IS010, 
SALES_REV_TURN        Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance 
(ESG) group of fields.  
WASTE_GENERATED_PER_SALES 
Waste generated per sales calculated as metric tons of waste, both 
hazardous and non-hazardous, per million of sales revenue in the 
company's reporting currency. To compare companies around the world, this 
ratio should be converted to a common currency. Ratio is calculated based 
on data items disclosed in company filings. Calculated as:        Total Waste / 
Sales        Where:    Total Waste is ES020, TOTAL_WASTE    Sales is 
IS010, SALES_REV_TURN        This field is part of the Environmental, 
Social and Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
INVESTMENTS_IN_SUSTAINABILITY 
Amount of money spent by the company, in millions, on environmental and 
social compliance and other company environmental and social initiatives, 
as defined by the company. Examples might include the amount invested in 
environmental remediation, pollution prevention, recycling, employee 
training, safety initiatives etc. Field is part of the Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
PERCENT_OF_DISCLOSURE 
Percentage of the company's operations that are covered in its disclosures 
on emissions.  A blank in this field indicates 100% of operations are covered. 
Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
ENVIRONMENTAL_ACCTG_COST 
Cost of environmental conservation and other environmental initiatives 
undertaken during the normal course of business as defined by the 
company. Examples might include the cost of environmental remediation, 
the cost of pollution prevention, the cost of R&D investment in solutions to 
environmental challenges/environmental product development, the cost of 
recycling, the cost of implementing an Environmental Management System 
etc. Field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group 
of fields.  
SRI_ASSETS_UNDER_MANAGEMENT 
Assets managed by the institution according to Socially Responsible 
Investing (SRI) standards. Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance 
(ESG) group of fields.  
CDP_REGULATORY_RISK_EXP_DES 
Further information explaining why the company does or does not believe to 
be exposed to climate change regulatory risk. The response is directly from 
the company's response to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 
questionnaire.  
CDP_PHYSICAL_RISK_EXP_DES 
Further information explaining why the company does or does not believe to 
be exposed to climate change physical risk. The response is directly from 
the company's response to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 
questionnaire.  
CDP_OTHER_RISK_EXP_DES 
Further information explaining why the company does or does not believe to 
be exposed to any other risk associated with climate change. The response 
is directly from the company's response to the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP) questionnaire.  
EM_ENERGY_REDUCTION_TARGET 
Indicates if the company has a specific emissions and or energy reduction 
target in place. The response is directly from the company's response to the 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) questionnaire.  
EM_ENERGY_REDUCTION_BENCHMARK 
Benchmark or key performance indicator that the company uses to assess 
progress against the emissions/energy reduction goals it has set. The 
response is directly from the company's response to the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP) questionnaire.  
EM_ENERGY_REDUCTION_COST_SAVINGS 
Amount of emissions reductions, energy savings, and associated cost 
savings that have been achieved to date as a result of the reduction plan. 
The response is directly from the company's response to the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) questionnaire.  
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SRI_ASSETS_%_TOTAL_AUM 
Percentage of firm's assets under management that are invested according 
to socially responsible (SRI) criteria.  Ratio is calculated based on data items 
disclosed in company filings.  Calculated as:        (SRI Assets Under 
Management / Total Assets Under Management)  * 100        Where:       SRI 
Assets Under Management is ES087, 
SRI_ASSETS_UNDER_MANAGEMENT       Total Assets Under 
Management is BS100, BS_ASSETS_UNDER_MGMT        This field is part 
of the Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields.  
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Part 3 
Epilogue 
By the end of this research, RI mainstreaming is ongoing, and so is the Delphi project. 
This epilogue aims to give a glimpse at three further developments in the project.  
After two years of deliberation, the time had come for Delphi to communicate its 
framework to the outside world. While the group was still debating the paradoxes inherent to its 
framework, it recognized the need to bring the framework out into the “public” -- which can be 
understood as other institutional investors, but also other people from within the organizations 
that the Delphi members belong to. This is perceived as a perilous exercise by the group, as it 
will be a public test of its legitimacy and validity, the outcome of which is unknown. We are 
typically in a situation of “dispute” as defined by Boltanski & Thévenot (2006), but with an 
added dimension of power games which exist between competitors as well as between 
departments in an organization. Starting in September, Delphi held a series of conference calls 
with “friends” of the project, to present the process and some parts of the framework. As for me, 
I presented the results of chapter 5 at conferences attended by academics and institutional 
investors alike. However, the framework itself, which was intended to be open-source, has not 
been put out in the public yet, creating anticipation as well as a bit of suspicion from potential 
users. It will be interesting to investigate the way in which the framework is adopted by 
practitioners once it is made public, and how the adoption of this tool, its evolution and its 
diffusion contribute to RI mainstreaming.  
A second development is that, after having rejected quantitative testing of its framework 
for a long time, Delphi decided that it was a desirable exercise after all. When the group received 
chapter 5’s quantitative study testing the framework, its members said they were not surprised. 
They said that the results were as they expected. In other words, the limited data availability, the 
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material metrics per sector and the lack of predictive power in the relationship corresponded to 
the collective beliefs. This development mirrors chapter 2’s results regarding the co-existence of 
logics of justification (referring to Boltanski and Thévenot’s principles of justification [1999]) 
and logics of action (defined as set of shared and regular ways of thinking and acting) which 
both influence our thoughts and behavior. With the framework, Delphi is re-inventing the objects 
and units of measurement according to which RI will be justified. With the quantitative testing, 
Delphi is justifying its tool in a way that is understood and accepted by the actors in the field, 
and by its members themselves. This illustrates interaction between justifying and practicing 
which plays a role in legitimizing RI. Further analysis should tell us more about this process. 
The third development is that Delphi started discussing possible collaborations with data 
providers. I attended calls between the Delphi project and Bloomberg during which each party 
explained their needs and constraints in terms of data. There was an opening towards potential 
collaborations regarding the selection of metrics, and the hosting of data. Data availability and 
data ownership are key issues in the financial field, as well as in RI. The major data players are 
large companies which Delphi, with its voluntary participation and absence of budget, can hardly 
compare to.  
These three developments confirm that the four different studies of this dissertation are 
intertwined, as the discourse, the tools and the practices all combine to support the aspiration of 
RI mainstreaming. The pluralistic methodology was needed to fully account for ongoing 
processes in the empirical context of RI mainstreaming. Furthermore, all three of these 
developments reintroduce power issues in the story of RI mainstreaming, which were ignored so 
far because of the “bubble of justice” that was created during the project, through mechanisms 
such as a Memorandums of Understanding. As a result, these developments are a welcome 
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opportunity to observe and study new dynamics in the challenges of responsible investment 
mainstreaming.  
6 Conclusion and discussion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis set out to explore the challenges of responsible investment mainstreaming. 
Analyzing discourse as well as practice, I have identified the beliefs, tensions and paradoxes 
inherent to this process, as well as the different periods RI went through, the coping mechanisms 
adopted by individuals and groups to address the tensions in RI, and the role of institutional 
investors and frameworks to practice RI. Most literature on RI and on the value of sustainability 
in general, adopts a neoclassical approach, with inconclusive results. By adopting a new 
theoretical perspective on ESG, including convention theory and paradox theory, this thesis 
sought to develop a nuanced, critical understanding of RI. Specifically, it sought to answer four 
questions:  
(1) “What are the collective beliefs for responsible investment and how have they 
evolved over time?” 
(2) “What are the disputes and resolutions around responsible investment’s 
mainstreaming?” 
(3) “What tensions are embedded in RI mainstreaming and through which arrangements 
are they coped with?”, and  
(4) “What are the ESG factors most relevant for a company’s market risk, depending on 
its sector?” 
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6.3 Synthesis and findings  
The main findings are chapter specific and were summarized within the respective 
chapters: collective beliefs on responsible investment in chapter 2; disputes and resolutions 
around responsible investment in chapter 3, a paradox perspective on responsible investment in 
chapter 4 and what factors matter most for market risk in chapter 5. This section will synthesize 
the findings to answer the study’s four research questions. 
In my first study, I focused on the content of collective beliefs through five periods of RI. 
The data revealed the existence of RI’s “civil rights” years (1982-1991), “green niche” years 
(1992-1997), “professionalization” years (1998-2000), “SRI” years (2001-2004) and “ESG” 
years (2005-ongoing). This study followed the evolution of multiple collective beliefs over time 
to identify two distinct categories of collective beliefs – justifying RI and practicing RI—that 
characterize how mainstream actors collectively make sense of RI. My analysis revealed that the 
RI collective beliefs currently (1) do not provide a favorable environment for RI mainstreaming 
and (2) need to be taken into account when discussing the value of sustainability.  
In my second study, I contributed to research on processes of legitimacy, using 
convention theory to understand ESG challenges. I showed that RI focuses on appealing to 
conventional finance with a market logic, resulting in very few challenges of the legitimacy of 
the existing institutional order. Indeed, by referring to the dominant worlds of worth, RI validates 
them and strengthens the existing compromise. This positions RI as the solution offered by 
financial markets to appease the critique, rather than as a critique of financial markets. However, 
RI does challenge the market logic from the inside, by questioning the common good within that 
world. As a result, it “purifies” finance, bringing it back to its foundations. It is in this way that 
RI might be making a difference and could contribute to society. The data also show the impact 
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of growing certification requirements which transform ESG investing, the mainstreamed version 
of RI, moving it away from an ecological product and from ecological discourse. In a few cases, 
RI seeks a resolution based on competing principles resulting in hybrid constructions of 
compromises, which could be consolidated by RI models and tools.  
My third study used RI as an empirical context and focused on processes to determine 
why RI is not yet mainstream. In it, I provided evidence of the variety of tensions present in the 
process of RI mainstreaming: multiple conventions, stability or transformation, judgment or 
metric, short or long term time horizon. I also provided evidence of the arrangements used to 
cope with the tensions in practice, both by the individuals and by the Delphi group, namely 
framing, shifting, transcending and defending the arrangement. I showed that while tensions are 
inherent in organizational systems, they are constructed as paradoxes by the actors involved with 
them. A duality of “contradictory, yet interrelated elements” (Smith & Lewis, 2011) is not a 
paradox if it is not acknowledged and treated as such by those subject to it. The logic in which 
the tension is approached (either/or, and/or, either/and) determines the nature of the tension. 
I completed my investigation with an empirical, data driven and investor-oriented chapter 
which focused on the link between sustainability and risk, measured by downside deviation. This 
chapter participates in the dominant academic discussion regarding responsible investment, 
namely does it add value. I focused on the link between ESG and risk, which is a recent addition 
to this discussion. I used a new ESG framework built by the investors I observed, to question 
what can be said about this link. A main finding is the difficult access to ESG data for 
institutional investors. ESG data is selectively available in a subjective way – which may be 
similar to the availability of financial data in the past, but does not correspond to data 
requirements of finance professionals today. The data suggests that ESG metrics matter for 
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market risk, particularly when measured by semi-deviation, but without any predictive power on 
the magnitude of future risk's reduction. When it comes to reducing financial risk, ESG exposure 
metrics (such as the existence of a health and safety policy, the existence of procedures to 
manage environmental footprint, or the exposure to climate change regulatory risks) matter, and 
not only ESG performance metrics. The most relevant factors to reduce a company’s market 
volatility vary from one industry to another. 
Together, these studies addressed the problems sketched in the introduction around the 
phenomenon of “RI mainstreaming”. Bringing the three conceptual pillars of beliefs, tensions 
and paradoxes together allows us to reconsider RI mainstreaming and suggest different qualities 
that could conceptualize this practitioner’s aspiration. Mainstreaming is to be understood as 
shared collective beliefs which enable effective coordination when assessing value. So one 
quality of mainstreaming is shared interpretation by the new actors of RI. Another quality of 
mainstreaming is stability, if, in mainstreaming, disputes are resolved by compromises which 
are stabilized in tools. Finally, another quality of mainstreaming could be plasticity, if the 
paradoxes are managed in an acceptable way, fluidly enough to adapt and evolve. These are 
some underlying ideals that investors hope to achieve behind their aspiration of RI 
mainstreaming. The shared interpretation, existence of tools and fluidity are not fully observed in 
practice, but are well under way. Interestingly, the last characteristic of plasticity means that 
solving the challenges of responsible investment is not an absolute condition for its 
mainstreaming. Indeed, the challenges identified are part of RI’s nature. 
6.4 Theoretical contribution 
The theoretical approaches for the value of sustainability, and in particular for 
responsible investment, need to be revisited in order to further understand the challenges of 
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responsible investment’s mainstreaming. As a step in that direction, this thesis has contributed to 
the existing understanding of some concepts investigated by the project.  
Throughout the four studies, I contributed to the understanding of responsible 
investment mainstreaming, as a concept. We saw that the number of collective beliefs around 
RI increased over time, meaning that constituents increasingly share common beliefs around this 
activity. The results also showed that the debate around RI has shifted from “What is RI” to 
“How to do RI”, highlighting the professionalization of the field. Indeed the questions of 
definition and justification disappear from the debate. But mainstreaming does not mean 
reducing ESG to a single number, the way accounting produces a single number with its ratios, 
and financial valuation produces a single price. And it doesn’t require every actor to use the 
same tools, but tools have to exist and be used by groups of actors who coordinate around them. 
The new focus on tools and processes is accompanied by an increasing number of forms of value 
co-existing in RI. A consequence of this multiplicity is that RI is viewed as a fragmented and 
possibly radically confused concept (Okoye, 2009).  
When it comes to RI mainstreaming, there is not much creation of novelty. For example, 
mainstreaming could still mean ESG comes as an afterthought, once financial analysis has been 
performed. RI mainstreaming is not a new paradigm for finance, but rather a shifting between 
different approaches to reconcile opposing objectives. Despite the absence of radical novelty, 
mainstreaming can have as a consequence bringing finance back to its fundamentals. Building on 
the findings of chapter 4, we may wonder if perhaps it is the lack of “shifting” -- meaning a 
constant bringing forth of first one and then the other side of the paradox at the right time and the 
right place -- which hinders the concept of RI. 
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In chapters 2, 3 and 5, I contribute to the concept of value, by demonstrating in each 
study that value is constructed, and that discourse plays an important role in how the property of 
value is designed into tools and processes. I apply the concept of convention to study the value 
attributed through price by a financial community, to contribute to the debate on how value is 
constructed. The market price doesn’t freely invent itself through disembodied negotiation 
between offer and demand as conventional economic theory would have us believe it. It is 
constructed by conventions, meaning there are additional variables for adjustment than just risk 
and return. 
A contribution of chapters 2 to 4 is that they shift attention back to dynamics of how 
multiple forms of value co-exist in the design of tools and processes. Convention theory has put 
a strong focus on multiple equilibriums, such as arrangements and compromises, whereas my 
studies indicate a constant, circular process allowing multiple dualities to coexist as valuable. My 
results add a dynamic perspective to convention theory’s framework by highlighting a possible 
shift back and forth between different equilibrium situations. Mainstreaming frames and 
reframes the ambiguous and polymorph concept of RI over time to avoid ‘conceptual closure’, 
on the one hand, and fragmentation, on the other (Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 2013). This 
switching of equilibriums is an interesting characteristic of RI, rendering it similar to mainstream 
finance. Indeed: the financial sphere, much like capitalism, has the quality of adapting constantly 
to critique, allowing it to survive through the tests it is subject to. The switching of equilibriums 
observed in the RI mainstreaming process point to a similar capacity to survive legitimacy tests 
by adapting to address the critiques.  
In my third study, I clarified the resolution of paradoxes. Most studies from a paradox 
perspective focus on outcomes. I put forth the view that paradox theory is in fact also a theory 
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about processes. The focus on typologies of paradoxes done in prior research (Smith & Lewis, 
2011) was a necessary first stage, but I suggest that the untapped essence of paradox theory lies 
in the dynamics of a paradoxical process. This study provided an additional argument to shift 
away from the debate on the financial contribution of RI, in order to focus on the nature and 
management of RI’s tensions. 
Finally, my different findings helped me support the proposition that the meso-level is 
the missing piece of the theoretical puzzle of RI. My research emphasized this meso-level, 
considering that value is created at the collective level, through coordination processes and 
collective beliefs. 
6.5 Managerial and policy implications 
This research has implications for ESG investors and other institutional investors, who 
will be interested in the slow legitimation and diffusion process of RI. I provide a longitudinal 
study of RI supported with empirical data, and distinguish five periods in the history of RI.  I 
show how each of the five periods is characterized by its own terminology for RI, particularly 
the later two in which the terms SRI and ESG were coined. With these results, I provide insight 
into the direction in which RI is evolving: towards a dominant market logic, with some influence 
of the industrial logic (labels and certifications are important) and of a civic logic (regulation is 
an important driver). 
Another implication for practitioners concerns how to change RI, how to advance its 
mainstreaming and legitimize it towards financial markets. Convention theorists put forward a 
taxonomy of four types of changes in conventions, from one equilibrium to another: general 
collapse, external invasion, translation and collective agreement (Boyer and Orléan, 1992). The 
last three are of particular interest for considering the adaptation of conventions that investment 
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professionals and their agents adhere to, since the industry is by nature conservative and mindful 
of fiduciary obligations to beneficiaries, making a slow process of change more likely than an 
abrupt abandonment or collapse of existing practices. The importance of legitimacy within the 
conventions framework also makes collective agreement, or collaboration, preferable to going 
alone. Our data show that these processes are taking place in the RI industry, embodied by tools 
for practicing RI. Accounting standard setters for nonfinancial information can deduct from my 
results the importance of their efforts to identify material indicators and metrics, to help investors 
focus on these rather than the plethora of less material or non-material information for ESG 
investments. Nonetheless, simplifying indicators and reducing their number does not mean that 
they can be aggregated in a way that is meaningful, let alone reduced to a single number. It may 
be interesting to ask what the conditions would be to reach one aggregate metric, a holy grail 
pursued by many practitioners (Young & Roberts, 2015). We observed the limited improvement 
in the availability of ESG data points over time. Paradoxes and multiple collective beliefs could 
account for this: leaving issues unclear and open can be helpful when many different interests 
collide. A hypothetical way out, resulting in an aggregate metric, would be to resolve the 
paradoxes, to address the issue as a dilemma and chose one “leg” of the paradox. If this is done 
for core characteristics of RI, we could obtain a single metric but at the cost of losing the essence 
of RI. 
For legislators, the lack of standardized data I highlighted is an issue to take into 
consideration. There is not much control on data availability for the moment. And it seems too 
early to impose specific metrics to report on, because these metrics have not been clearly 
identified yet, and their impact on risk and return has not been convincingly proven yet. In my 
analysis, I show that RI is a moving target. Which means that metrics and key performance 
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indicators for RI are also a moving target. In addition, the idea that objective metrics can be 
selected is utopic, from this thesis’ viewpoints. Indeed, RI is constructed and so are its KPIs. The 
role of legitimate actors who build frameworks is therefore crucial for legislators looking for 
KPIs. So is the level on which regulation takes place: a higher ESG factor level would be 
prefereable, rather than a granular metric level.  
Finally, this research also has implications for each of us as citizens of a financialized 
society. It can help us clarify our expectations towards RI, by showing that it is investor-centric 
and not radically different from mainstream finance. However, RI in its current version does 
challenge financial markets from the inside, by questioning the principles they are based on. 
6.6 Further research avenues 
The results put forth above lead to new routes of research, beyond the initial research 
questions, but still aligned with the objective of developing a nuanced, critical understanding of 
RI. I discuss below three avenues for further exploration that can advance the attainment of this 
goal.  
A first avenue is research on the impact of responsible investment. The definition of 
responsible investment evolved over time, from a variety of definitions focused on the means, 
like Kurtz14 in 2008 - to definitions of RI in terms of its contribution or impact, like Paetzold and 
Busch15 in 2014.  
This shift towards impact of RI resonates with the recent rise of impact investment, but 
also with the European Commission’s concern for impact assessment of investments, evidencing 
                                               
14
 “Socially responsible investment is the integration of environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues into 
mainstream finance.” (Kurtz, 2008) 
15
 “[RI is] variants of investment approaches that seek to contribute towards sustainable development, ethics and/or 
financial performance, and that do so through a focus on certain industries (e.g. renewable energy), the exclusion of 
specific activities (e.g. production of tobacco), or by considering environmental, social, and corporate governance 
(ESG) criteria.” (Paetzold & Busch, 2014) 
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the financialization of the European Commission’s approach. An avenue for further research is to 
study these impacts of RI using constructivist theoretical frameworks rather than the dominant 
positivist approach. It requires focusing more on the empirics, understanding the work of actors 
and how an ESG approach can change financial tools. 
A second avenue is research on the value of RI. I showed that even when studying 
sustainability, a topic linked to ethics and values, it is as if the debates are circumscribed within a 
single logic, the market one. Yet there is much ambivalence about turning unique qualities such 
as environmental friendliness, engagement, creativity, singularity, or mobility into one single-
minded metric of worth (Foucarde, 2011). Literature is moving from generic themes of return in 
the equity market to more specific themes such as sustainability in the real estate market or in 
mergers and acquisitions. One of the limits of these studies is determining what performance is 
being evaluated. Practitioners and academics alike talk about all sorts of value metrics. The 
majority of researchers analyze accounting return or equity market performance in terms of 
return at the firm level, using more rarely risk-adjusted return, or alpha estimates, or return at the 
portfolio level. Another limit is that they fail to consider important dimensions of value. The 
world is not limited to one form of value -- financial return -- and one form of metric -- market 
price -- as standard economic theory would have it (Vatin, 2013). In chapters 4 to 7, I gave 
evidence of the other important dimensions of value that co-exist. More work needs to be done to 
theorize how this co-existence occurs. A further question that could be addressed to research this 
issue is “How do multiple forms of value co-exist in the design of tools and processes?”  
A third focus of future research is on the important role of actors. With RI 
mainstreaming, two worlds are colliding. There may be two different types of asset managers: 
those who try to keep the opposing dimensions together, maintaining the paradox, and those who 
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try to keep them separate, resolving the paradox. A limit of this research is that it understudies 
the role of actors, due to the theoretical frameworks adopted. Indeed, the convention theory 
framework I adopted does not give explanatory power to the role of actors. To better understand 
RI mainstreaming, we should adopt a conceptual lens to focus on these different types of asset 
managers and how they understand financial valuation philosophically differently. In my case 
study, I was observing a group who wanted to make multiple forms of value co-exist. Focusing 
on actors also raises the question of who are the new actors who will shape the future of RI 
valuation. I hint at the role of individuals and interested parties such as asset managers and asset 
owners in shaping current conventions around the valuation of sustainability. In the history of RI, 
the arrival of a new dominant group of actors brought about new conventions. Religious actors 
once set the conventions for RI. And while religious norms are still important today, for example 
with Islamic finance, religious actors are no longer the dominant group of actors. They were 
replaced over time by institutional asset owners and asset managers who are now shaping new 
conventions, embodied by tools for RI. More data and research are needed to determine who are 
the new actors who will shape the future of RI with new collective beliefs. This focus on future 
actors naturally also leads to the issue of how we train future market participants, another key 
area for future research. 
6.7 Conclusion 
The significance of this thesis resides in the nuanced, critical approach it adopted to 
contribute to the body of knowledge on responsible investment. I showed how bringing beliefs, 
tensions and paradoxes into the discussion on the value of sustainability can advance research in 
that area. Indeed, what we have learned from the challenging process of RI mainstreaming goes 
beyond what financial return figures could tell us, and not just because of the added focus on 
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risk. We saw how RI evolved, to become today’s ESG investing, illustrating the becoming of 
things and the dominance of a market logic We saw how RI is not a radical alternative to 
conventional finance – it is in fact very similar to the market logic and strengthens its principles 
by limiting some of its most damaging consequences. We also saw how RI allows the 
coexistence of multiple forms of value. The lessons learned on how to manage this paradoxical 
situation are all the more relevant because of the many other paradoxical discourses and practices 
that characterize business and society.  
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